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living).2 If the cost of owner-occupied-housing services is proxied by mort-
gage interest expenses, then including that cost in a measure of inflation 
could mean, perversely, that a tighter monetary policy (a higher policy 
interest rate) causes a rise in measured inflation.3 The other main ratio-
nale for exclusion, evident in the Bank of Canada’s description of its core 
price index, is the elimination of highly volatile items from the inflation 
measure.4 This rationale, the reduction of volatility, will be my focus in 
this paper.
While PCE ex food and energy holds a special status as the core mea-
sure preferred by the Federal Reserve, the practices of other central banks 
make clear that there are alternatives to excluding all food and energy 
items (and only food and energy items). A look at disaggregated PCE 
data reveals that while food and energy items figure prominently among 
the components with the highest time series volatility, not all of the most 
volatile items are food or energy, and not all food and energy items rank 
among the most volatile.5 This fact suggests a closer examination of which 
items should be excluded if the aim is to produce an index with lower 
volatility than the headline index and still capture the longer-run trend in 
headline inflation.
In the next section, I begin the analysis by asking, simply, what are 
the most volatile items in the PCE? Rather than identifying the N most 
volatile items, for some N—à la the Bank of Canada’s core measure—I ask 
a somewhat different question. Food and energy make up roughly 20 per-
cent of the PCE by expenditure. What, then, are the most volatile items 
with aggregate weight of 20 percent? The list may be somewhat surpris-
ing. There are certainly plenty of food and energy items on the list but 
also computers, used autos, small electric appliances, women’s and girls’ 
clothing, airline services, and more. Also, many food items do not make 
the list—for example, cereals, bakery products, and “purchased meals: 
other than at schools,” which represents the price of meals at restaurants 
and bars. A common characteristic of food items not on the list (except 
for fish and seafood) is that they involve relatively more processing than 
raw items such as meats, eggs, fruits, and vegetables.
2 Inflation is commonly understood as a persistent and general increase in prices or an 
erosion of the purchasing power of a unit of money. More precise (and more operational) 
definitions are model-dependent. A cost of living index has a precise definition as the money 
cost to an economic unit (a household or individual) of maintaining a given level of well-
being in the face of changing prices. Astin (1999), in discussing the challenges of constructing 
harmonized inflation indexes for the euro area, provides a nice discussion of the different ends 
for which price indexes are constructed.
3 As stated on the Riksbank website (www.riksbank.com/templates/Page.aspx?id=10578), 
“Households’ mortgage interest expenditure is excluded more for reasons of clarity. It may in some 
cases be problematic for the Riksbank to explain why the immediate effect of a tighter monetary 
policy is that CPI inflation rises.”
4 Coincidentally, mortgage interest cost is also among the eight most volatile items 
excluded in the Bank of Canada’s core measure.
5 Bryan and Cecchetti (1994) make a similar point in reference to the exclusion of the 
component “food away from home” from CPI ex food and energy.
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xclusion-based measures of core inflation—the traditional “inflation 
ex…” measures—have a long history. The Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(BLS) produced versions of the Consumer Price Index (CPI) excluding 
food and excluding shelter at least since the late 1950s, when those series 
first appeared in the annual Economic Report of the President. “CPI ex 
food and energy”—now taken almost synonymously with core inflation—
made its first appearance in the report in 1980. Many national statistical 
agencies produce inflation measures of this sort, and many central banks 
refer to these measures as guides for monetary policy.
For example, from 2004 to 2007, the Federal Reserve cast the inflation 
forecasts in its semiannual reports to Congress in terms of the price index 
for personal consumption expenditures (PCE) excluding food and energy; 
since 2008, the Fed has released forecasts for both headline PCE and PCE 
excluding food and energy. While “ex food and energy” seems to be the 
most common exclusion-based measure, others are in use. The Sveriges 
Riksbank refers in its public communications to a measure of consumer 
price inflation excluding mortgage interest costs and energy, while the 
Bank of Canada uses a CPI excluding the eight most volatile items as an 
operational guide for monetary policy.
Academic interest in exclusion-based core inflation measures began 
with Blinder (1982), who used them to analyze the high rates of infla-
tion experienced in the United States in the 1970s. In the 27 years since 
Blinder’s work, a number of alternative, nonexclusion-based measures of 
core inflation have been proposed. Silver (2007) provides a nice survey of 
this growing literature. Rich and Steindel (2007) present a comprehensive 
“horse race” among competing core inflation measures. Despite the pro-
liferation of alternative core inflation measures, exclusion-based measures 
appear to remain the most popular among policymakers, judging by the 
number of central banks that make some reference to exclusion-based core 
measures.1
In the core measures adopted by the Riksbank and the Bank of Cana-
da, the main rationales are evident for the exclusion of certain items from 
a measure of inflation. One is that the prices of some items, such as the 
service flow from owner-occupied housing, are difficult to measure. It is 
unclear whether proxies for those prices—or even the prices themselves—
convey useful information about inflation (as distinct from the cost of 
1 A comprehensive list would include not just the Federal Reserve, Sveriges Riksbank and 
Bank of Canada but also the European Central Bank, the Bank of Japan, the Reserve Bank 
of Australia, and the Reserve Bank of New Zealand. Some central banks make reference in 
their public statements to measures of core inflation in addition to exclusion-based measures, 
but I know of none that reference a nonexclusion-based measure without also referencing 
an exclusion-based measure. The Bank of England is alone among major central banks in 
making no references to core inflation in its public statements.
M
onetary authorities all over the globe must be constantly alert to
the impact their decisions have on in￿ ation expectations in the long
run. That is particularly true at times when monetary policy signi￿cantly
departs from a pattern well understood by the markets. It is at those
times that central bankers, aware of the time inconsistency problem ￿rst
pointed out by Kydland and Prescott (1977), may be duly concerned with
the possibility that an unusually accommodative monetary policy stance
will be interpreted not as a temporary deviation from business as usual,
perhaps warranted by extenuating economic or ￿nancial circumstances, but
as a switch to a higher-in￿ ation regime.
In fact, Clarida, Gal￿, and Gertler (2000) have argued that the main
reason for the escalation of in￿ ation rates in the U.S. between the mid-1960s
and the beginning of the 1980s was that policymakers at the time didn￿ t pay
enough attention to then-rising in￿ ation expectations and therefore failed
to set policy instruments at the level required by the Federal Reserve￿ s
price stability mandate. After the appointment of Paul Volcker as Fed
chairman, that changed and U.S. monetary policy took a more proactive
stance, with the Fed decisively raising nominal short-term interest rates in
response to higher expected in￿ ation. Having learned from past mistakes,
central bankers are always on the lookout for reliable long-run in￿ ation-
expectations indicators to guide their policy decisions.
One such popular indicator often reported by central banks and ￿-
nancial institutions is derived from the so-called forward rates implied by
government bond yields (Figure 1).
According to the plots, long-run in￿ ation expectations steadily rose in
the U.K. between the fourth quarter of 2001 and third quarter of 2008,
only to abruptly turn down almost 0.6 percentage point in the last quarter
of 2008, when the local economy started to feel the e⁄ects of an unprece-















































living).2 If the cost of owner-occupied-housing services is proxied by mort-
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excluded in the Bank of Canada’s core measure.
5 Bryan and Cecchetti (1994) make a similar point in reference to the exclusion of the 
component “food away from home” from CPI ex food and energy.
institutions in that country as well as on the other side of the Atlantic.
In the U.S., the same indicator had been zigzagging in no de￿nite direc-
tion, occasionally displaying large variations in a relatively short period of
time. Examples include the 0.4 percentage-point increase that took place
between the second and third quarter of 2003, and the 0.3 percentage-point
decline observed shortly after the collapse of Lehman Brothers, between
the fourth quarter of 2008 and ￿rst quarter of 2009.
Can in￿ ation expectations move up and down so much in a few quar-
ters in two countries with long histories of relatively low and stable in￿ a-
tion? Could it be that the indicator in Figure 1 is measuring not what is
intended￿ ￿ uctuations in long-run in￿ ation expectations￿ but rather ￿ uc-
tuations in something else? The question is the subject of this article.
To provide a fair account of the answers that have been given to that
question, the article will explore the possibility that the ￿something else￿
behind the ￿ uctuations in this popular in￿ ation-expectations indicator is
time-varying risk premia, one of the many components that determine the
path of interest rates over time. These premia are the channels through
which the risk pro￿le of di⁄erent types of assets is re￿ ected in their prices
and returns. Loosely speaking, investors will be willing to hold in their
portfolios an asset with an uncertain payo⁄ only if it pays a higher rate
of return￿ that is, a risk premium￿ over and above that paid by an asset
with the same average but sure payo⁄. Whether or not those risk premia
are constant or move over time turns out to have potentially important
implications for the ability of asset-pricing models to match the observed
volatility of speci￿c asset prices or of long-run in￿ ation-expectations indi-
cators like the one in Figure 1.
In particular, the speculation that time-varying risk premia may be
responsible for most of the ￿ uctuations exhibited by in￿ ation-expectations
indicators constructed from government bond prices had been con￿ned
mostly to academic circles until former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan
Greenspan mentioned that possibility in his monetary policy testimony
before Congress in July 2005 (Greenspan, 2005a).1 He pointed to time-
varying risk premia as the main suspect for what he had referred to in
his February 2005 testimony (Greenspan, 2005b) as a ￿conundrum￿ ￿ the
allegedly puzzling insensitivity that long-term nominal interest rates were
exhibiting then to the monetary policy tightening cycle under way, in sharp
contrast with previous experiences during such cycles.2
Although Greenspan￿ s remarks elevated time-varying risk premia to
the category of plausible explanation for the conundrum, the quantitative
importance of those premia in accounting for the dynamics of government
bond prices and associated interest rates at di⁄erent maturities remains a
matter of controversy. Cochrane (2007), for example, pointed out alterna-
tive explanations for the conundrum that don￿ t involve time-varying risk
premia.
In any case, this continues to be an active area of research with impor-
1See, for example, Fama (1990) and Mishkin (1990).
2See Rudebusch, Sack, and Swanson (2007) and Backus and Wright (2007) for
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this growing literature. Rich and Steindel (2007) present a comprehensive 
“horse race” among competing core inflation measures. Despite the pro-
liferation of alternative core inflation measures, exclusion-based measures 
appear to remain the most popular among policymakers, judging by the 
number of central banks that make some reference to exclusion-based core 
measures.1
In the core measures adopted by the Riksbank and the Bank of Cana-
da, the main rationales are evident for the exclusion of certain items from 
a measure of inflation. One is that the prices of some items, such as the 
service flow from owner-occupied housing, are difficult to measure. It is 
unclear whether proxies for those prices—or even the prices themselves—
convey useful information about inflation (as distinct from the cost of 
1 A comprehensive list would include not just the Federal Reserve, Sveriges Riksbank and 
Bank of Canada but also the European Central Bank, the Bank of Japan, the Reserve Bank 
of Australia, and the Reserve Bank of New Zealand. Some central banks make reference in 
their public statements to measures of core inflation in addition to exclusion-based measures, 
but I know of none that reference a nonexclusion-based measure without also referencing 
an exclusion-based measure. The Bank of England is alone among major central banks in 
making no references to core inflation in its public statements.
tant implications for the correct interpretation of in￿ ation-expectations
indicators constructed with the forward rates technique. In particular,
owing to the empirically pervasive presence of time-varying risk premia,
such widely followed indicators may provide false signals and suggest that
long-run in￿ ation expectations have become unanchored when, in fact,
they may remain ￿rmly anchored at the implicit or explicit in￿ ation rate
targeted by the monetary authority. The precise source of this potential
confusion can be appreciated only with a thorough understanding of the
theoretical underpinnings of that class of indicators. To that end, this arti-
cle derives forward-rates-based in￿ ation-expectations indicators from basic
asset-pricing principles and examines their quantitative performance under
empirically plausible time-varying risk premia, always within the tractable
analytical framework o⁄ered by the so-called a¢ ne factor models widely
used in the ￿nancial literature.
The following is a more detailed road map to the rest of this docu-
ment: Section 1 presents a nontechnical overview of the approach behind
the construction of long-run in￿ ation-expectations indicators and discusses
the important role that a theory known as the expectations hypothesis
plays in their interpretation. Section 2 identi￿es the relevant assets for the
subject of this article￿ zero-coupon government bonds￿ and addresses the
problem of valuing them with the same basic asset-pricing principles used
for any security. This discussion leads almost naturally to the theoretical
construct of a¢ ne factor models of the term structure of interest rates,
which are widely used in the literature for their analytical and computa-
tional tractability. Section 3 studies how that class of models can conve-
niently break down government bond prices into di⁄erent components￿
those capturing long-term in￿ ation expectations and those capturing risk
premia￿ and the implications of di⁄erent assumptions about the nature of
the latter for the reliability of in￿ ation-expectations indicators constructed
from forward rates. The constant risk premia case is examined ￿rst with
a simple, easy-to-follow one-factor model. The time-varying risk premia
case is studied subsequently with a more sophisticated, not-so-easy-to-
follow three-factor model that can distinguish between real and nominal
variables and, therefore, rationalize the nominal￿ real forward-rate-spread
formula that is behind the calculations used to produce popular in￿ ation-
expectations indicators like the one in Figure 1. Section 4 assesses the
extent to which such indicators measure what is intended￿ the evolution
of long-run in￿ ation expectations over time.
1. THE YIELD CURVE AND THE EXPECTATIONS HYPOTHESIS
As hinted at in the introduction, the main inputs in the construction of
long-run in￿ ation-expectations indicators are government bond yields and
their term structure, known as the yield curve. The yield curve is a plot of
the rates of return (nominal or real, as the case may be) on zero-coupon
government bonds of di⁄erent maturities (that is, bonds that do not pay
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volatile items are food or energy, and not all food and energy items rank 
among the most volatile.5 This fact suggests a closer examination of which 
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volatile items, for some N—à la the Bank of Canada’s core measure—I ask 
a somewhat different question. Food and energy make up roughly 20 per-
cent of the PCE by expenditure. What, then, are the most volatile items 
with aggregate weight of 20 percent? The list may be somewhat surpris-
ing. There are certainly plenty of food and energy items on the list but 
also computers, used autos, small electric appliances, women’s and girls’ 
clothing, airline services, and more. Also, many food items do not make 
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other than at schools,” which represents the price of meals at restaurants 
and bars. A common characteristic of food items not on the list (except 
for fish and seafood) is that they involve relatively more processing than 
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2 Inflation is commonly understood as a persistent and general increase in prices or an 
erosion of the purchasing power of a unit of money. More precise (and more operational) 
definitions are model-dependent. A cost of living index has a precise definition as the money 
cost to an economic unit (a household or individual) of maintaining a given level of well-
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for which price indexes are constructed.
3 As stated on the Riksbank website (www.riksbank.com/templates/Page.aspx?id=10578), 
“Households’ mortgage interest expenditure is excluded more for reasons of clarity. It may in some 
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excluded in the Bank of Canada’s core measure.
5 Bryan and Cecchetti (1994) make a similar point in reference to the exclusion of the 
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Understanding the forces that drive bond yields may also require know-
ing their time-series properties; that is, the behavior of a given maturity
throughout time, as seen in Figure 3. Notice that slicing the graph with
a cut parallel to the horizontal axis going away from the reader produces
the cross-section, or yield curve, plotted for the three periods in Figure 2.
Two empirical features stand out in Figure 3: 1) The yield curve seems to
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most common exclusion-based measure, others are in use. The Sveriges 
Riksbank refers in its public communications to a measure of consumer 
price inflation excluding mortgage interest costs and energy, while the 
Bank of Canada uses a CPI excluding the eight most volatile items as an 
operational guide for monetary policy.
Academic interest in exclusion-based core inflation measures began 
with Blinder (1982), who used them to analyze the high rates of infla-
tion experienced in the United States in the 1970s. In the 27 years since 
Blinder’s work, a number of alternative, nonexclusion-based measures of 
core inflation have been proposed. Silver (2007) provides a nice survey of 
this growing literature. Rich and Steindel (2007) present a comprehensive 
“horse race” among competing core inflation measures. Despite the pro-
liferation of alternative core inflation measures, exclusion-based measures 
appear to remain the most popular among policymakers, judging by the 
number of central banks that make some reference to exclusion-based core 
measures.1
In the core measures adopted by the Riksbank and the Bank of Cana-
da, the main rationales are evident for the exclusion of certain items from 
a measure of inflation. One is that the prices of some items, such as the 
service flow from owner-occupied housing, are difficult to measure. It is 
unclear whether proxies for those prices—or even the prices themselves—
convey useful information about inflation (as distinct from the cost of 
1 A comprehensive list would include not just the Federal Reserve, Sveriges Riksbank and 
Bank of Canada but also the European Central Bank, the Bank of Japan, the Reserve Bank 
of Australia, and the Reserve Bank of New Zealand. Some central banks make reference in 
their public statements to measures of core inflation in addition to exclusion-based measures, 
but I know of none that reference a nonexclusion-based measure without also referencing 
an exclusion-based measure. The Bank of England is alone among major central banks in 
making no references to core inflation in its public statements.
The signi￿cance of the cross-section and time-series properties of gov-
ernment bond yields is that they might contain valuable information re-
garding long-run in￿ ation expectations. Nonexperts might ￿nd helpful at
this point an overview of the di¢ cult art of extracting that information
with the class of indicators that is the focus of this article￿ those that ex-
ploit price di⁄erentials between government bonds of di⁄erent maturities.
The basic idea behind those indicators is that, under certain conditions
discussed later, the typical nominal interest rate of the term structure can








real interest rate short-term dynamics
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in￿ ation risk premium
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t denotes the nominal interest rate contracted at time t on a
nominal ￿nancial claim with an expiration date n periods ahead.
Expression (1) is a highly stylized version of the rigorous one that will
be derived in the section titled ￿A One-Factor Model of the Yield Curve￿
on page 14, which highlights that the nominal interest rates on government
bonds, or nominal yields, studied in this article are typically made up of
six components:
￿ one that captures the in￿ ation rate expected in the long run,
￿ one that captures the real interest rate expected in the long run,
￿ two that capture the short-term dynamics of the two variables mentioned
above (possibly di⁄erent for each maturity), and
￿ two more in the last line that correspond to in￿ ation and real interest
rate risk premia (also possibly di⁄erent for each maturity) whose exact
nature and interpretation are discussed at length in this paper.
This representation of nominal government bond yields readily sug-
gests the general approach behind the di⁄erent methods that have been
proposed to elicit long-run in￿ ation expectations from the yield curve: to
infer in every period the components other than the ￿rst in (1) from the
distinct bits of information about them contained in each of the interest
rates in the yield curve and then subtract those components from some ap-
propriately chosen nominal yield or derivative of it to obtain the long-run
in￿ ation-expectations component as a residual. This is exactly what the
forward rates in￿ ation-expectations indicator plotted in Figure 1 tries to
accomplish in a clever way that will be discussed in ￿The Nominal￿ Real
Forward Rate Spread and Its Components￿on page 32.
However, as is often the case with concepts that appear good on paper,
the actual implementation of the residual method just outlined for the
calculation of in￿ ation-expectations indicators must overcome a number of















































living).2 If the cost of owner-occupied-housing services is proxied by mort-
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headline inflation.
In the next section, I begin the analysis by asking, simply, what are 
the most volatile items in the PCE? Rather than identifying the N most 
volatile items, for some N—à la the Bank of Canada’s core measure—I ask 
a somewhat different question. Food and energy make up roughly 20 per-
cent of the PCE by expenditure. What, then, are the most volatile items 
with aggregate weight of 20 percent? The list may be somewhat surpris-
ing. There are certainly plenty of food and energy items on the list but 
also computers, used autos, small electric appliances, women’s and girls’ 
clothing, airline services, and more. Also, many food items do not make 
the list—for example, cereals, bakery products, and “purchased meals: 
other than at schools,” which represents the price of meals at restaurants 
and bars. A common characteristic of food items not on the list (except 
for fish and seafood) is that they involve relatively more processing than 
raw items such as meats, eggs, fruits, and vegetables.
2 Inflation is commonly understood as a persistent and general increase in prices or an 
erosion of the purchasing power of a unit of money. More precise (and more operational) 
definitions are model-dependent. A cost of living index has a precise definition as the money 
cost to an economic unit (a household or individual) of maintaining a given level of well-
being in the face of changing prices. Astin (1999), in discussing the challenges of constructing 
harmonized inflation indexes for the euro area, provides a nice discussion of the different ends 
for which price indexes are constructed.
3 As stated on the Riksbank website (www.riksbank.com/templates/Page.aspx?id=10578), 
“Households’ mortgage interest expenditure is excluded more for reasons of clarity. It may in some 
cases be problematic for the Riksbank to explain why the immediate effect of a tighter monetary 
policy is that CPI inflation rises.”
4 Coincidentally, mortgage interest cost is also among the eight most volatile items 
excluded in the Bank of Canada’s core measure.
5 Bryan and Cecchetti (1994) make a similar point in reference to the exclusion of the 
component “food away from home” from CPI ex food and energy.
is whether the risk premia components of nominal interest rates vary over
time.
Until recently, the expectation hypothesis had ruled out time-varying
risk premia as a potential source of the ￿ uctuations typically exhibited
by in￿ ation-expectation indicators. The hypothesis, once widely accepted
and formally discussed in ￿Risk Premia Components and the Expectations
Hypothesis￿on page 20, maintains that the risk premia in the last line of (1)
are some constant, albeit possibly di⁄erent for each maturity. Given that
those components of the interest rate don￿ t move over time, the argument
goes, they could not account for relatively large variations in in￿ ation-
expectations indicators such as those plotted in Figure 1.
However, as pointed out by Backus and Wright (2007), a large number
of empirical studies have con￿rmed the early ￿nding by Macaulay (1938)
that the expectations hypothesis doesn￿ t o⁄er a realistic description of in-
terest rate dynamics in general and of government bond yields in particular,
inclining the balance in favor of the view that the risk premia components
of the yield curve exhibit substantial variations over time.3 As discussed in
this article, the consequences of that alternative assumption can be quite
dramatic for the reliability of in￿ ation-expectations indicators because they
can give the impression, as the one in Figure 1 does, that long-run in￿ ation
expectations shifted quite a bit over a certain period when, in fact, they
may have been ￿rmly anchored all the time at the long-run in￿ ation rate
targeted by the monetary authority.
Before getting any deeper into the subject, however, it is necessary
to introduce some notation and concepts involved in pricing government
bonds, the main input in the construction of many of the in￿ ation-ex-
pectations indicators proposed in the literature.
2. GOVERNMENT BOND PRICES AND YIELDS
Notation Preliminaries
As mentioned in the previous section, the construction of in￿ ation-
expectations indicators exploits heavily the information contained in the
term structure of government bond yields; that is, in the price di⁄erential
between bonds that di⁄er just in their maturity. In practice, however, gov-
ernment bonds di⁄er also in the amount and timing of interest payments.
To get around this problem and make government bonds issued in di⁄erent
conditions comparable to each other, their prices are typically calculated
in terms of their zero-coupon equivalent.
A zero-coupon bond is a special kind of security, one that pays no
interest or dividends until expiration, at which time investors receive just
the face value of the security. For example, a thirty-years-to-maturity zero-
coupon government bond with a $1 face value will pay investors $1 thirty
years later and nothing in between (therein the zero-coupon terminology).
Since under most circumstances comparable investment options carry a
strictly positive nominal interest rate, investors will not buy zero-coupon
bonds unless they sell for less than their face value; that is, at a discount.
3See Stambaugh (1988), Cook and Hahn (1990), Campbell and Shiller (1991),
















































xclusion-based measures of core inflation—the traditional “inflation 
ex…” measures—have a long history. The Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(BLS) produced versions of the Consumer Price Index (CPI) excluding 
food and excluding shelter at least since the late 1950s, when those series 
first appeared in the annual Economic Report of the President. “CPI ex 
food and energy”—now taken almost synonymously with core inflation—
made its first appearance in the report in 1980. Many national statistical 
agencies produce inflation measures of this sort, and many central banks 
refer to these measures as guides for monetary policy.
For example, from 2004 to 2007, the Federal Reserve cast the inflation 
forecasts in its semiannual reports to Congress in terms of the price index 
for personal consumption expenditures (PCE) excluding food and energy; 
since 2008, the Fed has released forecasts for both headline PCE and PCE 
excluding food and energy. While “ex food and energy” seems to be the 
most common exclusion-based measure, others are in use. The Sveriges 
Riksbank refers in its public communications to a measure of consumer 
price inflation excluding mortgage interest costs and energy, while the 
Bank of Canada uses a CPI excluding the eight most volatile items as an 
operational guide for monetary policy.
Academic interest in exclusion-based core inflation measures began 
with Blinder (1982), who used them to analyze the high rates of infla-
tion experienced in the United States in the 1970s. In the 27 years since 
Blinder’s work, a number of alternative, nonexclusion-based measures of 
core inflation have been proposed. Silver (2007) provides a nice survey of 
this growing literature. Rich and Steindel (2007) present a comprehensive 
“horse race” among competing core inflation measures. Despite the pro-
liferation of alternative core inflation measures, exclusion-based measures 
appear to remain the most popular among policymakers, judging by the 
number of central banks that make some reference to exclusion-based core 
measures.1
In the core measures adopted by the Riksbank and the Bank of Cana-
da, the main rationales are evident for the exclusion of certain items from 
a measure of inflation. One is that the prices of some items, such as the 
service flow from owner-occupied housing, are difficult to measure. It is 
unclear whether proxies for those prices—or even the prices themselves—
convey useful information about inflation (as distinct from the cost of 
1 A comprehensive list would include not just the Federal Reserve, Sveriges Riksbank and 
Bank of Canada but also the European Central Bank, the Bank of Japan, the Reserve Bank 
of Australia, and the Reserve Bank of New Zealand. Some central banks make reference in 
their public statements to measures of core inflation in addition to exclusion-based measures, 
but I know of none that reference a nonexclusion-based measure without also referencing 
an exclusion-based measure. The Bank of England is alone among major central banks in 
making no references to core inflation in its public statements.
To make this point more concrete, suppose that an investor knows
with perfect certainty that annual interest rates will be 5 percent for the
next thirty years. This investor will be willing to buy the thirty-year zero-
coupon government bond at the price $ 1
(1+ 5
100)30; that is, at a price of
about 23 cents.4
Thus, the price of a thirty-year zero-coupon government bond is linked











t is the price of the bond and Y
(30)
t the underlying gross an-
nual rate of return, or yield (equal to 1.05 in the example above). The
superscripts in parenthesis should not be interpreted as mathematical ex-
ponentiation but simply as tags identifying the time to maturity of a bond
originally issued at time t.
The above identity implies that the annual yield of an n period zero-











Because formula (2) holds for any government bond price, it is an
identity, not a theory of the ultimate determinants of government bond
prices. Such a theory is the topic of the next section.
The Pricing Kernel and the Valuation of Government Bonds
Given that government bonds are securities, it seems only natural that
any theory of government bond prices should start by imposing the require-















t is the price of any given security or asset i at time t, x
(i)
t+1 is
the stochastic stream of dividends or interest payments that the security
or asset will generate at t + 1, mt+1 is a stochastic discount factor that
converts t+1 payo⁄s into time t-equivalent values, and Et is the conditional
expectations operator that ￿instructs￿investors to take the average over
all possible joint realizations of the terms within brackets in period t + 1,
conditional on events observed up to time t. The presence of the word
4Notice that if the investor pays 23 cents for that bond today, he will be paid $1
when the bond matures thirty years later, which implies that the original investment
will have grown by the factor [(1+ 5
100)]30, exactly the same as if he had invested the 23
















































living).2 If the cost of owner-occupied-housing services is proxied by mort-
gage interest expenses, then including that cost in a measure of inflation 
could mean, perversely, that a tighter monetary policy (a higher policy 
interest rate) causes a rise in measured inflation.3 The other main ratio-
nale for exclusion, evident in the Bank of Canada’s description of its core 
price index, is the elimination of highly volatile items from the inflation 
measure.4 This rationale, the reduction of volatility, will be my focus in 
this paper.
While PCE ex food and energy holds a special status as the core mea-
sure preferred by the Federal Reserve, the practices of other central banks 
make clear that there are alternatives to excluding all food and energy 
items (and only food and energy items). A look at disaggregated PCE 
data reveals that while food and energy items figure prominently among 
the components with the highest time series volatility, not all of the most 
volatile items are food or energy, and not all food and energy items rank 
among the most volatile.5 This fact suggests a closer examination of which 
items should be excluded if the aim is to produce an index with lower 
volatility than the headline index and still capture the longer-run trend in 
headline inflation.
In the next section, I begin the analysis by asking, simply, what are 
the most volatile items in the PCE? Rather than identifying the N most 
volatile items, for some N—à la the Bank of Canada’s core measure—I ask 
a somewhat different question. Food and energy make up roughly 20 per-
cent of the PCE by expenditure. What, then, are the most volatile items 
with aggregate weight of 20 percent? The list may be somewhat surpris-
ing. There are certainly plenty of food and energy items on the list but 
also computers, used autos, small electric appliances, women’s and girls’ 
clothing, airline services, and more. Also, many food items do not make 
the list—for example, cereals, bakery products, and “purchased meals: 
other than at schools,” which represents the price of meals at restaurants 
and bars. A common characteristic of food items not on the list (except 
for fish and seafood) is that they involve relatively more processing than 
raw items such as meats, eggs, fruits, and vegetables.
2 Inflation is commonly understood as a persistent and general increase in prices or an 
erosion of the purchasing power of a unit of money. More precise (and more operational) 
definitions are model-dependent. A cost of living index has a precise definition as the money 
cost to an economic unit (a household or individual) of maintaining a given level of well-
being in the face of changing prices. Astin (1999), in discussing the challenges of constructing 
harmonized inflation indexes for the euro area, provides a nice discussion of the different ends 
for which price indexes are constructed.
3 As stated on the Riksbank website (www.riksbank.com/templates/Page.aspx?id=10578), 
“Households’ mortgage interest expenditure is excluded more for reasons of clarity. It may in some 
cases be problematic for the Riksbank to explain why the immediate effect of a tighter monetary 
policy is that CPI inflation rises.”
4 Coincidentally, mortgage interest cost is also among the eight most volatile items 
excluded in the Bank of Canada’s core measure.
5 Bryan and Cecchetti (1994) make a similar point in reference to the exclusion of the 
component “food away from home” from CPI ex food and energy.
factor may be a source of ambiguities later in this article, so the stochastic
discount factor mt+1 will be referred to hereafter as the pricing kernel.5
Because zero-coupon bonds do not pay interest, xt+1 in formula (4) is











Again, the superscript on Pt does not denote an exponentiation op-
erator but is simply a label that keeps track of the years left to maturity
of a bond issued in a given period t. Thus, the notation P
(n￿1)
t+1 on the
right-hand side of (5) denotes the price at time t + 1 of a zero-coupon
n-period bond originally issued at time t, which will mature and pay its
$1 face value n ￿ 1 periods later. Alternatively, the notation identi￿es a
newly issued bond at time t + 1 with maturity (n ￿ 1) periods later.
It is intuitively appealing to postulate that the price of those two equiv-
alent bonds should be the same. Otherwise, investors would buy only the
cheaper version of two bonds that pay the same amount at the same time,
$1 at time n￿1. As rigorously demonstrated in ￿nance theory, the equal-
ity of two payo⁄-equivalent securities or bonds is guaranteed by imposing
the no-arbitrage condition, which is satis￿ed if and only if the pricing ker-
nel mt+1 is strictly positive in all contingencies; that is, mt+1 (s) > 0 for
all s, where s identi￿es all possible contingencies that can materialize af-
ter time t. Following standard practice in the literature, this no-arbitrage
condition will be imposed throughout the article by working with strictly
positive pricing kernels.
Although the imposition of the no-arbitrage condition turns the asset-
pricing formula (5) into a theory, in the sense that it would be falsi￿able if it
turned out that observed prices do give rise to arbitrage opportunities, it is
not yet a very useful model of government bond prices because the pricing
kernel mt+1 is not observable. While it is fairly easy to get historical
records of government bond prices, there are no statistics reporting the
sequence of values for mt+1 underlying those prices.
Rendering the theoretical government bond pricing equation (5) opera-
tional requires linking the unobservable pricing kernel mt+1 to observables
such as the payo⁄s and prices of the securities under study, and even to
macroeconomic variables such as aggregate consumption. Historically, this
task has been accomplished with two di⁄erent approaches: 1) a reverse-
engineering approach, which tries to infer from the observed prices of the
class of securities under study the pricing kernel underlying their valua-
tions, and 2) a straight-engineering approach, which infers from theoret-
5The motivation for this alternative term widely used in the literature is that,
according to equation (4), all asset prices grow, as it were, out of the same seed or
kernel mt+1. The term kernel has been long used in mathematics in the context of
integral operators. The quali￿er pricing has been added in ￿nance to indicate the fact
that the basic asset-pricing formula (4) is a particular incarnation of an integral equation
(as captured by the expectations operator E), solved by ￿nding the function or kernel
mt+1 that recovers in the left-hand side, for each asset under study, the same price

















































xclusion-based measures of core inflation—the traditional “inflation 
ex…” measures—have a long history. The Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(BLS) produced versions of the Consumer Price Index (CPI) excluding 
food and excluding shelter at least since the late 1950s, when those series 
first appeared in the annual Economic Report of the President. “CPI ex 
food and energy”—now taken almost synonymously with core inflation—
made its first appearance in the report in 1980. Many national statistical 
agencies produce inflation measures of this sort, and many central banks 
refer to these measures as guides for monetary policy.
For example, from 2004 to 2007, the Federal Reserve cast the inflation 
forecasts in its semiannual reports to Congress in terms of the price index 
for personal consumption expenditures (PCE) excluding food and energy; 
since 2008, the Fed has released forecasts for both headline PCE and PCE 
excluding food and energy. While “ex food and energy” seems to be the 
most common exclusion-based measure, others are in use. The Sveriges 
Riksbank refers in its public communications to a measure of consumer 
price inflation excluding mortgage interest costs and energy, while the 
Bank of Canada uses a CPI excluding the eight most volatile items as an 
operational guide for monetary policy.
Academic interest in exclusion-based core inflation measures began 
with Blinder (1982), who used them to analyze the high rates of infla-
tion experienced in the United States in the 1970s. In the 27 years since 
Blinder’s work, a number of alternative, nonexclusion-based measures of 
core inflation have been proposed. Silver (2007) provides a nice survey of 
this growing literature. Rich and Steindel (2007) present a comprehensive 
“horse race” among competing core inflation measures. Despite the pro-
liferation of alternative core inflation measures, exclusion-based measures 
appear to remain the most popular among policymakers, judging by the 
number of central banks that make some reference to exclusion-based core 
measures.1
In the core measures adopted by the Riksbank and the Bank of Cana-
da, the main rationales are evident for the exclusion of certain items from 
a measure of inflation. One is that the prices of some items, such as the 
service flow from owner-occupied housing, are difficult to measure. It is 
unclear whether proxies for those prices—or even the prices themselves—
convey useful information about inflation (as distinct from the cost of 
1 A comprehensive list would include not just the Federal Reserve, Sveriges Riksbank and 
Bank of Canada but also the European Central Bank, the Bank of Japan, the Reserve Bank 
of Australia, and the Reserve Bank of New Zealand. Some central banks make reference in 
their public statements to measures of core inflation in addition to exclusion-based measures, 
but I know of none that reference a nonexclusion-based measure without also referencing 
an exclusion-based measure. The Bank of England is alone among major central banks in 
making no references to core inflation in its public statements.
ical considerations and households￿preferences over di⁄erent commodity
bundles (which can include leisure time) the pricing kernel that ought to
be used to price all assets, including government bonds.
The next section illustrates with a concrete example how the reverse-
engineering approach backs out the pricing kernel underlying government
bond prices. A discussion of the alternative, straight-engineering approach
is provided in Appendix A.
Reverse Engineering the Pricing Kernel from Government Bond Yields.
As the previous section suggests, the key to pricing government bonds cor-
rectly, in the sense that the theoretical government bond prices obtained
with formula (5) have some resemblance to those actually observed, is to
get the pricing kernel right. That is precisely the principle behind the
exercise in the reverse-engineering tradition carried out next.
Suppose the data suggest that the logarithm of the one-period govern-
ment bond yield is normally distributed conditional on information avail-
able at time t (in other words, that the one-period yield is conditionally








") + ￿ lnY
(1)
t + (￿ + ￿) "t+1; (6)
where 0 < ￿ < 1, and "t is an independent and identically distributed
normal random variable with mean 0 and variance ￿2
":
One property of this process is that it is mean-reverting. That is, the
one-period yield tends to revert to its long-run average value, ￿￿ 1
2￿2
"; after
it has been knocked o⁄ that value by a shock, "t.6
It seems intuitive to conjecture that government bond prices and yields
inherit some of their properties from those of the pricing kernel underlying
the valuation of those bonds and, therefore, to guess that the evolution of
the pricing kernel through time will be described by a stochastic process
with an autoregressive structure similar to that of the one-period govern-
ment bond yield:
ln mt+1 = (1 ￿ c2)c1 + c2 lnmt + c3￿t+1;
where c1, c2, and c3 are unknown deterministic coe¢ cients and ￿t+1 is a
stochastic process assumed to render lnmt+1 a normally distributed ran-
dom variable conditional on information available at time t, on the rea-
sonable conjecture that lnY
(1)
t+1 inherits that distribution from the pricing
kernel. Rearranging terms results in the expression for the pricing kernel
that will be used in what follows:
ln mt+1 = c1 + c2(lnmt ￿ c1) + c3￿t+1: (7)
6One complication that will not be discussed in detail here is that the components
￿ and ￿ of the coe¢ cient on the residual cannot be identi￿ed only from the time-series
properties of government bonds. It is also necessary to use the information contained















































living).2 If the cost of owner-occupied-housing services is proxied by mort-
gage interest expenses, then including that cost in a measure of inflation 
could mean, perversely, that a tighter monetary policy (a higher policy 
interest rate) causes a rise in measured inflation.3 The other main ratio-
nale for exclusion, evident in the Bank of Canada’s description of its core 
price index, is the elimination of highly volatile items from the inflation 
measure.4 This rationale, the reduction of volatility, will be my focus in 
this paper.
While PCE ex food and energy holds a special status as the core mea-
sure preferred by the Federal Reserve, the practices of other central banks 
make clear that there are alternatives to excluding all food and energy 
items (and only food and energy items). A look at disaggregated PCE 
data reveals that while food and energy items figure prominently among 
the components with the highest time series volatility, not all of the most 
volatile items are food or energy, and not all food and energy items rank 
among the most volatile.5 This fact suggests a closer examination of which 
items should be excluded if the aim is to produce an index with lower 
volatility than the headline index and still capture the longer-run trend in 
headline inflation.
In the next section, I begin the analysis by asking, simply, what are 
the most volatile items in the PCE? Rather than identifying the N most 
volatile items, for some N—à la the Bank of Canada’s core measure—I ask 
a somewhat different question. Food and energy make up roughly 20 per-
cent of the PCE by expenditure. What, then, are the most volatile items 
with aggregate weight of 20 percent? The list may be somewhat surpris-
ing. There are certainly plenty of food and energy items on the list but 
also computers, used autos, small electric appliances, women’s and girls’ 
clothing, airline services, and more. Also, many food items do not make 
the list—for example, cereals, bakery products, and “purchased meals: 
other than at schools,” which represents the price of meals at restaurants 
and bars. A common characteristic of food items not on the list (except 
for fish and seafood) is that they involve relatively more processing than 
raw items such as meats, eggs, fruits, and vegetables.
2 Inflation is commonly understood as a persistent and general increase in prices or an 
erosion of the purchasing power of a unit of money. More precise (and more operational) 
definitions are model-dependent. A cost of living index has a precise definition as the money 
cost to an economic unit (a household or individual) of maintaining a given level of well-
being in the face of changing prices. Astin (1999), in discussing the challenges of constructing 
harmonized inflation indexes for the euro area, provides a nice discussion of the different ends 
for which price indexes are constructed.
3 As stated on the Riksbank website (www.riksbank.com/templates/Page.aspx?id=10578), 
“Households’ mortgage interest expenditure is excluded more for reasons of clarity. It may in some 
cases be problematic for the Riksbank to explain why the immediate effect of a tighter monetary 
policy is that CPI inflation rises.”
4 Coincidentally, mortgage interest cost is also among the eight most volatile items 
excluded in the Bank of Canada’s core measure.
5 Bryan and Cecchetti (1994) make a similar point in reference to the exclusion of the 
component “food away from home” from CPI ex food and energy.
Notice that this speci￿cation of the pricing kernel automatically sat-
is￿es the no-arbitrage condition because the logarithm is a well-de￿ned
function only for strictly positive arguments. The challenge is to infer the
speci￿c distribution of the unforecastable shock ￿t+1 and the speci￿c val-
ues of the coe¢ cients in the pricing kernel (7) from the observed statistical
properties of one-period government bond yields.
To that e⁄ect, notice that in terms of the notation introduced with the
government bond pricing formula (5), P
(0)
t+1 is the price at period t+1 of a
bond issued at period t+1 that will pay its face value of $1 in that period.
Such a bond is as good as cash and therefore commands a price equal to its
face value; that is, P
(0)
t+1 = 1: Taking into account this observation in the
bond pricing formula (5) results in the following valuation of a one-period















ec1+c2(lnmt ￿ c1)+c3Et[￿t+1] + 1
2Et[c3￿t+1￿Et[c3￿t+1]]2
: (8)
The last equality follows from the fact that if a random variable X is
conditionally lognormally distributed￿ as mt+1 is conjectured to be￿ its
conditional expected value is given by Et[X] = eEt[lnX]+ 1
2V art[lnX], where




; which is the variance of
lnX; conditional on events observed up to time t.7
The next step in the process of inferring the speci￿c values of the
unknown coe¢ cients in formula (8) is to take logarithms of both sides of
it and shift the resulting expression forward one period to obtain:
lnY
(1)









Taking logarithms of equation (8); solving the resulting expression
for c1 + c2(lnmt ￿ c1); plugging that solution into the right-hand side
of (7); using the result in lieu of lnmt+1 in (9); and conjecturing that











7The formula for the price of the one-period government bond P
(1)
t = Et[mt+1]
conveys the intuition for the condition mt+1 > 0 to rule out arbitrage opportunities
mentioned earlier: If the pricing kernel were not strictly positive in all possible contin-
gencies but 0 in some of them and strictly negative in the others, its expected value
over all events potentially observable after time t, Et[mt+1], would be strictly negative,
with the implication that the price at time t of a bond paying $1 for sure one period
later would be negative. That is, investors would not only get paid for ￿buying￿such a
bond (this is what a negative price means) but also would receive $1 at its expiration
the following period. It is implausible to think that such an arbitrage opportunity to
















































xclusion-based measures of core inflation—the traditional “inflation 
ex…” measures—have a long history. The Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(BLS) produced versions of the Consumer Price Index (CPI) excluding 
food and excluding shelter at least since the late 1950s, when those series 
first appeared in the annual Economic Report of the President. “CPI ex 
food and energy”—now taken almost synonymously with core inflation—
made its first appearance in the report in 1980. Many national statistical 
agencies produce inflation measures of this sort, and many central banks 
refer to these measures as guides for monetary policy.
For example, from 2004 to 2007, the Federal Reserve cast the inflation 
forecasts in its semiannual reports to Congress in terms of the price index 
for personal consumption expenditures (PCE) excluding food and energy; 
since 2008, the Fed has released forecasts for both headline PCE and PCE 
excluding food and energy. While “ex food and energy” seems to be the 
most common exclusion-based measure, others are in use. The Sveriges 
Riksbank refers in its public communications to a measure of consumer 
price inflation excluding mortgage interest costs and energy, while the 
Bank of Canada uses a CPI excluding the eight most volatile items as an 
operational guide for monetary policy.
Academic interest in exclusion-based core inflation measures began 
with Blinder (1982), who used them to analyze the high rates of infla-
tion experienced in the United States in the 1970s. In the 27 years since 
Blinder’s work, a number of alternative, nonexclusion-based measures of 
core inflation have been proposed. Silver (2007) provides a nice survey of 
this growing literature. Rich and Steindel (2007) present a comprehensive 
“horse race” among competing core inflation measures. Despite the pro-
liferation of alternative core inflation measures, exclusion-based measures 
appear to remain the most popular among policymakers, judging by the 
number of central banks that make some reference to exclusion-based core 
measures.1
In the core measures adopted by the Riksbank and the Bank of Cana-
da, the main rationales are evident for the exclusion of certain items from 
a measure of inflation. One is that the prices of some items, such as the 
service flow from owner-occupied housing, are difficult to measure. It is 
unclear whether proxies for those prices—or even the prices themselves—
convey useful information about inflation (as distinct from the cost of 
1 A comprehensive list would include not just the Federal Reserve, Sveriges Riksbank and 
Bank of Canada but also the European Central Bank, the Bank of Japan, the Reserve Bank 
of Australia, and the Reserve Bank of New Zealand. Some central banks make reference in 
their public statements to measures of core inflation in addition to exclusion-based measures, 
but I know of none that reference a nonexclusion-based measure without also referencing 
an exclusion-based measure. The Bank of England is alone among major central banks in 
making no references to core inflation in its public statements.
some algebra, in the following expression:
lnY
(1)

















Comparing this expression with (6) reveals four equalities that the
unknown entities in (10) must satisfy to reproduce the observed AR(1)
process:
c2 = ￿; (11)













= (￿ + ￿) "t+1:
The last equation can be rewritten:






























This result implies Et[￿t+1] = ￿ ￿





(￿￿"t ￿ "t+1): (16)
Replacing the equalities given by expressions (11), (12), and (16) in
(7) represents the pricing kernel in terms of the known parameter values
and stochastic variable that describe the dynamics of the one-period gov-
ernment bond yield according to equation (6):
lnmt+1 = ￿￿ + ￿(lnmt + ￿) ￿ ￿"t ￿ "t+1:
It is a straightforward exercise to verify that this pricing kernel does















































living).2 If the cost of owner-occupied-housing services is proxied by mort-
gage interest expenses, then including that cost in a measure of inflation 
could mean, perversely, that a tighter monetary policy (a higher policy 
interest rate) causes a rise in measured inflation.3 The other main ratio-
nale for exclusion, evident in the Bank of Canada’s description of its core 
price index, is the elimination of highly volatile items from the inflation 
measure.4 This rationale, the reduction of volatility, will be my focus in 
this paper.
While PCE ex food and energy holds a special status as the core mea-
sure preferred by the Federal Reserve, the practices of other central banks 
make clear that there are alternatives to excluding all food and energy 
items (and only food and energy items). A look at disaggregated PCE 
data reveals that while food and energy items figure prominently among 
the components with the highest time series volatility, not all of the most 
volatile items are food or energy, and not all food and energy items rank 
among the most volatile.5 This fact suggests a closer examination of which 
items should be excluded if the aim is to produce an index with lower 
volatility than the headline index and still capture the longer-run trend in 
headline inflation.
In the next section, I begin the analysis by asking, simply, what are 
the most volatile items in the PCE? Rather than identifying the N most 
volatile items, for some N—à la the Bank of Canada’s core measure—I ask 
a somewhat different question. Food and energy make up roughly 20 per-
cent of the PCE by expenditure. What, then, are the most volatile items 
with aggregate weight of 20 percent? The list may be somewhat surpris-
ing. There are certainly plenty of food and energy items on the list but 
also computers, used autos, small electric appliances, women’s and girls’ 
clothing, airline services, and more. Also, many food items do not make 
the list—for example, cereals, bakery products, and “purchased meals: 
other than at schools,” which represents the price of meals at restaurants 
and bars. A common characteristic of food items not on the list (except 
for fish and seafood) is that they involve relatively more processing than 
raw items such as meats, eggs, fruits, and vegetables.
2 Inflation is commonly understood as a persistent and general increase in prices or an 
erosion of the purchasing power of a unit of money. More precise (and more operational) 
definitions are model-dependent. A cost of living index has a precise definition as the money 
cost to an economic unit (a household or individual) of maintaining a given level of well-
being in the face of changing prices. Astin (1999), in discussing the challenges of constructing 
harmonized inflation indexes for the euro area, provides a nice discussion of the different ends 
for which price indexes are constructed.
3 As stated on the Riksbank website (www.riksbank.com/templates/Page.aspx?id=10578), 
“Households’ mortgage interest expenditure is excluded more for reasons of clarity. It may in some 
cases be problematic for the Riksbank to explain why the immediate effect of a tighter monetary 
policy is that CPI inflation rises.”
4 Coincidentally, mortgage interest cost is also among the eight most volatile items 
excluded in the Bank of Canada’s core measure.
5 Bryan and Cecchetti (1994) make a similar point in reference to the exclusion of the 
component “food away from home” from CPI ex food and energy.
acterized by equation (6): Simply repeat with it the same steps that led
up to equation (10).8
A¢ ne Factor Models of the Pricing Kernel. To gain insight into the
thinking that led to the formulation of a¢ ne factor models of the pricing
kernel, solve equation (9) for lnmt+1 and replace the unknown coe¢ cients
and stochastic process ￿t with the right-hand side of expressions (11), (12),





















t+1 in this expression with the right-hand side of (6) results





" ￿ ￿ lnY
(1)
t ￿ ￿"t+1: (17)
Note that the right-hand side of the expression above has an a¢ ne
structure; that is, it consists of a constant, plus terms that are linear in
variables (or factors) and in stochastic unforecastable shocks. In the case
of this example, the constant is ￿1
2￿2
" and the only factor happens to be
the one-period yield, lnY
(1)
t , with coe¢ cient ￿; typically known in the
literature as factor loading because it ￿loads￿ its value onto the factor
that drives the pricing kernel. The parameter ￿ scales the unforecastable
innovation (in the sense that Et("t+1Yt) = 0) and is referred to in some
contexts as the price of risk, for reasons that will become clear shortly.
Although in this particular example, the parameters ￿ and ￿ happen to
be equal to 1, their values in the general case will be di⁄erent, so for
purposes of exposition it will be convenient to keep those symbols explicit
in expression (17).
Together with the lognormality of the relevant stochastic variables,
a¢ ne pricing kernels like (17) impart that structure to the prices of the
securities they value. As a result, securities prices can be computed almost
e⁄ortlessly with mechanical linear recursive formulas.9
This computational advantage, along with their analytical tractability,
explains the popularity of a¢ ne factor models of the pricing kernel and the
8Notice that an AR(1) process for the one-period government bond yield induces an
autoregressive moving-average representation￿ an ARMA(1,1)￿ of the pricing kernel,
with a long-run mean of ￿￿. Of course, more complicated time-series patterns for
one-period government bonds induce more complex time-series properties in the pricing
kernel as well. See Backus and Zin (1994) for a thorough treatment of this subject.
9See Du¢ e and Kan (1996) for a rigorous theoretical foundation of a¢ ne factor
models of the term structure. The origins of the proli￿c literature on factor models can
be traced to the intertemporal capital asset pricing model by Merton (1973) and to the
arbitrage pricing theory developed by Ross (1976). Readers will surely wonder how this
class of models has gone about selecting the factors that enter into the pricing kernel.
Again, there are two approaches. The reverse-engineering approach tries to back out the
underlying factors from actually observed prices, while the straight-engineering approach
starts out with factors suggested by theory, subsequently checking if the government
bond prices thus generated resemble those actually observed. A more detailed discussion
















































xclusion-based measures of core inflation—the traditional “inflation 
ex…” measures—have a long history. The Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(BLS) produced versions of the Consumer Price Index (CPI) excluding 
food and excluding shelter at least since the late 1950s, when those series 
first appeared in the annual Economic Report of the President. “CPI ex 
food and energy”—now taken almost synonymously with core inflation—
made its first appearance in the report in 1980. Many national statistical 
agencies produce inflation measures of this sort, and many central banks 
refer to these measures as guides for monetary policy.
For example, from 2004 to 2007, the Federal Reserve cast the inflation 
forecasts in its semiannual reports to Congress in terms of the price index 
for personal consumption expenditures (PCE) excluding food and energy; 
since 2008, the Fed has released forecasts for both headline PCE and PCE 
excluding food and energy. While “ex food and energy” seems to be the 
most common exclusion-based measure, others are in use. The Sveriges 
Riksbank refers in its public communications to a measure of consumer 
price inflation excluding mortgage interest costs and energy, while the 
Bank of Canada uses a CPI excluding the eight most volatile items as an 
operational guide for monetary policy.
Academic interest in exclusion-based core inflation measures began 
with Blinder (1982), who used them to analyze the high rates of infla-
tion experienced in the United States in the 1970s. In the 27 years since 
Blinder’s work, a number of alternative, nonexclusion-based measures of 
core inflation have been proposed. Silver (2007) provides a nice survey of 
this growing literature. Rich and Steindel (2007) present a comprehensive 
“horse race” among competing core inflation measures. Despite the pro-
liferation of alternative core inflation measures, exclusion-based measures 
appear to remain the most popular among policymakers, judging by the 
number of central banks that make some reference to exclusion-based core 
measures.1
In the core measures adopted by the Riksbank and the Bank of Cana-
da, the main rationales are evident for the exclusion of certain items from 
a measure of inflation. One is that the prices of some items, such as the 
service flow from owner-occupied housing, are difficult to measure. It is 
unclear whether proxies for those prices—or even the prices themselves—
convey useful information about inflation (as distinct from the cost of 
1 A comprehensive list would include not just the Federal Reserve, Sveriges Riksbank and 
Bank of Canada but also the European Central Bank, the Bank of Japan, the Reserve Bank 
of Australia, and the Reserve Bank of New Zealand. Some central banks make reference in 
their public statements to measures of core inflation in addition to exclusion-based measures, 
but I know of none that reference a nonexclusion-based measure without also referencing 
an exclusion-based measure. The Bank of England is alone among major central banks in 
making no references to core inflation in its public statements.
proliferation of studies that attempt to approximate the observed prices of
all sorts of assets and securities, including government bonds, with more
sophisticated versions of (17), summarized by the general expression:











￿h;l Fl "h;t+1; (18)
where ￿ is a constant; the coe¢ cients ￿h are the factor loadings corre-
sponding to each of the q factors Fh; the coe¢ cients ￿h will be interpreted
later (see page 22) as the price of risk associated with each source of risk,
captured by the stochastic unforecastable shocks "h, assumed to be iden-
tically and independently normally distributed with mean 0 and variance
1; and ￿h and ￿h;l are deterministic scalars that are greater than or equal
to 0:
Odd as it may seem, the occurrence of a square root in (18) introduces
in the pricing kernel the ￿ exibility to generate government prices whose
risk premia components are either constant or time varying.10 For reasons
that will be fully understood later, when all of the scalars ￿h;l are switched
o⁄￿ that is, when ￿h;l = 0 for all h and l￿ the pricing kernel will satisfy the
expectation hypothesis and induce government bond prices with constant
risk premia components. Otherwise, when at least one of those scalars
is strictly positive, the model will generate government bond prices with
time-varying risk premia components.
In fact, it can be veri￿ed that the pricing kernel (17) is a special case of
(18) because it is the result of multiplying both sides of the last expression
by ￿1 and setting ￿ = 1
2￿2
", q = 1, ￿1 = ￿, F1 = lnY
(1)
t , ￿1 = ￿, ￿1 = 1,
￿1;1 = 0. Given this last parameter value, it follows from the preceding
discussion that the one-factor model of the pricing kernel (17) will generate
bond yields characterized by constant risk premia, a useful benchmark
with which to explore in the next section the attractive computational and
analytical features of a¢ ne models in general.
A One-Factor Model of the Yield Curve
This section illustrates how the one-factor pricing kernel (17) generates
prices for government bonds of any maturity￿ and, therefore, the yield
curve￿ with methods that exploit the recursive structure of the basic zero-
coupon bond pricing formula (5).
To that e⁄ect, recall that "t+1 is normally distributed, which via (17)
implies that mt+1 is conditionally lognormally distributed. The price for
the one-period government bond can therefore be easily calculated by ex-
10The motivation for the square root trick originally introduced by Cox, Ingersoll,
and Ross (1985) is that, in continuous time, this speci￿cation ensures the nominal pricing
kernel doesn￿ t generate negative nominal interest rates. The fact that this possibility
is not ruled out in discrete time frameworks like the one adopted in this paper doesn￿ t
necessarily pose a problem. Recall that Y
(1)
t represents a gross yield 1 + Rt, so as long
as the negative interest rate is not too large, say ￿5 percent, the yield will be positive
and lnY
(1)















































living).2 If the cost of owner-occupied-housing services is proxied by mort-
gage interest expenses, then including that cost in a measure of inflation 
could mean, perversely, that a tighter monetary policy (a higher policy 
interest rate) causes a rise in measured inflation.3 The other main ratio-
nale for exclusion, evident in the Bank of Canada’s description of its core 
price index, is the elimination of highly volatile items from the inflation 
measure.4 This rationale, the reduction of volatility, will be my focus in 
this paper.
While PCE ex food and energy holds a special status as the core mea-
sure preferred by the Federal Reserve, the practices of other central banks 
make clear that there are alternatives to excluding all food and energy 
items (and only food and energy items). A look at disaggregated PCE 
data reveals that while food and energy items figure prominently among 
the components with the highest time series volatility, not all of the most 
volatile items are food or energy, and not all food and energy items rank 
among the most volatile.5 This fact suggests a closer examination of which 
items should be excluded if the aim is to produce an index with lower 
volatility than the headline index and still capture the longer-run trend in 
headline inflation.
In the next section, I begin the analysis by asking, simply, what are 
the most volatile items in the PCE? Rather than identifying the N most 
volatile items, for some N—à la the Bank of Canada’s core measure—I ask 
a somewhat different question. Food and energy make up roughly 20 per-
cent of the PCE by expenditure. What, then, are the most volatile items 
with aggregate weight of 20 percent? The list may be somewhat surpris-
ing. There are certainly plenty of food and energy items on the list but 
also computers, used autos, small electric appliances, women’s and girls’ 
clothing, airline services, and more. Also, many food items do not make 
the list—for example, cereals, bakery products, and “purchased meals: 
other than at schools,” which represents the price of meals at restaurants 
and bars. A common characteristic of food items not on the list (except 
for fish and seafood) is that they involve relatively more processing than 
raw items such as meats, eggs, fruits, and vegetables.
2 Inflation is commonly understood as a persistent and general increase in prices or an 
erosion of the purchasing power of a unit of money. More precise (and more operational) 
definitions are model-dependent. A cost of living index has a precise definition as the money 
cost to an economic unit (a household or individual) of maintaining a given level of well-
being in the face of changing prices. Astin (1999), in discussing the challenges of constructing 
harmonized inflation indexes for the euro area, provides a nice discussion of the different ends 
for which price indexes are constructed.
3 As stated on the Riksbank website (www.riksbank.com/templates/Page.aspx?id=10578), 
“Households’ mortgage interest expenditure is excluded more for reasons of clarity. It may in some 
cases be problematic for the Riksbank to explain why the immediate effect of a tighter monetary 
policy is that CPI inflation rises.”
4 Coincidentally, mortgage interest cost is also among the eight most volatile items 
excluded in the Bank of Canada’s core measure.
5 Bryan and Cecchetti (1994) make a similar point in reference to the exclusion of the 
component “food away from home” from CPI ex food and energy.




t = Et[mt+1] = eEt[lnmt+1]+ 1







Taking logarithms and considering de￿nition (3) results in the one-























This equation imposes the restriction ￿ = 1 and ￿ = 1 because those
are the values for the factor-loading parameter and the price-of-risk para-
meter (with interpretations to be given later) that make both ends of the
equation equal.11
Consider next the problem of pricing the two-period zero-coupon bond










The two-period bond price can be readily computed with this formula
because the composite random variable within brackets inherits from its





t+1 and equations (6) and (17). Exploiting once more



















Algebraic manipulations after taking logs on both sides of the equation
result in the following relationship:
lnP
(2)
t = Et[lnmt+1] +
1
2










where V art and Covt denote, respectively, the conditional variance and
covariance of the random variables within the corresponding brackets.
Taking into account that the sum of the ￿rst two terms in (20) is equal
to ￿lnY
(1)
t (see equation 19), the two-period bond price can be written in
the more compact notation:
11As discussed in more detail in Appendix A, the factor lnYt could have been
kept latent; that is, as an unidenti￿ed factor lnXt that equation (19) would have later
revealed to be the one-period bond yield with factor loading and price of risk equal to

















































xclusion-based measures of core inflation—the traditional “inflation 
ex…” measures—have a long history. The Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(BLS) produced versions of the Consumer Price Index (CPI) excluding 
food and excluding shelter at least since the late 1950s, when those series 
first appeared in the annual Economic Report of the President. “CPI ex 
food and energy”—now taken almost synonymously with core inflation—
made its first appearance in the report in 1980. Many national statistical 
agencies produce inflation measures of this sort, and many central banks 
refer to these measures as guides for monetary policy.
For example, from 2004 to 2007, the Federal Reserve cast the inflation 
forecasts in its semiannual reports to Congress in terms of the price index 
for personal consumption expenditures (PCE) excluding food and energy; 
since 2008, the Fed has released forecasts for both headline PCE and PCE 
excluding food and energy. While “ex food and energy” seems to be the 
most common exclusion-based measure, others are in use. The Sveriges 
Riksbank refers in its public communications to a measure of consumer 
price inflation excluding mortgage interest costs and energy, while the 
Bank of Canada uses a CPI excluding the eight most volatile items as an 
operational guide for monetary policy.
Academic interest in exclusion-based core inflation measures began 
with Blinder (1982), who used them to analyze the high rates of infla-
tion experienced in the United States in the 1970s. In the 27 years since 
Blinder’s work, a number of alternative, nonexclusion-based measures of 
core inflation have been proposed. Silver (2007) provides a nice survey of 
this growing literature. Rich and Steindel (2007) present a comprehensive 
“horse race” among competing core inflation measures. Despite the pro-
liferation of alternative core inflation measures, exclusion-based measures 
appear to remain the most popular among policymakers, judging by the 
number of central banks that make some reference to exclusion-based core 
measures.1
In the core measures adopted by the Riksbank and the Bank of Cana-
da, the main rationales are evident for the exclusion of certain items from 
a measure of inflation. One is that the prices of some items, such as the 
service flow from owner-occupied housing, are difficult to measure. It is 
unclear whether proxies for those prices—or even the prices themselves—
convey useful information about inflation (as distinct from the cost of 
1 A comprehensive list would include not just the Federal Reserve, Sveriges Riksbank and 
Bank of Canada but also the European Central Bank, the Bank of Japan, the Reserve Bank 
of Australia, and the Reserve Bank of New Zealand. Some central banks make reference in 
their public statements to measures of core inflation in addition to exclusion-based measures, 
but I know of none that reference a nonexclusion-based measure without also referencing 
an exclusion-based measure. The Bank of England is alone among major central banks in 
















All that is needed to obtain an expression for the two-year bond in
terms of fundamental parameters is to carry out the expectations and vari-
ances calculations indicated on the right-hand side of the formula. To that
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t ￿ (￿ + ￿) "t+1;
which, in turn, implies:
Et lnP
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= ￿(￿ + ￿)￿2
": (24)
Plugging (22), (23), and (24) into (21), adding and subtracting ￿￿ 1
2￿2
"
to and from the right-hand side of the resulting expression, and rearranging
terms delivers the two-period yield as a function of primitive parameters:
￿lnP
(2)
t = 2 lnY
(2)
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The prices for all subsequent maturities could be calculated with the
bond pricing formula (5) by repeated application of the same steps followed
to calculate the price of a two-period bond. In particular, the price of an
















which, after taking logarithms on both sides and applying some algebra,















































living).2 If the cost of owner-occupied-housing services is proxied by mort-
gage interest expenses, then including that cost in a measure of inflation 
could mean, perversely, that a tighter monetary policy (a higher policy 
interest rate) causes a rise in measured inflation.3 The other main ratio-
nale for exclusion, evident in the Bank of Canada’s description of its core 
price index, is the elimination of highly volatile items from the inflation 
measure.4 This rationale, the reduction of volatility, will be my focus in 
this paper.
While PCE ex food and energy holds a special status as the core mea-
sure preferred by the Federal Reserve, the practices of other central banks 
make clear that there are alternatives to excluding all food and energy 
items (and only food and energy items). A look at disaggregated PCE 
data reveals that while food and energy items figure prominently among 
the components with the highest time series volatility, not all of the most 
volatile items are food or energy, and not all food and energy items rank 
among the most volatile.5 This fact suggests a closer examination of which 
items should be excluded if the aim is to produce an index with lower 
volatility than the headline index and still capture the longer-run trend in 
headline inflation.
In the next section, I begin the analysis by asking, simply, what are 
the most volatile items in the PCE? Rather than identifying the N most 
volatile items, for some N—à la the Bank of Canada’s core measure—I ask 
a somewhat different question. Food and energy make up roughly 20 per-
cent of the PCE by expenditure. What, then, are the most volatile items 
with aggregate weight of 20 percent? The list may be somewhat surpris-
ing. There are certainly plenty of food and energy items on the list but 
also computers, used autos, small electric appliances, women’s and girls’ 
clothing, airline services, and more. Also, many food items do not make 
the list—for example, cereals, bakery products, and “purchased meals: 
other than at schools,” which represents the price of meals at restaurants 
and bars. A common characteristic of food items not on the list (except 
for fish and seafood) is that they involve relatively more processing than 
raw items such as meats, eggs, fruits, and vegetables.
2 Inflation is commonly understood as a persistent and general increase in prices or an 
erosion of the purchasing power of a unit of money. More precise (and more operational) 
definitions are model-dependent. A cost of living index has a precise definition as the money 
cost to an economic unit (a household or individual) of maintaining a given level of well-
being in the face of changing prices. Astin (1999), in discussing the challenges of constructing 
harmonized inflation indexes for the euro area, provides a nice discussion of the different ends 
for which price indexes are constructed.
3 As stated on the Riksbank website (www.riksbank.com/templates/Page.aspx?id=10578), 
“Households’ mortgage interest expenditure is excluded more for reasons of clarity. It may in some 
cases be problematic for the Riksbank to explain why the immediate effect of a tighter monetary 
policy is that CPI inflation rises.”
4 Coincidentally, mortgage interest cost is also among the eight most volatile items 
excluded in the Bank of Canada’s core measure.
5 Bryan and Cecchetti (1994) make a similar point in reference to the exclusion of the 






























However, this method for generating the yield curve requires the suc-
cessive substitution of prices represented in terms of variables dated at time
t or earlier on the right-hand side of the formula, a tedious process that
becomes unwieldy rather quickly. It turns out that the a¢ ne structure of
the model makes it possible to accomplish that same task with a shortcut.
A more expedient procedure to compute bond prices for all maturities
and to generate the yield curve is to exploit the observation that, after
adding and subtracting the term 1
2￿2￿2
" on the right-hand side of (25),
the nominal price of the two-period bond can be rewritten as a linear







































Given that V art[lnY
(1)
t+1] is the constant (￿ + ￿)2￿2
", it follows that
factor models of the pricing kernel impart their a¢ ne structure as well
to the prices of the securities under study￿ government bonds, in this
case. As demonstrated next, this feature makes possible the calculation of
government bond prices for all maturities using a recursive formula that is
easy to implement in a computer program.
To see the recursive structure of government bond prices generated
by such models, make the guess that the formula for the price of any






















t+1 on the right-hand side of formula (26) for
















































xclusion-based measures of core inflation—the traditional “inflation 
ex…” measures—have a long history. The Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(BLS) produced versions of the Consumer Price Index (CPI) excluding 
food and excluding shelter at least since the late 1950s, when those series 
first appeared in the annual Economic Report of the President. “CPI ex 
food and energy”—now taken almost synonymously with core inflation—
made its first appearance in the report in 1980. Many national statistical 
agencies produce inflation measures of this sort, and many central banks 
refer to these measures as guides for monetary policy.
For example, from 2004 to 2007, the Federal Reserve cast the inflation 
forecasts in its semiannual reports to Congress in terms of the price index 
for personal consumption expenditures (PCE) excluding food and energy; 
since 2008, the Fed has released forecasts for both headline PCE and PCE 
excluding food and energy. While “ex food and energy” seems to be the 
most common exclusion-based measure, others are in use. The Sveriges 
Riksbank refers in its public communications to a measure of consumer 
price inflation excluding mortgage interest costs and energy, while the 
Bank of Canada uses a CPI excluding the eight most volatile items as an 
operational guide for monetary policy.
Academic interest in exclusion-based core inflation measures began 
with Blinder (1982), who used them to analyze the high rates of infla-
tion experienced in the United States in the 1970s. In the 27 years since 
Blinder’s work, a number of alternative, nonexclusion-based measures of 
core inflation have been proposed. Silver (2007) provides a nice survey of 
this growing literature. Rich and Steindel (2007) present a comprehensive 
“horse race” among competing core inflation measures. Despite the pro-
liferation of alternative core inflation measures, exclusion-based measures 
appear to remain the most popular among policymakers, judging by the 
number of central banks that make some reference to exclusion-based core 
measures.1
In the core measures adopted by the Riksbank and the Bank of Cana-
da, the main rationales are evident for the exclusion of certain items from 
a measure of inflation. One is that the prices of some items, such as the 
service flow from owner-occupied housing, are difficult to measure. It is 
unclear whether proxies for those prices—or even the prices themselves—
convey useful information about inflation (as distinct from the cost of 
1 A comprehensive list would include not just the Federal Reserve, Sveriges Riksbank and 
Bank of Canada but also the European Central Bank, the Bank of Japan, the Reserve Bank 
of Australia, and the Reserve Bank of New Zealand. Some central banks make reference in 
their public statements to measures of core inflation in addition to exclusion-based measures, 
but I know of none that reference a nonexclusion-based measure without also referencing 
an exclusion-based measure. The Bank of England is alone among major central banks in 
making no references to core inflation in its public statements.
in a consistent manner. Take into account (6), (17), and the equality
V art+i[lnY
(1)
t+i+1] = V art[lnY
(1)
t+1] for i = 0 implied by the former equa-
tion, and subsequently match the coe¢ cients in the resulting expression
with those for the corresponding terms on the right-hand side of (28), to
reveal the following recursive structure for the coe¢ cients An, Bn, and Cn:









Bn = 1 + ￿Bn￿1;








with initial conditions A0 = B0 = C0 = 0 obtained from the requirement
that the recursive formula (28) must deliver the price of the one-period





Because the recursion for the coe¢ cient Bn implies that it behaves like
the truncated geometric progression
1￿￿n
1￿￿ , for consistency with the other
coe¢ cients, it will be more convenient to use the following alternative
equivalent representation:
Bn = Bn￿1 + ￿n￿1: (31)
Two features of the recursive price formula (28) are worth highlighting.
First, the coe¢ cients for each maturity are successively built up, as it
were, by adding to the coe¢ cients of the immediately preceding maturity
the increments represented by the terms following the ￿rst coe¢ cient on
the right-hand sides of expressions (29), (30), and (31). This feature will
become handy at the time of computing forward rates.
Second, as it follows from (23), for the speci￿c one-factor model ana-
lyzed in this section, the conditional variance of the factor is the constant
(￿ +￿)2￿2
". As a result of this property, known as homoskedasticity in the
statistical jargon, the term CnV art[lnY
(1)
t+1] in (28) is for each maturity
the constant Cn(￿ + ￿)2￿2
", which could be consolidated into the constant
An, a standard practice not adopted here, for expositional reasons.
It is a straightforward (albeit tedious) exercise to show that the re-
cursive application of (28) to bonds of successive maturities generates the









































































living).2 If the cost of owner-occupied-housing services is proxied by mort-
gage interest expenses, then including that cost in a measure of inflation 
could mean, perversely, that a tighter monetary policy (a higher policy 
interest rate) causes a rise in measured inflation.3 The other main ratio-
nale for exclusion, evident in the Bank of Canada’s description of its core 
price index, is the elimination of highly volatile items from the inflation 
measure.4 This rationale, the reduction of volatility, will be my focus in 
this paper.
While PCE ex food and energy holds a special status as the core mea-
sure preferred by the Federal Reserve, the practices of other central banks 
make clear that there are alternatives to excluding all food and energy 
items (and only food and energy items). A look at disaggregated PCE 
data reveals that while food and energy items figure prominently among 
the components with the highest time series volatility, not all of the most 
volatile items are food or energy, and not all food and energy items rank 
among the most volatile.5 This fact suggests a closer examination of which 
items should be excluded if the aim is to produce an index with lower 
volatility than the headline index and still capture the longer-run trend in 
headline inflation.
In the next section, I begin the analysis by asking, simply, what are 
the most volatile items in the PCE? Rather than identifying the N most 
volatile items, for some N—à la the Bank of Canada’s core measure—I ask 
a somewhat different question. Food and energy make up roughly 20 per-
cent of the PCE by expenditure. What, then, are the most volatile items 
with aggregate weight of 20 percent? The list may be somewhat surpris-
ing. There are certainly plenty of food and energy items on the list but 
also computers, used autos, small electric appliances, women’s and girls’ 
clothing, airline services, and more. Also, many food items do not make 
the list—for example, cereals, bakery products, and “purchased meals: 
other than at schools,” which represents the price of meals at restaurants 
and bars. A common characteristic of food items not on the list (except 
for fish and seafood) is that they involve relatively more processing than 
raw items such as meats, eggs, fruits, and vegetables.
2 Inflation is commonly understood as a persistent and general increase in prices or an 
erosion of the purchasing power of a unit of money. More precise (and more operational) 
definitions are model-dependent. A cost of living index has a precise definition as the money 
cost to an economic unit (a household or individual) of maintaining a given level of well-
being in the face of changing prices. Astin (1999), in discussing the challenges of constructing 
harmonized inflation indexes for the euro area, provides a nice discussion of the different ends 
for which price indexes are constructed.
3 As stated on the Riksbank website (www.riksbank.com/templates/Page.aspx?id=10578), 
“Households’ mortgage interest expenditure is excluded more for reasons of clarity. It may in some 
cases be problematic for the Riksbank to explain why the immediate effect of a tighter monetary 
policy is that CPI inflation rises.”
4 Coincidentally, mortgage interest cost is also among the eight most volatile items 
excluded in the Bank of Canada’s core measure.
5 Bryan and Cecchetti (1994) make a similar point in reference to the exclusion of the 

































































Expression (32) reproduces the price for the two-period bond (25) ob-
tained with the brute-force approach pursued earlier to motivate the re-
cursive formula (28).
Notice also that the three formulas are a rigorous restatement of the
stylized formula (1) presented in section 1. This can be seen more clearly
by taking, for example, the formula for the four-period bond, dividing
both sides of it by 4 and considering the relationship ln(1+it) = Et[ln(1+
rt+1)] + Et[ln(1 + ￿t+1)], the popular logarithmic variation of the Fisher
equation proposed by Irving Fisher (1896; 1930) in his attempts to formal-
ize a theory on the determination of interest rates. Under the assumption
that the short-term nominal interest rate has a well-de￿ned long-run or un-
conditional mean (formally, that E[ln(1+it)] = E[ln(1+rt+1)]+E[ln(1+
￿t+1)] = E[ln(1+rt)]+E[ln(1+￿t)]), the logarithmic version of the Fisher
equation and (6) imply E[lnY
(1)
t ] = ￿￿ 1
2￿2
" = E[ln(1+rt)]+E[ln(1+￿t)].




t = E ln(1 + ￿t) + E ln(1 + rt) +
1
4
(1 + ￿ + ￿2 + ￿3)
￿
Et[ln(1 + ￿t+1) ￿ E ln(1 + ￿t)] +

















The parallel of this expression with its heuristic version (1) in section
1 is apparent if the last two terms correspond to risk premia components,
















































xclusion-based measures of core inflation—the traditional “inflation 
ex…” measures—have a long history. The Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(BLS) produced versions of the Consumer Price Index (CPI) excluding 
food and excluding shelter at least since the late 1950s, when those series 
first appeared in the annual Economic Report of the President. “CPI ex 
food and energy”—now taken almost synonymously with core inflation—
made its first appearance in the report in 1980. Many national statistical 
agencies produce inflation measures of this sort, and many central banks 
refer to these measures as guides for monetary policy.
For example, from 2004 to 2007, the Federal Reserve cast the inflation 
forecasts in its semiannual reports to Congress in terms of the price index 
for personal consumption expenditures (PCE) excluding food and energy; 
since 2008, the Fed has released forecasts for both headline PCE and PCE 
excluding food and energy. While “ex food and energy” seems to be the 
most common exclusion-based measure, others are in use. The Sveriges 
Riksbank refers in its public communications to a measure of consumer 
price inflation excluding mortgage interest costs and energy, while the 
Bank of Canada uses a CPI excluding the eight most volatile items as an 
operational guide for monetary policy.
Academic interest in exclusion-based core inflation measures began 
with Blinder (1982), who used them to analyze the high rates of infla-
tion experienced in the United States in the 1970s. In the 27 years since 
Blinder’s work, a number of alternative, nonexclusion-based measures of 
core inflation have been proposed. Silver (2007) provides a nice survey of 
this growing literature. Rich and Steindel (2007) present a comprehensive 
“horse race” among competing core inflation measures. Despite the pro-
liferation of alternative core inflation measures, exclusion-based measures 
appear to remain the most popular among policymakers, judging by the 
number of central banks that make some reference to exclusion-based core 
measures.1
In the core measures adopted by the Riksbank and the Bank of Cana-
da, the main rationales are evident for the exclusion of certain items from 
a measure of inflation. One is that the prices of some items, such as the 
service flow from owner-occupied housing, are difficult to measure. It is 
unclear whether proxies for those prices—or even the prices themselves—
convey useful information about inflation (as distinct from the cost of 
1 A comprehensive list would include not just the Federal Reserve, Sveriges Riksbank and 
Bank of Canada but also the European Central Bank, the Bank of Japan, the Reserve Bank 
of Australia, and the Reserve Bank of New Zealand. Some central banks make reference in 
their public statements to measures of core inflation in addition to exclusion-based measures, 
but I know of none that reference a nonexclusion-based measure without also referencing 
an exclusion-based measure. The Bank of England is alone among major central banks in 
making no references to core inflation in its public statements.
Risk Premia Components and the Expectations Hypothesis. To see
why the last two terms in formulas (32) to (34) contain the risk premia
components of government bond yields, start with expression (21) for the
price of a two-period government bond. Rearranging terms after taking
















Notice that the left-hand side of this equation is the di⁄erential be-
tween the return that an investor would expect from an investment strategy
of buying a two-period bond at time t and holding it until maturity, repre-
sented by the ￿rst term, and the alternative strategy of buying in sequence
two one-period bonds, represented by the terms between parentheses. If
these two portfolios were exactly equivalent in the eyes of investors, their
returns should be the same, which by the no-arbitrage condition implies
that the right-hand side of this equation should be equal to 0.
By the same token, a nonzero di⁄erential on the right-hand side would
imply, in the absence of arbitrage, that investors don￿ t regard the two
investment options as equivalent. A negative di⁄erential would imply that
investors see the two-period bond as a safer investment than the sequence
of two one-period bonds and are willing to give up returns or, equivalently,
pay an insurance premium, to hold the two-period bond in their portfolios.
A positive di⁄erential would imply that the two-period bond is considered a
riskier investment and that investors will therefore demand a higher return
for it; that is, a risk premium over the sequence of two one-period bonds.
Whether investors pay an insurance premium or get paid a risk pre-
mium for holding a bond of given characteristics in their portfolios is de-
termined by the right-hand side of equation (35). In other words, the two
right-hand-side terms identify the risk premia components of the nominal
interest rate heuristically introduced in section 1.
An entirely analogous procedure identi￿es the risk premia components
of a government bond of arbitrary maturity n with the right-hand side of
the following general version of (35):





















It can be veri￿ed that substituting the recursive price formula (28) in
the right-hand side of the expression, taking into account (6), generates risk
premia components for the two- to four-period bonds that exactly replicate
the third and fourth terms of the price formulas for those maturities given
by (32) through (34). The di⁄erent components of those formulas can,















































living).2 If the cost of owner-occupied-housing services is proxied by mort-
gage interest expenses, then including that cost in a measure of inflation 
could mean, perversely, that a tighter monetary policy (a higher policy 
interest rate) causes a rise in measured inflation.3 The other main ratio-
nale for exclusion, evident in the Bank of Canada’s description of its core 
price index, is the elimination of highly volatile items from the inflation 
measure.4 This rationale, the reduction of volatility, will be my focus in 
this paper.
While PCE ex food and energy holds a special status as the core mea-
sure preferred by the Federal Reserve, the practices of other central banks 
make clear that there are alternatives to excluding all food and energy 
items (and only food and energy items). A look at disaggregated PCE 
data reveals that while food and energy items figure prominently among 
the components with the highest time series volatility, not all of the most 
volatile items are food or energy, and not all food and energy items rank 
among the most volatile.5 This fact suggests a closer examination of which 
items should be excluded if the aim is to produce an index with lower 
volatility than the headline index and still capture the longer-run trend in 
headline inflation.
In the next section, I begin the analysis by asking, simply, what are 
the most volatile items in the PCE? Rather than identifying the N most 
volatile items, for some N—à la the Bank of Canada’s core measure—I ask 
a somewhat different question. Food and energy make up roughly 20 per-
cent of the PCE by expenditure. What, then, are the most volatile items 
with aggregate weight of 20 percent? The list may be somewhat surpris-
ing. There are certainly plenty of food and energy items on the list but 
also computers, used autos, small electric appliances, women’s and girls’ 
clothing, airline services, and more. Also, many food items do not make 
the list—for example, cereals, bakery products, and “purchased meals: 
other than at schools,” which represents the price of meals at restaurants 
and bars. A common characteristic of food items not on the list (except 
for fish and seafood) is that they involve relatively more processing than 
raw items such as meats, eggs, fruits, and vegetables.
2 Inflation is commonly understood as a persistent and general increase in prices or an 
erosion of the purchasing power of a unit of money. More precise (and more operational) 
definitions are model-dependent. A cost of living index has a precise definition as the money 
cost to an economic unit (a household or individual) of maintaining a given level of well-
being in the face of changing prices. Astin (1999), in discussing the challenges of constructing 
harmonized inflation indexes for the euro area, provides a nice discussion of the different ends 
for which price indexes are constructed.
3 As stated on the Riksbank website (www.riksbank.com/templates/Page.aspx?id=10578), 
“Households’ mortgage interest expenditure is excluded more for reasons of clarity. It may in some 
cases be problematic for the Riksbank to explain why the immediate effect of a tighter monetary 
policy is that CPI inflation rises.”
4 Coincidentally, mortgage interest cost is also among the eight most volatile items 
excluded in the Bank of Canada’s core measure.
5 Bryan and Cecchetti (1994) make a similar point in reference to the exclusion of the 
component “food away from home” from CPI ex food and energy.
The ￿rst term on the right-hand side of formulas (32) to (34), ￿￿ 1
2￿2
",
captures the value to which the short nominal interest rate￿ the one-period
yield￿ reverts in the long run according to (6). If it were up to this term,
the yield curve would be ￿ at on average, as is apparent from dividing both
sides of equations (32) through (34) by the corresponding maturity length.
The second term on the right-hand side of those formulas￿ the term
involving [lnY
(1)
t ￿ (￿ ￿ 1
2￿2
")]￿ captures the change in yields induced by
deviations of the time t one-period yield from its stationary value or long-
run mean. The size of the response of each yield in the term structure to
movements in the one-period yield is ultimately controlled by the sequence
of coe¢ cients fBn=ng in the appropriately modi￿ed version of (28) for
yields. In light of the arguments preceding equation (31), those coe¢ cients





, which decreases monotonically to 0
because, from one member of the sequence to the next, the denominator
is always augmented by 1, while the numerator is always augmented by a
smaller number that decreases to 0 at the geometric rate ￿. This pattern
implies that the impact that deviations of the one-period yield have on
subsequent yields dies out with the maturity of the bond. In particular,








n = 0). Regardless of
how they propagate throughout the term structure, positive and negative
deviations of the one-period yield from its long-run mean cancel each other




")] = 0: So if it were up to the second
term in formulas (32) through (34) just analyzed, the yield curve would
still be ￿ at on average instead of upward sloping, as Figure 2 suggests.
Thus, the forces that induce a positive slope in the yield curve must be
contained in the third and fourth terms on the right-hand side of formulas
(32) to (34) which, for the arguments given when interpreting equation
(35), capture the risk premia components built into the bond yield for the
associated maturity. By comparison with expression (36), the third term
corresponds to the sum of the variances generated by each element of the
price sequence flnP
(1)
t+ig, while the fourth corresponds to the sum of the
covariances of each of those elements with the contemporaneous pricing
kernel.
The third term is a statistical artifact that emerges in the process




t+i.12 The generic representation of this
12For that reason, this variance-related term is sometimes referred to as a Jensen￿ s
inequality component, in reference to the result established by Jensen that if f(:) is a
concave function of the stochastic variable x, then Etf(x) < f(Etx). Since ln(x) is a




t+1): This condition and the





t+1, an inequality that is satis￿ed in












: Readers may wonder what happened
to the variance, or Jensen￿ s inequality component, corresponding to the pricing kernel.
The answer is that it is hidden under the guise 1
2￿2

















































xclusion-based measures of core inflation—the traditional “inflation 
ex…” measures—have a long history. The Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(BLS) produced versions of the Consumer Price Index (CPI) excluding 
food and excluding shelter at least since the late 1950s, when those series 
first appeared in the annual Economic Report of the President. “CPI ex 
food and energy”—now taken almost synonymously with core inflation—
made its first appearance in the report in 1980. Many national statistical 
agencies produce inflation measures of this sort, and many central banks 
refer to these measures as guides for monetary policy.
For example, from 2004 to 2007, the Federal Reserve cast the inflation 
forecasts in its semiannual reports to Congress in terms of the price index 
for personal consumption expenditures (PCE) excluding food and energy; 
since 2008, the Fed has released forecasts for both headline PCE and PCE 
excluding food and energy. While “ex food and energy” seems to be the 
most common exclusion-based measure, others are in use. The Sveriges 
Riksbank refers in its public communications to a measure of consumer 
price inflation excluding mortgage interest costs and energy, while the 
Bank of Canada uses a CPI excluding the eight most volatile items as an 
operational guide for monetary policy.
Academic interest in exclusion-based core inflation measures began 
with Blinder (1982), who used them to analyze the high rates of infla-
tion experienced in the United States in the 1970s. In the 27 years since 
Blinder’s work, a number of alternative, nonexclusion-based measures of 
core inflation have been proposed. Silver (2007) provides a nice survey of 
this growing literature. Rich and Steindel (2007) present a comprehensive 
“horse race” among competing core inflation measures. Despite the pro-
liferation of alternative core inflation measures, exclusion-based measures 
appear to remain the most popular among policymakers, judging by the 
number of central banks that make some reference to exclusion-based core 
measures.1
In the core measures adopted by the Riksbank and the Bank of Cana-
da, the main rationales are evident for the exclusion of certain items from 
a measure of inflation. One is that the prices of some items, such as the 
service flow from owner-occupied housing, are difficult to measure. It is 
unclear whether proxies for those prices—or even the prices themselves—
convey useful information about inflation (as distinct from the cost of 
1 A comprehensive list would include not just the Federal Reserve, Sveriges Riksbank and 
Bank of Canada but also the European Central Bank, the Bank of Japan, the Reserve Bank 
of Australia, and the Reserve Bank of New Zealand. Some central banks make reference in 
their public statements to measures of core inflation in addition to exclusion-based measures, 
but I know of none that reference a nonexclusion-based measure without also referencing 
an exclusion-based measure. The Bank of England is alone among major central banks in 
making no references to core inflation in its public statements.





1￿￿ )2; implies that the ab-
solute value of its counterpart in the yield formula is increasing in the
maturity of the bond. As a result of this property, this third term intro-
duces a downward bias in the yield curve.13
That leaves the fourth term on the right-hand side of (32) to (34) as
the only one capable of making the yield curve slope up on average, as
it does in the U.S. data, according to Figure 2. The generic representa-
tion of the counterpart of this variance-related term in the yield formula








1￿￿ ): It is easy to verify that the arguments in
footnote 13 apply also to this term and that its absolute value, therefore,
increases as well with the maturity of the bond. It follows that this fourth
term cannot induce an upward-sloping yield curve unless it is made overall
positive by a negative covariance between the pricing kernel and the con-
temporaneous one-period bond price; that is, unless ￿(￿ + ￿)￿2
" < 0: For
the particular example under consideration, this condition is equivalent to
the requirement that the coe¢ cients on the unforecastable errors of the
autoregressive process (6), (￿ + ￿); and of the pricing kernel (17), ￿; have
the opposite sign.
The negative covariance condition is necessary but not su¢ cient to
generate an upward-sloping yield curve because the size of the covariance
matters, too: An overall positive but small covariance-related fourth term
might be overwhelmed by the overall negative variance-related third term.
In line with the discussion following equation (35), this would imply that
the bonds￿risk decreases with their maturity and that investors would
be willing to accept lower yields on long-term bonds than on short-term
bonds. Only a large enough negative covariance will make a bond of any
given maturity riskier than the preceding ones in the term structure and,
therefore, induce a positive slope in the yield curve.
The role that the sign and size of the covariance between lnmt+1 and
lnP
(1)
t+1 play in shaping the slope of the yield curve makes apparent why the
literature refers to the parameter ￿ as the price of risk: The last term in
formulas (32) to (34) can be interpreted as the total cost of risk associated
with a bond of a given maturity, obtained from multiplying the unit price
of risk ￿, which is the same for all maturities, by the quantity of risk
contained in each bond, measured by the remaining parameters in that
last term, which is typically di⁄erent for each maturity: (￿+￿)￿2
"=2 for the
two-period bond yield, (￿ + ￿)￿2
"
1
3[1 + (1 + ￿)] for the three-period bond
13To see this, divide both sides of formulas (32) to (34) by the length of the
associated maturity. Simple algebra shows that the size of the generic third term on




























































> 0; because 0 < ￿ < 1

















































living).2 If the cost of owner-occupied-housing services is proxied by mort-
gage interest expenses, then including that cost in a measure of inflation 
could mean, perversely, that a tighter monetary policy (a higher policy 
interest rate) causes a rise in measured inflation.3 The other main ratio-
nale for exclusion, evident in the Bank of Canada’s description of its core 
price index, is the elimination of highly volatile items from the inflation 
measure.4 This rationale, the reduction of volatility, will be my focus in 
this paper.
While PCE ex food and energy holds a special status as the core mea-
sure preferred by the Federal Reserve, the practices of other central banks 
make clear that there are alternatives to excluding all food and energy 
items (and only food and energy items). A look at disaggregated PCE 
data reveals that while food and energy items figure prominently among 
the components with the highest time series volatility, not all of the most 
volatile items are food or energy, and not all food and energy items rank 
among the most volatile.5 This fact suggests a closer examination of which 
items should be excluded if the aim is to produce an index with lower 
volatility than the headline index and still capture the longer-run trend in 
headline inflation.
In the next section, I begin the analysis by asking, simply, what are 
the most volatile items in the PCE? Rather than identifying the N most 
volatile items, for some N—à la the Bank of Canada’s core measure—I ask 
a somewhat different question. Food and energy make up roughly 20 per-
cent of the PCE by expenditure. What, then, are the most volatile items 
with aggregate weight of 20 percent? The list may be somewhat surpris-
ing. There are certainly plenty of food and energy items on the list but 
also computers, used autos, small electric appliances, women’s and girls’ 
clothing, airline services, and more. Also, many food items do not make 
the list—for example, cereals, bakery products, and “purchased meals: 
other than at schools,” which represents the price of meals at restaurants 
and bars. A common characteristic of food items not on the list (except 
for fish and seafood) is that they involve relatively more processing than 
raw items such as meats, eggs, fruits, and vegetables.
2 Inflation is commonly understood as a persistent and general increase in prices or an 
erosion of the purchasing power of a unit of money. More precise (and more operational) 
definitions are model-dependent. A cost of living index has a precise definition as the money 
cost to an economic unit (a household or individual) of maintaining a given level of well-
being in the face of changing prices. Astin (1999), in discussing the challenges of constructing 
harmonized inflation indexes for the euro area, provides a nice discussion of the different ends 
for which price indexes are constructed.
3 As stated on the Riksbank website (www.riksbank.com/templates/Page.aspx?id=10578), 
“Households’ mortgage interest expenditure is excluded more for reasons of clarity. It may in some 
cases be problematic for the Riksbank to explain why the immediate effect of a tighter monetary 
policy is that CPI inflation rises.”
4 Coincidentally, mortgage interest cost is also among the eight most volatile items 
excluded in the Bank of Canada’s core measure.
5 Bryan and Cecchetti (1994) make a similar point in reference to the exclusion of the 




4[1+(1+￿)+(1+￿+￿2)] for the four-period bond yield,







1￿￿ ) in general for the n-period bond.14
Thus, this analysis has established that the risk premia components
are di⁄erent for each maturity and also, important for the arguments to
follow, that they remain the same over time for any given maturity. This
is the key prediction of the expectations hypothesis. The fact that this
hypothesis holds for the particular one-factor model studied in this section
can be exploited to check whether long-run in￿ ation expectations are well-
anchored with the forward rates method discussed next.15
3. FORWARD RATES AND LONG-RUN INFLATION EXPECTATIONS
The Constant Risk Premia Case
Imagine an investor that at time t simultaneously performs the fol-





t ) units of an (n+j)-period zero-coupon bond. This op-
eration guarantees that the investor n periods later will receive $1, the face
value of the n-period bond he purchased at t, for which he will have to pay




t ):$1]; that is, the quantity
of (n + j)-period bonds he sold at t times their $1 face value.
Note that this sequence of ￿nancial transactions is equivalent to a
contract that guarantees to the investor at time t that he will be able to get





at time t+n+j. The total return on the loan over its j-period duration is




t )=$1, the annualized version of which















where FNt stands for nominal forward rate, given that nominal prices
appear in the right-hand side of the expression. In what follows, it will be











Replacing the recursive formula (28) in the right-hand side of (37)
for the case in which j = 1 results in the following expression for the
14Fisher (2001) o⁄ers an accessible and more detailed explanation of the di⁄erent
forces that shape the yield curve. See Backus and Zin (1994) for a rigorous statement
of the conditions that guarantee an upward-sloping yield curve. Piazzesi and Schneider
(2006) show that those conditions can be rationalized with microfoundations if in￿ation
is, on average, bad news for consumption growth.
15In fact, the expectations hypothesis is often formally stated using equation (36)
but with its right-hand side set equal to some constant. See chapter 10 of Campbell,

















































xclusion-based measures of core inflation—the traditional “inflation 
ex…” measures—have a long history. The Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(BLS) produced versions of the Consumer Price Index (CPI) excluding 
food and excluding shelter at least since the late 1950s, when those series 
first appeared in the annual Economic Report of the President. “CPI ex 
food and energy”—now taken almost synonymously with core inflation—
made its first appearance in the report in 1980. Many national statistical 
agencies produce inflation measures of this sort, and many central banks 
refer to these measures as guides for monetary policy.
For example, from 2004 to 2007, the Federal Reserve cast the inflation 
forecasts in its semiannual reports to Congress in terms of the price index 
for personal consumption expenditures (PCE) excluding food and energy; 
since 2008, the Fed has released forecasts for both headline PCE and PCE 
excluding food and energy. While “ex food and energy” seems to be the 
most common exclusion-based measure, others are in use. The Sveriges 
Riksbank refers in its public communications to a measure of consumer 
price inflation excluding mortgage interest costs and energy, while the 
Bank of Canada uses a CPI excluding the eight most volatile items as an 
operational guide for monetary policy.
Academic interest in exclusion-based core inflation measures began 
with Blinder (1982), who used them to analyze the high rates of infla-
tion experienced in the United States in the 1970s. In the 27 years since 
Blinder’s work, a number of alternative, nonexclusion-based measures of 
core inflation have been proposed. Silver (2007) provides a nice survey of 
this growing literature. Rich and Steindel (2007) present a comprehensive 
“horse race” among competing core inflation measures. Despite the pro-
liferation of alternative core inflation measures, exclusion-based measures 
appear to remain the most popular among policymakers, judging by the 
number of central banks that make some reference to exclusion-based core 
measures.1
In the core measures adopted by the Riksbank and the Bank of Cana-
da, the main rationales are evident for the exclusion of certain items from 
a measure of inflation. One is that the prices of some items, such as the 
service flow from owner-occupied housing, are difficult to measure. It is 
unclear whether proxies for those prices—or even the prices themselves—
convey useful information about inflation (as distinct from the cost of 
1 A comprehensive list would include not just the Federal Reserve, Sveriges Riksbank and 
Bank of Canada but also the European Central Bank, the Bank of Japan, the Reserve Bank 
of Australia, and the Reserve Bank of New Zealand. Some central banks make reference in 
their public statements to measures of core inflation in addition to exclusion-based measures, 
but I know of none that reference a nonexclusion-based measure without also referencing 
an exclusion-based measure. The Bank of England is alone among major central banks in 
making no references to core inflation in its public statements.
n-maturity one-period-ahead forward nominal rate:
lnFN
(n)!(n+1)






































where the second equality has been obtained after taking into account (29),
(30), and (31) and developing the square in the right-hand side of (30).
The expression explains the popularity of forward rates: The trick
of subtracting successive bond prices retains in the resulting expression
only the increments by which the coe¢ cients of the price formula (28) are
augmented in the process of going from one maturity to the next. As
a result, forward rates tend to approximate the long-run means of the
real interest rate and in￿ ation more accurately than the underlying yields
themselves.
This assertion can be veri￿ed by writing formula (38) for the concrete
case n = 3:
lnFN
(3)!(4)
















(1 + ￿ + ￿2)2(￿ + ￿)2￿2




Comparison of this expression with (34) con￿rms that only the tail
of the coe¢ cients A4, B4; and C4 enters into the forward rate. This is a
direct consequence, of course, of the incremental nature of the recursions
(29), (30), and (31).
Furthermore, for forward rates far into the future, the term associated
with deviations from long-run means will tend to be negligible. For ex-
ample, if ￿ = 0:8, a value not too far from those used in the literature
at annual frequencies, the coe¢ cient for the third term in the equation
corresponding to the fourteen-￿fteen-year forward rate will be ￿14 ￿ 0:04.
Such small numbers suggest that, for practical purposes, the third term
in the immediately preceding expression can be ignored when looking at
forward rates several periods ahead. For long enough maturities, therefore,
the general formula for nominal forward rates (38) can be approximated
with the simpler expression:
lnFN
(n)!(n+1)













where the ￿rst two terms pop up as a result of taking into account that (6)
and the assumption E[ln(1 + it)] = E[ln(1 + rt)] + E[ln(1 + ￿t)], justi￿ed
on page 19, imply ￿ ￿ 1
2￿2
" = E lnY
(1)















































living).2 If the cost of owner-occupied-housing services is proxied by mort-
gage interest expenses, then including that cost in a measure of inflation 
could mean, perversely, that a tighter monetary policy (a higher policy 
interest rate) causes a rise in measured inflation.3 The other main ratio-
nale for exclusion, evident in the Bank of Canada’s description of its core 
price index, is the elimination of highly volatile items from the inflation 
measure.4 This rationale, the reduction of volatility, will be my focus in 
this paper.
While PCE ex food and energy holds a special status as the core mea-
sure preferred by the Federal Reserve, the practices of other central banks 
make clear that there are alternatives to excluding all food and energy 
items (and only food and energy items). A look at disaggregated PCE 
data reveals that while food and energy items figure prominently among 
the components with the highest time series volatility, not all of the most 
volatile items are food or energy, and not all food and energy items rank 
among the most volatile.5 This fact suggests a closer examination of which 
items should be excluded if the aim is to produce an index with lower 
volatility than the headline index and still capture the longer-run trend in 
headline inflation.
In the next section, I begin the analysis by asking, simply, what are 
the most volatile items in the PCE? Rather than identifying the N most 
volatile items, for some N—à la the Bank of Canada’s core measure—I ask 
a somewhat different question. Food and energy make up roughly 20 per-
cent of the PCE by expenditure. What, then, are the most volatile items 
with aggregate weight of 20 percent? The list may be somewhat surpris-
ing. There are certainly plenty of food and energy items on the list but 
also computers, used autos, small electric appliances, women’s and girls’ 
clothing, airline services, and more. Also, many food items do not make 
the list—for example, cereals, bakery products, and “purchased meals: 
other than at schools,” which represents the price of meals at restaurants 
and bars. A common characteristic of food items not on the list (except 
for fish and seafood) is that they involve relatively more processing than 
raw items such as meats, eggs, fruits, and vegetables.
2 Inflation is commonly understood as a persistent and general increase in prices or an 
erosion of the purchasing power of a unit of money. More precise (and more operational) 
definitions are model-dependent. A cost of living index has a precise definition as the money 
cost to an economic unit (a household or individual) of maintaining a given level of well-
being in the face of changing prices. Astin (1999), in discussing the challenges of constructing 
harmonized inflation indexes for the euro area, provides a nice discussion of the different ends 
for which price indexes are constructed.
3 As stated on the Riksbank website (www.riksbank.com/templates/Page.aspx?id=10578), 
“Households’ mortgage interest expenditure is excluded more for reasons of clarity. It may in some 
cases be problematic for the Riksbank to explain why the immediate effect of a tighter monetary 
policy is that CPI inflation rises.”
4 Coincidentally, mortgage interest cost is also among the eight most volatile items 
excluded in the Bank of Canada’s core measure.
5 Bryan and Cecchetti (1994) make a similar point in reference to the exclusion of the 
component “food away from home” from CPI ex food and energy.
A remarkable implication of approximation (39) is that the plot of a
time series of forward rates between any two given maturities in the distant
future will look like a ￿ at line if long-run in￿ ation expectations are well
anchored at the long-run in￿ ation rate E ln(1 + ￿t). This is because, by
assumption, the real interest rate has a well-de￿ned long-run mean and
because the last two terms are constant for each maturity, given that they
correspond to the tails of risk premia components generated by a single-
factor model for which the expectations hypothesis holds.
The preceding analysis suggests that there is a relatively straightfor-
ward test to check whether long-run in￿ ation expectations are well an-
chored or not when the expectations hypothesis is satis￿ed. The inspiration
for such a test comes from many studies in the literature, such as that by
Rudebusch (1998) and the one by Clarida, Gal￿, and Gertler (2000) men-
tioned in the introduction, which maintain the hypothesis in their analyses
and, as a result, predict that forward rates far into the future should be
unresponsive to monetary policy surprises.
G￿rkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2005) tested that implication by run-
ning regressions of U.S. forward rates of di⁄erent maturities on indicators
of monetary policy surprises. They found that even forward rates far into
the future move quite a bit in response to unexpected changes in monetary
policy. If the real interest rate exhibits mean reversion in the long run and
the risk premium component of the forward rate is constant, as the ref-
erence models assume, the only thing that can move forward rates in the
long end of the term structure is nonanchored in￿ ation expectations or,
equivalently, an in￿ ation process that doesn￿ t have a well-de￿ned long-run
mean. This could be a hint that the monetary policy regime in place is
such that it prompts revisions of long-run in￿ ation expectations every time
the monetary authority surprises the markets with a decision.
However, as G￿rkaynak, Sack, and Swanson were quick to point out,
it is also possible that the assumptions of the reference models are not sat-
is￿ed in reality. It could be, for example, that contrary to the assumption
made in deriving (39), the real interest rate does not ￿ uctuate around any
well-de￿ned long-run mean but instead drifts over time in a random walk
fashion.16 It is clear from inspection of (39) that permanent movements
of the real interest rate could be responsible for movements of the forward
rates in the long end of the term structure.
Alternatively, it could be that the expectations hypothesis does not
hold and that the last two terms in (39) appear to be constant only as
a result of model misspeci￿cation. Observers unaware of this fact would
tend to attribute ￿ uctuations in forward rates in the far end of the term
structure to unanchored long-term in￿ ation expectations, when the real
source of such ￿ uctuations is time-varying risk premia. Because that seems
to be a more empirically appealing assumption, as documented earlier,
it is imperative to examine in the next section its implications for the
interpretation of in￿ ation-expectations indicators constructed from forward
rates.
16As documented in Phillips (1998), the stochastic properties of the real interest
















































xclusion-based measures of core inflation—the traditional “inflation 
ex…” measures—have a long history. The Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(BLS) produced versions of the Consumer Price Index (CPI) excluding 
food and excluding shelter at least since the late 1950s, when those series 
first appeared in the annual Economic Report of the President. “CPI ex 
food and energy”—now taken almost synonymously with core inflation—
made its first appearance in the report in 1980. Many national statistical 
agencies produce inflation measures of this sort, and many central banks 
refer to these measures as guides for monetary policy.
For example, from 2004 to 2007, the Federal Reserve cast the inflation 
forecasts in its semiannual reports to Congress in terms of the price index 
for personal consumption expenditures (PCE) excluding food and energy; 
since 2008, the Fed has released forecasts for both headline PCE and PCE 
excluding food and energy. While “ex food and energy” seems to be the 
most common exclusion-based measure, others are in use. The Sveriges 
Riksbank refers in its public communications to a measure of consumer 
price inflation excluding mortgage interest costs and energy, while the 
Bank of Canada uses a CPI excluding the eight most volatile items as an 
operational guide for monetary policy.
Academic interest in exclusion-based core inflation measures began 
with Blinder (1982), who used them to analyze the high rates of infla-
tion experienced in the United States in the 1970s. In the 27 years since 
Blinder’s work, a number of alternative, nonexclusion-based measures of 
core inflation have been proposed. Silver (2007) provides a nice survey of 
this growing literature. Rich and Steindel (2007) present a comprehensive 
“horse race” among competing core inflation measures. Despite the pro-
liferation of alternative core inflation measures, exclusion-based measures 
appear to remain the most popular among policymakers, judging by the 
number of central banks that make some reference to exclusion-based core 
measures.1
In the core measures adopted by the Riksbank and the Bank of Cana-
da, the main rationales are evident for the exclusion of certain items from 
a measure of inflation. One is that the prices of some items, such as the 
service flow from owner-occupied housing, are difficult to measure. It is 
unclear whether proxies for those prices—or even the prices themselves—
convey useful information about inflation (as distinct from the cost of 
1 A comprehensive list would include not just the Federal Reserve, Sveriges Riksbank and 
Bank of Canada but also the European Central Bank, the Bank of Japan, the Reserve Bank 
of Australia, and the Reserve Bank of New Zealand. Some central banks make reference in 
their public statements to measures of core inflation in addition to exclusion-based measures, 
but I know of none that reference a nonexclusion-based measure without also referencing 
an exclusion-based measure. The Bank of England is alone among major central banks in 
making no references to core inflation in its public statements.
The Time-Varying Risk Premia Case
Disentangling the Nominal and Real Pricing Kernels. The implica-
tions of time-varying risk premia for the interpretation of in￿ ation-ex-
pectations indicators constructed from forward rates will become more
transparent by distinguishing between nominal and real government bond
prices. That can be accomplished by decomposing the nominal pricing
kernel as shown in this section into a real part, which prices government
bonds in real terms, and an in￿ ation part, which transforms those real
prices into nominal ones.
The starting point for that decomposition is the observation that up
to now, government bonds have been priced in nominal terms and that the
underlying pricing kernel is therefore a nominal pricing kernel, a fact that
will be convenient to recognize with the notation m$
t+1. With this new























The real pricing kernel should price bonds according to their value in
real terms, which can be calculated by dividing each period￿ s nominal price















where mt+1 denotes the real pricing kernel.
Multiplying both sides of the last equation by Pt connects the real






whose logarithmic transformation is:
lnm$




Note that if the price level is increasing, the fraction Pt=Pt+1 is a
number less than 1, which implies that ln(Pt=Pt+1) is a negative number.
Formula (43) therefore has an intuitive interpretation: It says that in the
presence of in￿ ation, nominal bonds should be more heavily discounted
than real bonds, with the additional discount approximately equal to the
in￿ ation rate. This representation of the pricing kernel has the ￿ avor of
the Fisher relationship brie￿ y introduced on page 19.
For subsequent algebraic manipulations, it is more convenient to rep-
resent equation (43) in the equivalent form:
lnm$















































living).2 If the cost of owner-occupied-housing services is proxied by mort-
gage interest expenses, then including that cost in a measure of inflation 
could mean, perversely, that a tighter monetary policy (a higher policy 
interest rate) causes a rise in measured inflation.3 The other main ratio-
nale for exclusion, evident in the Bank of Canada’s description of its core 
price index, is the elimination of highly volatile items from the inflation 
measure.4 This rationale, the reduction of volatility, will be my focus in 
this paper.
While PCE ex food and energy holds a special status as the core mea-
sure preferred by the Federal Reserve, the practices of other central banks 
make clear that there are alternatives to excluding all food and energy 
items (and only food and energy items). A look at disaggregated PCE 
data reveals that while food and energy items figure prominently among 
the components with the highest time series volatility, not all of the most 
volatile items are food or energy, and not all food and energy items rank 
among the most volatile.5 This fact suggests a closer examination of which 
items should be excluded if the aim is to produce an index with lower 
volatility than the headline index and still capture the longer-run trend in 
headline inflation.
In the next section, I begin the analysis by asking, simply, what are 
the most volatile items in the PCE? Rather than identifying the N most 
volatile items, for some N—à la the Bank of Canada’s core measure—I ask 
a somewhat different question. Food and energy make up roughly 20 per-
cent of the PCE by expenditure. What, then, are the most volatile items 
with aggregate weight of 20 percent? The list may be somewhat surpris-
ing. There are certainly plenty of food and energy items on the list but 
also computers, used autos, small electric appliances, women’s and girls’ 
clothing, airline services, and more. Also, many food items do not make 
the list—for example, cereals, bakery products, and “purchased meals: 
other than at schools,” which represents the price of meals at restaurants 
and bars. A common characteristic of food items not on the list (except 
for fish and seafood) is that they involve relatively more processing than 
raw items such as meats, eggs, fruits, and vegetables.
2 Inflation is commonly understood as a persistent and general increase in prices or an 
erosion of the purchasing power of a unit of money. More precise (and more operational) 
definitions are model-dependent. A cost of living index has a precise definition as the money 
cost to an economic unit (a household or individual) of maintaining a given level of well-
being in the face of changing prices. Astin (1999), in discussing the challenges of constructing 
harmonized inflation indexes for the euro area, provides a nice discussion of the different ends 
for which price indexes are constructed.
3 As stated on the Riksbank website (www.riksbank.com/templates/Page.aspx?id=10578), 
“Households’ mortgage interest expenditure is excluded more for reasons of clarity. It may in some 
cases be problematic for the Riksbank to explain why the immediate effect of a tighter monetary 
policy is that CPI inflation rises.”
4 Coincidentally, mortgage interest cost is also among the eight most volatile items 
excluded in the Bank of Canada’s core measure.
5 Bryan and Cecchetti (1994) make a similar point in reference to the exclusion of the 
component “food away from home” from CPI ex food and energy.
in which, for consistency with previous notation, 1 + ￿t+1 =
Pt+1
Pt .
The expression suggests that if the logarithms of the stochastic real
pricing kernel mt+1 and the gross in￿ ation component (1 + ￿t+1) can be
represented as linear functions of state variables or factors, the nominal
pricing kernel will inherit that property as well. This additivity is one
feature of a¢ ne factor models that accounts for their tractability because it
makes it possible to infer the in￿ ation-expectations component imbedded in
bond prices with the simple algebraic operation of subtracting real forward
rates from nominal ones.
The Real Pricing Kernel. A ￿rst step in disentangling nominal from
real variables is to start out with a pricing kernel in the class of a¢ ne
factor models that can price government bonds in real terms with the
asset-pricing formula (42). One such speci￿cation of the stochastic real
pricing kernel proposed in the literature that will be particularly useful for
the purpose of this article is:
￿lnmt+1 = ￿ + ￿c ln
ct
ct￿1
+ ￿v vt + ￿c￿c
p
vt "c;t+1 + ￿v￿v"v;t+1; (45)
where ct stands for aggregate real consumption and ct=ct￿1 for aggregate
real consumption growth, vt is a stochastic variable to be de￿ned later, ￿c
and ￿v are strictly positive scalars, and "c;t+1 and "v;t+1 are identically
and independently distributed normal random variables with mean 0 and
variance equal to 1.17
In light of the interpretation of expression (18) o⁄ered earlier, it fol-
lows that this particular two-factor pricing kernel generates time-varying
risk premia because it sets one of the scalars ￿h;l in the radicand of that
expression, ￿1;2, to a strictly positive value. That implication is given away
by the fact that, in contrast with the one-factor model studied in the pre-
vious section, one of the unforecastable errors, "c;t+1, appears multiplied
by the square root of the level of one of the factors in the model, vt.
Although this two-factor real pricing kernel may appear arbitrary, it
can be derived, as demonstrated by Gallmeyer et al. (2007), from con-
sumers￿choice theory in the spirit of the straight-engineering approach
discussed in Appendix A. Moreover, those authors show that the pric-
ing kernel inherits its square-root element from the following stochastic
process with which they propose to capture the behavior of real consump-










where 0 < ￿c < 1 is a coe¢ cient that captures the persistence of real con-
sumption growth, ￿c is the long-run average of that variable (i.e.,
17Notice that this pricing kernel can be obtained from the general a¢ ne expression
(18) after multiplying both sides of that expression by -1 and setting ￿ = ￿, q = 2,
￿1 = ￿c, F1 = ln
ct
ct￿1 , ￿2 = ￿v, F2 = vt, ￿1 = ￿c, ￿1 = 0, ￿1;1 = 0, ￿1;2 = ￿2
c,
"1;t+1 = "c;t+1, ￿2 = ￿v, ￿2 = ￿2
v, ￿2;1 = 0, ￿2;2 = 0, and "2;t+1 = "v;t+1. Thus, the
stochastic pricing kernel (45) is a two-factor a¢ ne model with factors ln
ct
ct￿1 and vt,
















































xclusion-based measures of core inflation—the traditional “inflation 
ex…” measures—have a long history. The Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(BLS) produced versions of the Consumer Price Index (CPI) excluding 
food and excluding shelter at least since the late 1950s, when those series 
first appeared in the annual Economic Report of the President. “CPI ex 
food and energy”—now taken almost synonymously with core inflation—
made its first appearance in the report in 1980. Many national statistical 
agencies produce inflation measures of this sort, and many central banks 
refer to these measures as guides for monetary policy.
For example, from 2004 to 2007, the Federal Reserve cast the inflation 
forecasts in its semiannual reports to Congress in terms of the price index 
for personal consumption expenditures (PCE) excluding food and energy; 
since 2008, the Fed has released forecasts for both headline PCE and PCE 
excluding food and energy. While “ex food and energy” seems to be the 
most common exclusion-based measure, others are in use. The Sveriges 
Riksbank refers in its public communications to a measure of consumer 
price inflation excluding mortgage interest costs and energy, while the 
Bank of Canada uses a CPI excluding the eight most volatile items as an 
operational guide for monetary policy.
Academic interest in exclusion-based core inflation measures began 
with Blinder (1982), who used them to analyze the high rates of infla-
tion experienced in the United States in the 1970s. In the 27 years since 
Blinder’s work, a number of alternative, nonexclusion-based measures of 
core inflation have been proposed. Silver (2007) provides a nice survey of 
this growing literature. Rich and Steindel (2007) present a comprehensive 
“horse race” among competing core inflation measures. Despite the pro-
liferation of alternative core inflation measures, exclusion-based measures 
appear to remain the most popular among policymakers, judging by the 
number of central banks that make some reference to exclusion-based core 
measures.1
In the core measures adopted by the Riksbank and the Bank of Cana-
da, the main rationales are evident for the exclusion of certain items from 
a measure of inflation. One is that the prices of some items, such as the 
service flow from owner-occupied housing, are difficult to measure. It is 
unclear whether proxies for those prices—or even the prices themselves—
convey useful information about inflation (as distinct from the cost of 
1 A comprehensive list would include not just the Federal Reserve, Sveriges Riksbank and 
Bank of Canada but also the European Central Bank, the Bank of Japan, the Reserve Bank 
of Australia, and the Reserve Bank of New Zealand. Some central banks make reference in 
their public statements to measures of core inflation in addition to exclusion-based measures, 
but I know of none that reference a nonexclusion-based measure without also referencing 
an exclusion-based measure. The Bank of England is alone among major central banks in 
making no references to core inflation in its public statements.
E[ln
ct+1
ct ] = ￿c), the innovation "c;t+1 is an identically and independently
distributed normal random variable with mean 0 and variance equal to 1,
and vt is a stochastic variable whose dynamics is governed by the following
univariate autoregressive process:
vt+1 = (1 ￿ ￿v)￿v + ￿vvt + ￿v"v;t+1; (47)
where 0 < ￿v < 1, ￿v = E[vt], and "v;t+1 is, as usual, an identically
and independently distributed normal random variable with mean 0 and
variance equal to 1.
Notice that the speci￿cation for real consumption growth implies that
its conditional variance, V art[ln
ct+1
ct ] = Et[ln
ct+1
ct ￿ Et ln
ct+1
ct ]2 = ￿2
cvt,
is not constant (homoskedastic) but varies over time with the level of an-
other variable (heteroskedastic). It is this feature of the pricing kernel that
introduces time-varying risk premia into government bond prices.18
But that is not the only reason for appealing to a square-root spec-
i￿cation for the unforecastable error in the stochastic process governing
real consumption growth. A more important consideration is empirical in
nature: The evidence extensively documented by Bansal and Yaron (2004)
strongly suggests that the conditional variance of real consumption growth
is time varying.
The Dynamics of the In￿ ation Rate. As hinted at by the discussion
following expression (44), all it takes to go from the real pricing kernel to
the nominal one is to specify a stochastic process for the in￿ ation rate that
is also a linear function of state variables or factors. Following Gallmeyer
et al. (2007), the dynamics of the in￿ ation rate is assumed to be given by
the stochastic process:
ln(1 + ￿t+1) = ￿ ￿ + ￿c ln
ct+1
ct
+ ￿vvt+1 + ￿sst+1; (48)
where ￿ ￿, ￿c, ￿v, and ￿s are constant coe¢ cients and st is a stochastic
nominal variable with autoregressive representation:
st+1 = ￿sst + ￿s"s;t+1; (49)
where 0 < ￿s < 1 and "s;t is, as usual, an identically and independently
distributed normal random variable with mean 0 and variance equal to
1. Conceptually, st captures the nonsystematic component of monetary
policy; that is, unanticipated policy moves.
Notice that, according to this speci￿cation, positive monetary policy
surprises cancel out negative ones on average; that is, E[st] = 0. As a
18In fact, if the conditional variance of real consumption growth were constant over
time, the real pricing kernel would collapse to a one-factor model, with real consumption
growth the only factor. With some violation of rigor, this assertion can be intuitively
veri￿ed by setting vt = 1 for all t in (45). The proper procedure, however, is to follow
the same steps as in Gallmeyer et al. (2007) and show that the pricing kernel for the


















































living).2 If the cost of owner-occupied-housing services is proxied by mort-
gage interest expenses, then including that cost in a measure of inflation 
could mean, perversely, that a tighter monetary policy (a higher policy 
interest rate) causes a rise in measured inflation.3 The other main ratio-
nale for exclusion, evident in the Bank of Canada’s description of its core 
price index, is the elimination of highly volatile items from the inflation 
measure.4 This rationale, the reduction of volatility, will be my focus in 
this paper.
While PCE ex food and energy holds a special status as the core mea-
sure preferred by the Federal Reserve, the practices of other central banks 
make clear that there are alternatives to excluding all food and energy 
items (and only food and energy items). A look at disaggregated PCE 
data reveals that while food and energy items figure prominently among 
the components with the highest time series volatility, not all of the most 
volatile items are food or energy, and not all food and energy items rank 
among the most volatile.5 This fact suggests a closer examination of which 
items should be excluded if the aim is to produce an index with lower 
volatility than the headline index and still capture the longer-run trend in 
headline inflation.
In the next section, I begin the analysis by asking, simply, what are 
the most volatile items in the PCE? Rather than identifying the N most 
volatile items, for some N—à la the Bank of Canada’s core measure—I ask 
a somewhat different question. Food and energy make up roughly 20 per-
cent of the PCE by expenditure. What, then, are the most volatile items 
with aggregate weight of 20 percent? The list may be somewhat surpris-
ing. There are certainly plenty of food and energy items on the list but 
also computers, used autos, small electric appliances, women’s and girls’ 
clothing, airline services, and more. Also, many food items do not make 
the list—for example, cereals, bakery products, and “purchased meals: 
other than at schools,” which represents the price of meals at restaurants 
and bars. A common characteristic of food items not on the list (except 
for fish and seafood) is that they involve relatively more processing than 
raw items such as meats, eggs, fruits, and vegetables.
2 Inflation is commonly understood as a persistent and general increase in prices or an 
erosion of the purchasing power of a unit of money. More precise (and more operational) 
definitions are model-dependent. A cost of living index has a precise definition as the money 
cost to an economic unit (a household or individual) of maintaining a given level of well-
being in the face of changing prices. Astin (1999), in discussing the challenges of constructing 
harmonized inflation indexes for the euro area, provides a nice discussion of the different ends 
for which price indexes are constructed.
3 As stated on the Riksbank website (www.riksbank.com/templates/Page.aspx?id=10578), 
“Households’ mortgage interest expenditure is excluded more for reasons of clarity. It may in some 
cases be problematic for the Riksbank to explain why the immediate effect of a tighter monetary 
policy is that CPI inflation rises.”
4 Coincidentally, mortgage interest cost is also among the eight most volatile items 
excluded in the Bank of Canada’s core measure.
5 Bryan and Cecchetti (1994) make a similar point in reference to the exclusion of the 
component “food away from home” from CPI ex food and energy.
result, such surprises have no impact on the long-run in￿ ation rate given
by:
E[ln(1 + ￿t)] = ￿ ￿ + ￿c￿c + ￿v￿v: (50)
Another feature of the stochastic process characterizing monetary pol-
icy is that its conditional variance, V art[st+1] = Et[st+1 ￿ Et(st)]2 = ￿2
s,
is homoskedastic.19
Taking into account (46), (47), and (49), expression (48) can be rewrit-
ten:




+ ￿v￿vvt + ￿s￿sst +
￿c￿c
p
vt "c;t+1 + ￿v￿v"v;t+1 + ￿s￿s"s;t+1: (51)
The Nominal Pricing Kernel. For the reasons given in the subsection
￿Disentangling the Nominal and Real Pricing Kernels￿on page 26, it is
legitimate to add the real pricing kernel (45) to the in￿ ation process (51) to
obtain a three-factor-model representation of the nominal pricing kernel:
￿lnm$
t+1 = ￿lnmt+1 + ln(1 + ￿t+1)




+ (￿v + ￿v￿v)vt + ￿s￿sst +
(￿c + ￿c)￿c
p
vt "c;t+1 + (￿v + ￿v)￿v"v;t+1 + ￿s￿s"s;t+1




+ (￿v + ￿v￿v)vt + ￿s￿sst +
(￿c + ￿c)￿c
p
vt "c;t+1 + (￿v + ￿v)￿v"v;t+1 + ￿s￿s"s;t+1:
(52)
Several features of this nominal pricing kernel are worth noticing.
First, the dependence of that kernel on long-run in￿ ation expectations,
represented by the term E[ln(1+￿t)]; has been made explicit by plugging
(50) into the second equality in (52). Second, the source of time-varying
risk premia in this three-factor model, as shown later, is the term containing p
vt. Third, the nominal variable st, ultimately responsible for capturing
the e⁄ects of monetary policy on the short-term ￿ uctuations of in￿ ation
around its long-run mean, turns the two-factor model of the real pricing
kernel into a three-factor model of the nominal pricing kernel.
19Although readers may feel uncomfortable with the seemingly arbitrary assump-
tion that the in￿ation rate follows the stochastic process (48), again Gallmeyer et al.
(2007) show that this dynamics emerges endogenously in an endowment economy char-
acterized by the real pricing kernel (45) and where the monetary policy instrument￿ the
short-term interest rate￿ is set to the level determined by a Taylor-like rule. The sys-
tematic component of that rule is a linear function of the logarithm of real consumption
growth, ln
ct


















































xclusion-based measures of core inflation—the traditional “inflation 
ex…” measures—have a long history. The Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(BLS) produced versions of the Consumer Price Index (CPI) excluding 
food and excluding shelter at least since the late 1950s, when those series 
first appeared in the annual Economic Report of the President. “CPI ex 
food and energy”—now taken almost synonymously with core inflation—
made its first appearance in the report in 1980. Many national statistical 
agencies produce inflation measures of this sort, and many central banks 
refer to these measures as guides for monetary policy.
For example, from 2004 to 2007, the Federal Reserve cast the inflation 
forecasts in its semiannual reports to Congress in terms of the price index 
for personal consumption expenditures (PCE) excluding food and energy; 
since 2008, the Fed has released forecasts for both headline PCE and PCE 
excluding food and energy. While “ex food and energy” seems to be the 
most common exclusion-based measure, others are in use. The Sveriges 
Riksbank refers in its public communications to a measure of consumer 
price inflation excluding mortgage interest costs and energy, while the 
Bank of Canada uses a CPI excluding the eight most volatile items as an 
operational guide for monetary policy.
Academic interest in exclusion-based core inflation measures began 
with Blinder (1982), who used them to analyze the high rates of infla-
tion experienced in the United States in the 1970s. In the 27 years since 
Blinder’s work, a number of alternative, nonexclusion-based measures of 
core inflation have been proposed. Silver (2007) provides a nice survey of 
this growing literature. Rich and Steindel (2007) present a comprehensive 
“horse race” among competing core inflation measures. Despite the pro-
liferation of alternative core inflation measures, exclusion-based measures 
appear to remain the most popular among policymakers, judging by the 
number of central banks that make some reference to exclusion-based core 
measures.1
In the core measures adopted by the Riksbank and the Bank of Cana-
da, the main rationales are evident for the exclusion of certain items from 
a measure of inflation. One is that the prices of some items, such as the 
service flow from owner-occupied housing, are difficult to measure. It is 
unclear whether proxies for those prices—or even the prices themselves—
convey useful information about inflation (as distinct from the cost of 
1 A comprehensive list would include not just the Federal Reserve, Sveriges Riksbank and 
Bank of Canada but also the European Central Bank, the Bank of Japan, the Reserve Bank 
of Australia, and the Reserve Bank of New Zealand. Some central banks make reference in 
their public statements to measures of core inflation in addition to exclusion-based measures, 
but I know of none that reference a nonexclusion-based measure without also referencing 
an exclusion-based measure. The Bank of England is alone among major central banks in 
making no references to core inflation in its public statements.
Nominal Government Bond Prices. Equipped with the nominal and
real pricing kernels, it is possible to compute the nominal and real bond
prices for all maturities with the pricing formulas (40) and (42), respec-
tively, through the series of tedious steps outlined at the beginning of the
section ￿A One-Factor Model of the Yield Curve￿on page 14. Fortunately,
given the a¢ ne structure of both kernels and the lognormal distribution of
the relevant variables, the more handy recursive formula presented at the
end of that section is valid as well. Thus, nominal government bond prices
can be readily computed with a more general version of formula (28):
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] + Dv;nV art[vt+1] + Ds;nV art[st+1];
(53)
whose coe¢ cients, following the steps outlined in the section just men-
tioned, can be calculated sequentially from the recursions:
An = An￿1 + ￿ ￿ + ￿c￿c + ￿v￿v + ￿ + ￿c￿c +
￿




Bc;n = Bc;n￿1 + ￿n￿1
c (￿c + ￿c￿c);
Bv;n = Bv;n￿1 + ￿n￿1
v (￿v + ￿v￿v);
Bs;n = Bs;n￿1 + ￿n￿1
s ￿s￿s;
Dc;n = ￿vDc;n￿1 ￿
1
2
(￿c + ￿c + Bc;n￿1)2;
Dv;n = Dv;n￿1 ￿
1
2
(￿v + ￿v + Bv;n￿1 + ￿2
cDc;n￿1)2;
Ds;n = Ds;n￿1 ￿
1
2
(￿s + Bs;n￿1)2; (54)
with initial conditions A0 = Bc;0 = Bv;0 = Bs;0 = Dc;0 = Dv;0 = Ds;0 = 0
implied by the restriction that the price of the one-period bond generated
by formula (53) is equal to that generated by the basic formula (41).20
20Readers with training in ￿nance might be tempted to compute the nomi-
nal price of a bond of a given maturity n with the theoretically equivalent multi-
period version of formula (40) that can be obtained after repeatedly substituting the
prices that pop up sequentially in the right-hand side of that equation for replicas







t+n]: However, the process of computing prices with
this alternative formula is not just tedious but analytically intractable because under
the square-root speci￿cation for the standard deviation of real consumption growth as-
sumed in (46), the factor ln
ct+1
ct and the log of the nominal pricing kernel, ln m$
t+1, are
normally distributed conditional on ln
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living).2 If the cost of owner-occupied-housing services is proxied by mort-
gage interest expenses, then including that cost in a measure of inflation 
could mean, perversely, that a tighter monetary policy (a higher policy 
interest rate) causes a rise in measured inflation.3 The other main ratio-
nale for exclusion, evident in the Bank of Canada’s description of its core 
price index, is the elimination of highly volatile items from the inflation 
measure.4 This rationale, the reduction of volatility, will be my focus in 
this paper.
While PCE ex food and energy holds a special status as the core mea-
sure preferred by the Federal Reserve, the practices of other central banks 
make clear that there are alternatives to excluding all food and energy 
items (and only food and energy items). A look at disaggregated PCE 
data reveals that while food and energy items figure prominently among 
the components with the highest time series volatility, not all of the most 
volatile items are food or energy, and not all food and energy items rank 
among the most volatile.5 This fact suggests a closer examination of which 
items should be excluded if the aim is to produce an index with lower 
volatility than the headline index and still capture the longer-run trend in 
headline inflation.
In the next section, I begin the analysis by asking, simply, what are 
the most volatile items in the PCE? Rather than identifying the N most 
volatile items, for some N—à la the Bank of Canada’s core measure—I ask 
a somewhat different question. Food and energy make up roughly 20 per-
cent of the PCE by expenditure. What, then, are the most volatile items 
with aggregate weight of 20 percent? The list may be somewhat surpris-
ing. There are certainly plenty of food and energy items on the list but 
also computers, used autos, small electric appliances, women’s and girls’ 
clothing, airline services, and more. Also, many food items do not make 
the list—for example, cereals, bakery products, and “purchased meals: 
other than at schools,” which represents the price of meals at restaurants 
and bars. A common characteristic of food items not on the list (except 
for fish and seafood) is that they involve relatively more processing than 
raw items such as meats, eggs, fruits, and vegetables.
2 Inflation is commonly understood as a persistent and general increase in prices or an 
erosion of the purchasing power of a unit of money. More precise (and more operational) 
definitions are model-dependent. A cost of living index has a precise definition as the money 
cost to an economic unit (a household or individual) of maintaining a given level of well-
being in the face of changing prices. Astin (1999), in discussing the challenges of constructing 
harmonized inflation indexes for the euro area, provides a nice discussion of the different ends 
for which price indexes are constructed.
3 As stated on the Riksbank website (www.riksbank.com/templates/Page.aspx?id=10578), 
“Households’ mortgage interest expenditure is excluded more for reasons of clarity. It may in some 
cases be problematic for the Riksbank to explain why the immediate effect of a tighter monetary 
policy is that CPI inflation rises.”
4 Coincidentally, mortgage interest cost is also among the eight most volatile items 
excluded in the Bank of Canada’s core measure.
5 Bryan and Cecchetti (1994) make a similar point in reference to the exclusion of the 
component “food away from home” from CPI ex food and energy.
Notice that the formal structure of this price formula￿ like that for the
one-factor model studied earlier￿ groups terms in three broad categories:
a constant, those associated with the short-term dynamics induced by de-
viations of each factor from its corresponding long-run mean (recall that
E[ln ct
ct￿1] = ￿c;E[vt] = ￿v; and E[st] = 0), and those associated with the
conditional variances of the factors.
Inspection of the recursions (54) reveals that in the latter category,
only the coe¢ cient corresponding to the variance of the real consump-
tion growth factor, Dc;n, doesn￿ t follow the pattern of the comparable
coe¢ cient Cn in the one-factor model with constant risk premia studied
from page 14 onward (see expression 30). The anomaly is that the in-
cremental risk premium between successive maturities attributable to the
consumption factor, captured by the di⁄erence Dc;n ￿Dc;n￿1, is not inde-
pendent from the coe¢ cient for the shorter maturity in that di⁄erential,
Dc;n￿1. That is, each element Dc;n in the sequence of coe¢ cients fDc;ng
is obtained by adding to the immediately preceding element the amount
(￿v ￿ 1)Dc;n￿1 ￿ 1
2(￿c + ￿c + Bc;n￿1)2, an increment not independent
from the previous element in the sequence Dc;n￿1. By contrast, the co-
e¢ cients in the sequence fBc;ng are augmented from one maturity to the
next by ￿n￿1
c (￿c + ￿c￿c), an increment independent from the coe¢ cient
corresponding to the immediately preceding maturity Bc;n￿1.
The out-of-pattern behavior in the coe¢ cients associated with the con-
ditional variance of consumption, Dc;n, is not by chance. It has to do with
the fact that real consumption growth is the only one of the three factors
in the speci￿c model studied in this section whose conditional variance
changes over time (recall that V art[ln
ct+1
ct ] = ￿2
cvt). It is through this
real consumption growth factor that time-varying risk premia enter into
forward rates, potentially creating havoc with the readings of in￿ ation-
expectations indicators constructed using those rates.
Real Government Bond Prices. The preceding section suggests that
the same series of steps invoked there could be applied to produce a recur-
sive formula that prices government bonds in real terms using the factors
that enter into the pricing kernel (45). Indeed, that is the case, with the
resulting formula given by:
￿lnp
(n)
t = an + bc;n(ln
ct
ct￿1




] + dv;nV art[vt+1]; (55)
where p
(n)
t stands for the price of a government bond that delivers one unit
of the consumption good (rather than $1) at its expiration at time t + n

















































xclusion-based measures of core inflation—the traditional “inflation 
ex…” measures—have a long history. The Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(BLS) produced versions of the Consumer Price Index (CPI) excluding 
food and excluding shelter at least since the late 1950s, when those series 
first appeared in the annual Economic Report of the President. “CPI ex 
food and energy”—now taken almost synonymously with core inflation—
made its first appearance in the report in 1980. Many national statistical 
agencies produce inflation measures of this sort, and many central banks 
refer to these measures as guides for monetary policy.
For example, from 2004 to 2007, the Federal Reserve cast the inflation 
forecasts in its semiannual reports to Congress in terms of the price index 
for personal consumption expenditures (PCE) excluding food and energy; 
since 2008, the Fed has released forecasts for both headline PCE and PCE 
excluding food and energy. While “ex food and energy” seems to be the 
most common exclusion-based measure, others are in use. The Sveriges 
Riksbank refers in its public communications to a measure of consumer 
price inflation excluding mortgage interest costs and energy, while the 
Bank of Canada uses a CPI excluding the eight most volatile items as an 
operational guide for monetary policy.
Academic interest in exclusion-based core inflation measures began 
with Blinder (1982), who used them to analyze the high rates of infla-
tion experienced in the United States in the 1970s. In the 27 years since 
Blinder’s work, a number of alternative, nonexclusion-based measures of 
core inflation have been proposed. Silver (2007) provides a nice survey of 
this growing literature. Rich and Steindel (2007) present a comprehensive 
“horse race” among competing core inflation measures. Despite the pro-
liferation of alternative core inflation measures, exclusion-based measures 
appear to remain the most popular among policymakers, judging by the 
number of central banks that make some reference to exclusion-based core 
measures.1
In the core measures adopted by the Riksbank and the Bank of Cana-
da, the main rationales are evident for the exclusion of certain items from 
a measure of inflation. One is that the prices of some items, such as the 
service flow from owner-occupied housing, are difficult to measure. It is 
unclear whether proxies for those prices—or even the prices themselves—
convey useful information about inflation (as distinct from the cost of 
1 A comprehensive list would include not just the Federal Reserve, Sveriges Riksbank and 
Bank of Canada but also the European Central Bank, the Bank of Japan, the Reserve Bank 
of Australia, and the Reserve Bank of New Zealand. Some central banks make reference in 
their public statements to measures of core inflation in addition to exclusion-based measures, 
but I know of none that reference a nonexclusion-based measure without also referencing 
an exclusion-based measure. The Bank of England is alone among major central banks in 
making no references to core inflation in its public statements.
an = an￿1 + ￿ + ￿c￿c +
￿




bc;n = bc;n￿1 + ￿n￿1
c ￿c;
bv;n = bv;n￿1 + ￿n￿1
v ￿v;




dv;n = dv;n￿1 ￿
1
2
(￿v + bv;n￿1 + ￿2
cdc;n￿1)2; (56)
with initial conditions a0 = bc;0 = bv;0 = dc;0 = dv;0 = 0 implied by
the restriction that the real price of the one-period bond generated by the
formula must be the same as that generated with the basic real bond pricing
formula p
(1)
t = Et[mt+1]. Recall that by the no-arbitrage condition, the
real price of a bond issued at t + 1 that pays one unit of the consumption
good in that same period, p
(0)
t+1, must be 1.21
Because no nominal variables enter into the real pricing kernel, real
bond prices depend on just the two real factors present in the two-factor
pricing kernel (45): real consumption growth and its volatility.22 Given
the dependence of this pricing formula on the factor captured by real con-
sumption growth, it is not surprising that the corresponding coe¢ cient,
dc;n, displays the same anomalous pattern detected in its nominal coun-
terpart, Dc;n, and from the same source: a variance of that factor that
changes over time.
The formula for the real price of government bonds completes the
list of elements needed to present the theory behind the construction of
in￿ ation-expectations indicators like the one in Figure 1.
The Nominal￿ Real Forward Rate Spread and Its Components. In-
spection of the recursions (54) for the nominal price formula reveals that
they contain parameters associated with nominal as well as real factors,
while the analogous recursions (56) for the real price formula contain para-
meters related just to real factors. Thus, it seems legitimate to conjecture
that subtracting the coe¢ cients pertaining to real prices from those corre-
sponding to nominal prices will produce the desired result of isolating the
nominal factors￿ long-run in￿ ation expectations among them.
In fact, that is the attempt behind popular in￿ ation-expectations in-
dicators, typically calculated as the following nominal￿ real forward rate
spread:
21The same warning as in footnote 20 applies to the attempt of computing




22This is, of course, a consequence of the independence of the real stochastic pric-
















































living).2 If the cost of owner-occupied-housing services is proxied by mort-
gage interest expenses, then including that cost in a measure of inflation 
could mean, perversely, that a tighter monetary policy (a higher policy 
interest rate) causes a rise in measured inflation.3 The other main ratio-
nale for exclusion, evident in the Bank of Canada’s description of its core 
price index, is the elimination of highly volatile items from the inflation 
measure.4 This rationale, the reduction of volatility, will be my focus in 
this paper.
While PCE ex food and energy holds a special status as the core mea-
sure preferred by the Federal Reserve, the practices of other central banks 
make clear that there are alternatives to excluding all food and energy 
items (and only food and energy items). A look at disaggregated PCE 
data reveals that while food and energy items figure prominently among 
the components with the highest time series volatility, not all of the most 
volatile items are food or energy, and not all food and energy items rank 
among the most volatile.5 This fact suggests a closer examination of which 
items should be excluded if the aim is to produce an index with lower 
volatility than the headline index and still capture the longer-run trend in 
headline inflation.
In the next section, I begin the analysis by asking, simply, what are 
the most volatile items in the PCE? Rather than identifying the N most 
volatile items, for some N—à la the Bank of Canada’s core measure—I ask 
a somewhat different question. Food and energy make up roughly 20 per-
cent of the PCE by expenditure. What, then, are the most volatile items 
with aggregate weight of 20 percent? The list may be somewhat surpris-
ing. There are certainly plenty of food and energy items on the list but 
also computers, used autos, small electric appliances, women’s and girls’ 
clothing, airline services, and more. Also, many food items do not make 
the list—for example, cereals, bakery products, and “purchased meals: 
other than at schools,” which represents the price of meals at restaurants 
and bars. A common characteristic of food items not on the list (except 
for fish and seafood) is that they involve relatively more processing than 
raw items such as meats, eggs, fruits, and vegetables.
2 Inflation is commonly understood as a persistent and general increase in prices or an 
erosion of the purchasing power of a unit of money. More precise (and more operational) 
definitions are model-dependent. A cost of living index has a precise definition as the money 
cost to an economic unit (a household or individual) of maintaining a given level of well-
being in the face of changing prices. Astin (1999), in discussing the challenges of constructing 
harmonized inflation indexes for the euro area, provides a nice discussion of the different ends 
for which price indexes are constructed.
3 As stated on the Riksbank website (www.riksbank.com/templates/Page.aspx?id=10578), 
“Households’ mortgage interest expenditure is excluded more for reasons of clarity. It may in some 
cases be problematic for the Riksbank to explain why the immediate effect of a tighter monetary 
policy is that CPI inflation rises.”
4 Coincidentally, mortgage interest cost is also among the eight most volatile items 
excluded in the Bank of Canada’s core measure.
5 Bryan and Cecchetti (1994) make a similar point in reference to the exclusion of the 
component “food away from home” from CPI ex food and energy.
lnF ￿ N
(n)!(n+j)





t ￿ ln ￿ P
(n+j)
t ￿ [ln ￿ p
(n)





where lnF ￿ N
(n)!(n+j)
t is the forward nominal rate de￿ned in (37) calcu-
lated from actually observed nominal prices ￿ P
(n)
t ; identi￿ed by a bar over
the corresponding symbol; lnF ￿ R
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t is the analogous concept cal-
culated from actually observed real (in￿ ation￿ indexed) government bond
prices ￿ p
(n)
t ; and n denotes a long maturity, typically ￿ve years or more.
Whether the calculations above deliver as intended an indicator that
e⁄ectively and reliably traces the evolution of long-run in￿ ation expecta-
tions over time will have to be established by reading that indicator under
the light of its theoretical counterpart, which for j = 1 in the case of the
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where the hats over the symbols identifying forward rates and prices indi-
cate variables implied by the model rather than obtained from the data,
and the second equality follows from straight application of the theoretical
price formulas (53) and (55).
Substituting the recursions (54) and (56) in the expression and working
through considerable algebra results in the following alternative represen-
tation of the nominal￿ real forward rate spread:
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xclusion-based measures of core inflation—the traditional “inflation 
ex…” measures—have a long history. The Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(BLS) produced versions of the Consumer Price Index (CPI) excluding 
food and excluding shelter at least since the late 1950s, when those series 
first appeared in the annual Economic Report of the President. “CPI ex 
food and energy”—now taken almost synonymously with core inflation—
made its first appearance in the report in 1980. Many national statistical 
agencies produce inflation measures of this sort, and many central banks 
refer to these measures as guides for monetary policy.
For example, from 2004 to 2007, the Federal Reserve cast the inflation 
forecasts in its semiannual reports to Congress in terms of the price index 
for personal consumption expenditures (PCE) excluding food and energy; 
since 2008, the Fed has released forecasts for both headline PCE and PCE 
excluding food and energy. While “ex food and energy” seems to be the 
most common exclusion-based measure, others are in use. The Sveriges 
Riksbank refers in its public communications to a measure of consumer 
price inflation excluding mortgage interest costs and energy, while the 
Bank of Canada uses a CPI excluding the eight most volatile items as an 
operational guide for monetary policy.
Academic interest in exclusion-based core inflation measures began 
with Blinder (1982), who used them to analyze the high rates of infla-
tion experienced in the United States in the 1970s. In the 27 years since 
Blinder’s work, a number of alternative, nonexclusion-based measures of 
core inflation have been proposed. Silver (2007) provides a nice survey of 
this growing literature. Rich and Steindel (2007) present a comprehensive 
“horse race” among competing core inflation measures. Despite the pro-
liferation of alternative core inflation measures, exclusion-based measures 
appear to remain the most popular among policymakers, judging by the 
number of central banks that make some reference to exclusion-based core 
measures.1
In the core measures adopted by the Riksbank and the Bank of Cana-
da, the main rationales are evident for the exclusion of certain items from 
a measure of inflation. One is that the prices of some items, such as the 
service flow from owner-occupied housing, are difficult to measure. It is 
unclear whether proxies for those prices—or even the prices themselves—
convey useful information about inflation (as distinct from the cost of 
1 A comprehensive list would include not just the Federal Reserve, Sveriges Riksbank and 
Bank of Canada but also the European Central Bank, the Bank of Japan, the Reserve Bank 
of Australia, and the Reserve Bank of New Zealand. Some central banks make reference in 
their public statements to measures of core inflation in addition to exclusion-based measures, 
but I know of none that reference a nonexclusion-based measure without also referencing 
an exclusion-based measure. The Bank of England is alone among major central banks in 
making no references to core inflation in its public statements.
where the coe¢ cients ￿i;n, i = v;s;c; are complicated functions of the
fundamental parameters that appear in the recursions (54) and (56). The
explicit derivation of those functions can be found in Appendix B.
Given that the autoregressive coe¢ cients ￿c;￿v, and ￿s are assumed
to be less than 1 in absolute value, the second line in this expression can
be ignored for long maturities, based on the same arguments made in
the discussion preceding the approximate formula (39). The nominal￿ real
forward rate spread can be approximated with the expression:
lnF ^ N
(n)!(n+1)
t ￿lnF ^ R
(n)!(n+1)
t ￿ E[ln(1+￿t)]￿￿v;n ￿￿s;n ￿￿c;n vt:
(59)
As already mentioned, two di⁄erences stand out between the theoret-
ical nominal forward rate (39) derived for the one-factor model studied on
page 14 and the theoretical nominal￿ real forward rate spread above: The
latter is not contaminated by a long-run mean for the real interest rate,
and￿ more critically for the message of this article￿ its risk premium com-
ponent, captured by the last three terms in (59), is not constant but moves
over time with the level of the factorvt.
To be precise, movements in the factor vt will induce in the nominal￿
real forward rate spread (58) ￿ uctuations on the order of magnitude of
￿c;n vt, the size of the term capturing time-varying risk premia on the
right-hand side of that expression. Importantly, that term will be the
only quantitatively signi￿cant source of such ￿ uctuations for long maturi-
ties, as is apparent in expression (59), the approximate version of the exact
nominal￿ real forward rate spread. Thus, time-varying risk premia could be
largely responsible for the ￿ uctuations in popular in￿ ation-expectations in-
dicators, which are nothing but the empirical counterparts of the nominal￿
real forward rate spreads derived here. This is precisely the conjecture
rigorously examined in the next section.
4. THE NOMINAL￿ REAL FORWARD RATE SPREAD AND
INFLATION-EXPECTATIONS INDICATORS
The popular long-run in￿ ation-expectations indicator typically included
in ￿nancial and economic reports is obtained by calculating a time series
for expression (57) with actually observed zero-coupon prices for ￿ve- and
ten-year nominal and in￿ ation-adjusted government bonds.23 The question
23The observations in Figure 1 correspond to quarterly averages of daily nominal￿
real forward rate spreads calculated from zero-coupon prices between March 1999 and
March 2009. For the U.S., data for nominal bond yields correspond to series SVENY10
(ten-year nominal bond) and SVENY05 (￿ve-year nominal bond) in G￿rkaynak, Sack,
and Wright (2006), and data for real bond yields correspond to series TIPSY10 (ten-year
real bond) and TIPSY05 (￿ve-year real bond) in G￿rkaynak, Sack, and Wright (2008).
For the U.K., the data were extracted from the Bank of England Interactive Database
in www.bankofengland.co.uk/mfsd/iadb/NewIntermed.asp and correspond to series re-
ported under Interest and Exchange Rates/Yields/Zero Coupon Yields, speci￿cally:
IUDMNZC (ten-year nominal yield), IUDSNZC (￿ve-year nominal yield), IUDMRZC
(ten-year real yield), and IUDSRZC (￿ve-year real yield). The zero-coupon quali￿cation
is important because the forward-rate-based in￿ation-expectations indicators reported
in the press are typically calculated instead from constant maturity bonds which, unlike















































living).2 If the cost of owner-occupied-housing services is proxied by mort-
gage interest expenses, then including that cost in a measure of inflation 
could mean, perversely, that a tighter monetary policy (a higher policy 
interest rate) causes a rise in measured inflation.3 The other main ratio-
nale for exclusion, evident in the Bank of Canada’s description of its core 
price index, is the elimination of highly volatile items from the inflation 
measure.4 This rationale, the reduction of volatility, will be my focus in 
this paper.
While PCE ex food and energy holds a special status as the core mea-
sure preferred by the Federal Reserve, the practices of other central banks 
make clear that there are alternatives to excluding all food and energy 
items (and only food and energy items). A look at disaggregated PCE 
data reveals that while food and energy items figure prominently among 
the components with the highest time series volatility, not all of the most 
volatile items are food or energy, and not all food and energy items rank 
among the most volatile.5 This fact suggests a closer examination of which 
items should be excluded if the aim is to produce an index with lower 
volatility than the headline index and still capture the longer-run trend in 
headline inflation.
In the next section, I begin the analysis by asking, simply, what are 
the most volatile items in the PCE? Rather than identifying the N most 
volatile items, for some N—à la the Bank of Canada’s core measure—I ask 
a somewhat different question. Food and energy make up roughly 20 per-
cent of the PCE by expenditure. What, then, are the most volatile items 
with aggregate weight of 20 percent? The list may be somewhat surpris-
ing. There are certainly plenty of food and energy items on the list but 
also computers, used autos, small electric appliances, women’s and girls’ 
clothing, airline services, and more. Also, many food items do not make 
the list—for example, cereals, bakery products, and “purchased meals: 
other than at schools,” which represents the price of meals at restaurants 
and bars. A common characteristic of food items not on the list (except 
for fish and seafood) is that they involve relatively more processing than 
raw items such as meats, eggs, fruits, and vegetables.
2 Inflation is commonly understood as a persistent and general increase in prices or an 
erosion of the purchasing power of a unit of money. More precise (and more operational) 
definitions are model-dependent. A cost of living index has a precise definition as the money 
cost to an economic unit (a household or individual) of maintaining a given level of well-
being in the face of changing prices. Astin (1999), in discussing the challenges of constructing 
harmonized inflation indexes for the euro area, provides a nice discussion of the different ends 
for which price indexes are constructed.
3 As stated on the Riksbank website (www.riksbank.com/templates/Page.aspx?id=10578), 
“Households’ mortgage interest expenditure is excluded more for reasons of clarity. It may in some 
cases be problematic for the Riksbank to explain why the immediate effect of a tighter monetary 
policy is that CPI inflation rises.”
4 Coincidentally, mortgage interest cost is also among the eight most volatile items 
excluded in the Bank of Canada’s core measure.
5 Bryan and Cecchetti (1994) make a similar point in reference to the exclusion of the 
component “food away from home” from CPI ex food and energy.
raised at the beginning of this article was whether the ￿ uctuations typically
exhibited by this indicator re￿ ect movements in long-run in￿ ation expec-
tations or in something else. The purpose of this section is to establish the
extent to which time-varying risk premia are quantitatively large enough
to account for the movements that in￿ ation-expectations indicators show
in the data. That is accomplished with numerical simulations of the three-
factor model laid out in the previous sections. The simulations involve the
following steps:
1. Choose values for the relevant primitive parameters in the pricing kernel
(45) and stochastic processes (46), (47), (48), and (49). To add realism
to the exercise, the parameter values are set equal to those selected or
implied by the study in Gallmeyer et al. (2007), whose choices were
based on other empirical studies and the time-series behavior of the
appropriate macroeconomic aggregates, such as real consumption growth
(the parameter values are reported in Appendix C).24
2. Create an arti￿cial time series for the three unforecastable errors in the
model, f"c;tg, f"v;tg, and f"s;tg.
3. Do the same for the three factors in the model using expressions (46),
(47), and (49), the time series for the unforecastable errors from the
previous step, and initial (time 0) values for the factors equal to their
long-run means (with the implication that at time 1, the factors take on
values given by the expressions ln c1
c0 = ￿c+￿c
p
￿v"c;1, v1 = ￿v +￿v"v;1,
and s1 = ￿s"s;1).
4. Use price formulas (53) and (55), recursions (54) and (56), and the arti-
￿cial time series for the factors obtained in the previous step to calculate
arti￿cial time series for the logarithm of nominal and real prices corre-
sponding to zero-coupon government bonds with ￿ve and ten years to
maturity.
24Two parameters of quantitatively signi￿cant importance for the simulations re-
ported later, ￿s and ￿2
c, were not set to the values chosen or implied by Gallmeyer
et al. (2007). The parameter ￿s was set equal to 0.85 instead of the 0.922 those authors
used, in order to minimize the relatively large ￿uctuations in the simulated in￿ation-
expectations indicator induced by the term in (58) associated with deviations of the fac-
tor st from its mean, and to focus the attention on the ￿uctuations induced by the time-
varying risk premium component of that expression. The value for the parameter ￿2
c
was picked with a di⁄erent procedure from that used by Gallmeyer et al. Those authors
derived their theoretical pricing kernel under the assumption ￿2
c = 1 (￿2
x = 1 in the au-
thors￿notation). In the quantitative exercise section, however, they report to have used
a di⁄erent value given by the formula V ar[ln
ct+1
ct ](1￿￿2
c); with V ar[ln
ct+1
ct ] set equal
to 0.000023, the sample variance of detrended quarterly consumption growth over the




2 = 0:0048). That expres-
sion is consistent with the formula for the unconditional variance of consumption growth








Given that the time-varying risk premia case is the one of interest for the purpose of
this article, the value of the parameter ￿2
c was set instead to that implied by the formula
for the unconditional variance of real consumption growth that would be obtained under
heteroskedasticity, V ar[ln
ct+1
ct ] = E[ln
ct+1























































xclusion-based measures of core inflation—the traditional “inflation 
ex…” measures—have a long history. The Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(BLS) produced versions of the Consumer Price Index (CPI) excluding 
food and excluding shelter at least since the late 1950s, when those series 
first appeared in the annual Economic Report of the President. “CPI ex 
food and energy”—now taken almost synonymously with core inflation—
made its first appearance in the report in 1980. Many national statistical 
agencies produce inflation measures of this sort, and many central banks 
refer to these measures as guides for monetary policy.
For example, from 2004 to 2007, the Federal Reserve cast the inflation 
forecasts in its semiannual reports to Congress in terms of the price index 
for personal consumption expenditures (PCE) excluding food and energy; 
since 2008, the Fed has released forecasts for both headline PCE and PCE 
excluding food and energy. While “ex food and energy” seems to be the 
most common exclusion-based measure, others are in use. The Sveriges 
Riksbank refers in its public communications to a measure of consumer 
price inflation excluding mortgage interest costs and energy, while the 
Bank of Canada uses a CPI excluding the eight most volatile items as an 
operational guide for monetary policy.
Academic interest in exclusion-based core inflation measures began 
with Blinder (1982), who used them to analyze the high rates of infla-
tion experienced in the United States in the 1970s. In the 27 years since 
Blinder’s work, a number of alternative, nonexclusion-based measures of 
core inflation have been proposed. Silver (2007) provides a nice survey of 
this growing literature. Rich and Steindel (2007) present a comprehensive 
“horse race” among competing core inflation measures. Despite the pro-
liferation of alternative core inflation measures, exclusion-based measures 
appear to remain the most popular among policymakers, judging by the 
number of central banks that make some reference to exclusion-based core 
measures.1
In the core measures adopted by the Riksbank and the Bank of Cana-
da, the main rationales are evident for the exclusion of certain items from 
a measure of inflation. One is that the prices of some items, such as the 
service flow from owner-occupied housing, are difficult to measure. It is 
unclear whether proxies for those prices—or even the prices themselves—
convey useful information about inflation (as distinct from the cost of 
1 A comprehensive list would include not just the Federal Reserve, Sveriges Riksbank and 
Bank of Canada but also the European Central Bank, the Bank of Japan, the Reserve Bank 
of Australia, and the Reserve Bank of New Zealand. Some central banks make reference in 
their public statements to measures of core inflation in addition to exclusion-based measures, 
but I know of none that reference a nonexclusion-based measure without also referencing 
an exclusion-based measure. The Bank of England is alone among major central banks in 
making no references to core inflation in its public statements.
5. Calculate the theoretical nominal￿ real forward rate spread with expres-
sion (57) for n = 5 and j = 5, using the arti￿cial time series for prices
generated in the previous step rather than actually observed prices.
The outcome of the last step, a time series for the ￿ve-year nominal￿
real forward rate spread, is reported in Figure 4.
The plot is nothing but the theoretical counterpart of the empirical
in￿ ation-expectations indicator calculated from actually observed prices.
The important insight from this plot is that the synthetic long-run in￿ ation-
expectations indicator ￿ uctuates even if long-run in￿ ation expectations do
not because, by construction, long-run in￿ ation expectations stay ￿rmly
anchored at the 2.31 percent annual in￿ ation target implied by the para-
meter values adopted for the in￿ ation process (48).25 This implies that the
larger-than-normal drop in the synthetic indicator toward the end of the
arti￿cial sample is the result of time-varying risk premia induced by an
abnormally low realization of the factor vt, which can be seen from looking
at the approximate expression for the nominal￿ real forward rate spread
(59). Thus, the simulation of the three-factor model serves as a warning
against interpreting ￿ uctuations in empirical nominal￿ real forward rates
as evidence of a change of equal size in long-run in￿ ation expectations.
But that warning must be balanced by some obvious limitations of the
quantitative exercise summarized by Figure 4. First, as already noted, the
arti￿cially generated time series of the factors includes realizations of vt
that exceed four standard errors and are, therefore, extremely rare. Were it
not for those infrequent values, the theoretical nominal￿ forward rate spread
would look most of the time like the smooth line in the ￿rst two-thirds of
25The sample mean of the arti￿cial in￿ation-expectations indicator plotted in Figure
4 (top line) is slightly above the long-run in￿ation expectations underlying its calculation
(bottom line) because the risk premia components left over in the nominal￿ real forward















































living).2 If the cost of owner-occupied-housing services is proxied by mort-
gage interest expenses, then including that cost in a measure of inflation 
could mean, perversely, that a tighter monetary policy (a higher policy 
interest rate) causes a rise in measured inflation.3 The other main ratio-
nale for exclusion, evident in the Bank of Canada’s description of its core 
price index, is the elimination of highly volatile items from the inflation 
measure.4 This rationale, the reduction of volatility, will be my focus in 
this paper.
While PCE ex food and energy holds a special status as the core mea-
sure preferred by the Federal Reserve, the practices of other central banks 
make clear that there are alternatives to excluding all food and energy 
items (and only food and energy items). A look at disaggregated PCE 
data reveals that while food and energy items figure prominently among 
the components with the highest time series volatility, not all of the most 
volatile items are food or energy, and not all food and energy items rank 
among the most volatile.5 This fact suggests a closer examination of which 
items should be excluded if the aim is to produce an index with lower 
volatility than the headline index and still capture the longer-run trend in 
headline inflation.
In the next section, I begin the analysis by asking, simply, what are 
the most volatile items in the PCE? Rather than identifying the N most 
volatile items, for some N—à la the Bank of Canada’s core measure—I ask 
a somewhat different question. Food and energy make up roughly 20 per-
cent of the PCE by expenditure. What, then, are the most volatile items 
with aggregate weight of 20 percent? The list may be somewhat surpris-
ing. There are certainly plenty of food and energy items on the list but 
also computers, used autos, small electric appliances, women’s and girls’ 
clothing, airline services, and more. Also, many food items do not make 
the list—for example, cereals, bakery products, and “purchased meals: 
other than at schools,” which represents the price of meals at restaurants 
and bars. A common characteristic of food items not on the list (except 
for fish and seafood) is that they involve relatively more processing than 
raw items such as meats, eggs, fruits, and vegetables.
2 Inflation is commonly understood as a persistent and general increase in prices or an 
erosion of the purchasing power of a unit of money. More precise (and more operational) 
definitions are model-dependent. A cost of living index has a precise definition as the money 
cost to an economic unit (a household or individual) of maintaining a given level of well-
being in the face of changing prices. Astin (1999), in discussing the challenges of constructing 
harmonized inflation indexes for the euro area, provides a nice discussion of the different ends 
for which price indexes are constructed.
3 As stated on the Riksbank website (www.riksbank.com/templates/Page.aspx?id=10578), 
“Households’ mortgage interest expenditure is excluded more for reasons of clarity. It may in some 
cases be problematic for the Riksbank to explain why the immediate effect of a tighter monetary 
policy is that CPI inflation rises.”
4 Coincidentally, mortgage interest cost is also among the eight most volatile items 
excluded in the Bank of Canada’s core measure.
5 Bryan and Cecchetti (1994) make a similar point in reference to the exclusion of the 
component “food away from home” from CPI ex food and energy.
Figure 4. A more benign assessment might not ￿nd enough reasons to
completely invalidate the empirical relevance of the exercise because, after
all, the decline that the indicator in Figure 1 exhibits toward the end of
2008 and beginning of 2009 indeed took place under a rare circumstance￿
a ￿nancial turmoil of a geographical extension, depth, and intensity not
seen since the Great Depression, by many accounts.
The issue of the frequency of unusual events does seem minor relative
to that of orders of magnitude: the trough of the theoretical in￿ ation-
expectations indicator displayed in Figure 4 is just 0.08 percentage point
below the peak of that indicator at the beginning of the arti￿cial sam-
ple, whereas the comparable di⁄erence in the empirical counterpart of that
spread in Figure 1 is about six times as large for the U.S. This inability to
produce ￿ uctuations in the nominal￿ real forward rate spread of a magni-
tude similar to those observed in the data is not limited to the three-factor
model just simulated. It is a problem common to virtually all models of
the term structure, as documented by Rudebusch and Swanson (2009):
￿The term premium on nominal long-term bonds in the standard dynamic
stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model used in macroeconomics is
far too small and stable relative to empirical measures obtained from the
data￿ an example of the ￿ bond premium puzzle.￿￿
Judging from the numerical simulation of the particular three-factor
model studied in this article, the puzzle applies as well to in￿ ation-ex-
pectations indicators calculated with the forward-rates technique: The
time-varying risk premia implied by observed macroeconomic aggregates
and a monetary policy targeting a time-invariant long-run in￿ ation rate
are too small and stable to account for the volatility of those indicators.
This quantitative ￿nding seems to favor the alternative hypothesis that
the large swings typically observed in in￿ ation-expectations indicators are
induced mostly by changes in long-run in￿ ation expectations.
However, many policymakers and researchers are likely to dispute that
conclusion on the grounds that it is hard to believe that long-run in￿ ation
expectations can go up or down by as much as 0.5 percentage point or
more from one quarter to the next in countries with a track record of low
and stable in￿ ation, such as the U.S. and the U.K. A change in long-run
in￿ ation expectations of that magnitude would typically be associated with
an actual or prospective change of monetary policy regime, as signaled by
a modi￿cation to the legal status of the monetary authority, the replace-
ment of the individuals ultimately in charge of monetary policy, or political
upheaval.
In the case of the U.S., it is far from obvious that any of those con-
tingencies were behind the 0.6 percentage-point jump that the indicator
registered, according to Figure 1, in the brief period spanning the second
and fourth quarters of 2003. Chairman Greenspan was at the helm of the
Fed all that time, and nothing suggests that his preferred long-run in￿ ation
rate changed over those six months. Moreover, nothing indicated that he
would be removed before the expiration of his mandate about two years
later. Consistent with this view, in￿ ation-expectations indicators based
on surveys rather than forward rates didn￿ t move between those two quar-
















































xclusion-based measures of core inflation—the traditional “inflation 
ex…” measures—have a long history. The Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(BLS) produced versions of the Consumer Price Index (CPI) excluding 
food and excluding shelter at least since the late 1950s, when those series 
first appeared in the annual Economic Report of the President. “CPI ex 
food and energy”—now taken almost synonymously with core inflation—
made its first appearance in the report in 1980. Many national statistical 
agencies produce inflation measures of this sort, and many central banks 
refer to these measures as guides for monetary policy.
For example, from 2004 to 2007, the Federal Reserve cast the inflation 
forecasts in its semiannual reports to Congress in terms of the price index 
for personal consumption expenditures (PCE) excluding food and energy; 
since 2008, the Fed has released forecasts for both headline PCE and PCE 
excluding food and energy. While “ex food and energy” seems to be the 
most common exclusion-based measure, others are in use. The Sveriges 
Riksbank refers in its public communications to a measure of consumer 
price inflation excluding mortgage interest costs and energy, while the 
Bank of Canada uses a CPI excluding the eight most volatile items as an 
operational guide for monetary policy.
Academic interest in exclusion-based core inflation measures began 
with Blinder (1982), who used them to analyze the high rates of infla-
tion experienced in the United States in the 1970s. In the 27 years since 
Blinder’s work, a number of alternative, nonexclusion-based measures of 
core inflation have been proposed. Silver (2007) provides a nice survey of 
this growing literature. Rich and Steindel (2007) present a comprehensive 
“horse race” among competing core inflation measures. Despite the pro-
liferation of alternative core inflation measures, exclusion-based measures 
appear to remain the most popular among policymakers, judging by the 
number of central banks that make some reference to exclusion-based core 
measures.1
In the core measures adopted by the Riksbank and the Bank of Cana-
da, the main rationales are evident for the exclusion of certain items from 
a measure of inflation. One is that the prices of some items, such as the 
service flow from owner-occupied housing, are difficult to measure. It is 
unclear whether proxies for those prices—or even the prices themselves—
convey useful information about inflation (as distinct from the cost of 
1 A comprehensive list would include not just the Federal Reserve, Sveriges Riksbank and 
Bank of Canada but also the European Central Bank, the Bank of Japan, the Reserve Bank 
of Australia, and the Reserve Bank of New Zealand. Some central banks make reference in 
their public statements to measures of core inflation in addition to exclusion-based measures, 
but I know of none that reference a nonexclusion-based measure without also referencing 
an exclusion-based measure. The Bank of England is alone among major central banks in 
making no references to core inflation in its public statements.
Survey of Professional Forecasters, the long-term (ten-year) forecasts for
the in￿ ation rate remained ￿rmly anchored at a 2.5 percent annual rate
throughout 2003.
These considerations and similar ones in the literature suggest that
the current understanding of the determinants of government bond prices
is too limited to establish with any con￿dence which fraction of the rela-
tively large variations in in￿ ation-expectations indicators based on forward
rates can be attributed to actual changes in long-run in￿ ation expectations
and which to time-varying risk premia. Unfortunately, chances are slim
that the existing di¢ culties in interpreting in￿ ation-expectations indica-
tors constructed with the forward-rates technique will be resolved soon.
The assessment by Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay (1997, pg. 455) that ￿no
one model has yet emerged as a consensus choice for modeling the term
structure￿ continues to re￿ ect the situation as accurately today as it did
more than a decade ago.
5. CONCLUSION
Protecting the value of currency is a mission almost all societies entrust
to their monetary authorities. For that reason, policymakers are always on
the lookout for long-run in￿ ation-expectations indicators that can provide
early warnings when those expectations are about to become unanchored.
The materialization of that prospect would be a nightmare for any central
banker: Once the in￿ ation-expectations genie is let out of the bottle, it
will be hard to put it back in again without risking a recession.
This article discusses the challenges of constructing such long-term
in￿ ation-expectations indicators from available data on nominal and real
government bond yields. A necessary step in the process is understanding
exactly how long-term in￿ ation expectations are priced into such bonds.
To that end, the article adopts an asset-pricing perspective revealing that,
under the lens of a¢ ne factor models, government yields can be decom-
posed into long-term in￿ ation-expectations and risk premia components.
The subsequent analysis focuses on the di¢ cult task of identifying the
former under di⁄erent assumptions about the latter.
It turns out that producing indicators that can reliably track the evo-
lution of long-run in￿ ation expectations from one period to the next is
fraught with signi￿cant theoretical and empirical challenges in the pres-
ence of time-varying risk premia, which seem to be an undisputed feature
of the data. The disturbing property of risk premia that move around
over time is that they can severely distort popular in￿ ation-expectations
indicators calculated from nominal￿ real forward rate spreads. As a result,
such indicators could give the wrong impression that long-run in￿ ation
expectations have switched dangerously to a de￿ ationary mood when, in
reality, that is a mirage produced by declining risk premia. Yet in di⁄erent
economic circumstances, those same falling risk premia might mask a rise
in long-term in￿ ation expectations.
Gauging long-term in￿ ation expectations correctly requires a rather
precise quanti￿cation of the risk premia components of nominal and real
interest rates. Unfortunately, the behavior of those components is still















































living).2 If the cost of owner-occupied-housing services is proxied by mort-
gage interest expenses, then including that cost in a measure of inflation 
could mean, perversely, that a tighter monetary policy (a higher policy 
interest rate) causes a rise in measured inflation.3 The other main ratio-
nale for exclusion, evident in the Bank of Canada’s description of its core 
price index, is the elimination of highly volatile items from the inflation 
measure.4 This rationale, the reduction of volatility, will be my focus in 
this paper.
While PCE ex food and energy holds a special status as the core mea-
sure preferred by the Federal Reserve, the practices of other central banks 
make clear that there are alternatives to excluding all food and energy 
items (and only food and energy items). A look at disaggregated PCE 
data reveals that while food and energy items figure prominently among 
the components with the highest time series volatility, not all of the most 
volatile items are food or energy, and not all food and energy items rank 
among the most volatile.5 This fact suggests a closer examination of which 
items should be excluded if the aim is to produce an index with lower 
volatility than the headline index and still capture the longer-run trend in 
headline inflation.
In the next section, I begin the analysis by asking, simply, what are 
the most volatile items in the PCE? Rather than identifying the N most 
volatile items, for some N—à la the Bank of Canada’s core measure—I ask 
a somewhat different question. Food and energy make up roughly 20 per-
cent of the PCE by expenditure. What, then, are the most volatile items 
with aggregate weight of 20 percent? The list may be somewhat surpris-
ing. There are certainly plenty of food and energy items on the list but 
also computers, used autos, small electric appliances, women’s and girls’ 
clothing, airline services, and more. Also, many food items do not make 
the list—for example, cereals, bakery products, and “purchased meals: 
other than at schools,” which represents the price of meals at restaurants 
and bars. A common characteristic of food items not on the list (except 
for fish and seafood) is that they involve relatively more processing than 
raw items such as meats, eggs, fruits, and vegetables.
2 Inflation is commonly understood as a persistent and general increase in prices or an 
erosion of the purchasing power of a unit of money. More precise (and more operational) 
definitions are model-dependent. A cost of living index has a precise definition as the money 
cost to an economic unit (a household or individual) of maintaining a given level of well-
being in the face of changing prices. Astin (1999), in discussing the challenges of constructing 
harmonized inflation indexes for the euro area, provides a nice discussion of the different ends 
for which price indexes are constructed.
3 As stated on the Riksbank website (www.riksbank.com/templates/Page.aspx?id=10578), 
“Households’ mortgage interest expenditure is excluded more for reasons of clarity. It may in some 
cases be problematic for the Riksbank to explain why the immediate effect of a tighter monetary 
policy is that CPI inflation rises.”
4 Coincidentally, mortgage interest cost is also among the eight most volatile items 
excluded in the Bank of Canada’s core measure.
5 Bryan and Cecchetti (1994) make a similar point in reference to the exclusion of the 
component “food away from home” from CPI ex food and energy.
summarized by Federal Reserve Vice Chairman Donald Kohn (2005):￿...the
separation of market prices into distinct pieces re￿ ecting expected values
and risk is a di¢ cult task that relies heavily on modeling assumptions
about underlying processes and investor behavior.￿
The recognition that the art of eliciting in￿ ation expectations from the
yield curve is di¢ cult suggests that some time will pass before many of the
remaining theoretical and empirical issues relevant to the construction of
reliable long-run in￿ ation-expectations indicators are sorted out. In the
meantime, policymakers are well advised not to attribute the relatively
ample ￿ uctuations observed in popular long-run in￿ ation-expectations in-
dicators to actual changes in those expectations. That interpretation would
have some merit if risk premia were constant, but that view of the world
seems no longer tenable given the overwhelming evidence accumulated by
now against the empirical relevance of the expectations hypothesis. At the
same time, policymakers should refrain from attributing all ￿ uctuations
in in￿ ation-expectations indicators to time-varying risk premia. Although
time-varying risk premia are a natural suspect, the quantitative evidence
accumulated so far is simply too weak and circumstantial to lead to a
















































xclusion-based measures of core inflation—the traditional “inflation 
ex…” measures—have a long history. The Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(BLS) produced versions of the Consumer Price Index (CPI) excluding 
food and excluding shelter at least since the late 1950s, when those series 
first appeared in the annual Economic Report of the President. “CPI ex 
food and energy”—now taken almost synonymously with core inflation—
made its first appearance in the report in 1980. Many national statistical 
agencies produce inflation measures of this sort, and many central banks 
refer to these measures as guides for monetary policy.
For example, from 2004 to 2007, the Federal Reserve cast the inflation 
forecasts in its semiannual reports to Congress in terms of the price index 
for personal consumption expenditures (PCE) excluding food and energy; 
since 2008, the Fed has released forecasts for both headline PCE and PCE 
excluding food and energy. While “ex food and energy” seems to be the 
most common exclusion-based measure, others are in use. The Sveriges 
Riksbank refers in its public communications to a measure of consumer 
price inflation excluding mortgage interest costs and energy, while the 
Bank of Canada uses a CPI excluding the eight most volatile items as an 
operational guide for monetary policy.
Academic interest in exclusion-based core inflation measures began 
with Blinder (1982), who used them to analyze the high rates of infla-
tion experienced in the United States in the 1970s. In the 27 years since 
Blinder’s work, a number of alternative, nonexclusion-based measures of 
core inflation have been proposed. Silver (2007) provides a nice survey of 
this growing literature. Rich and Steindel (2007) present a comprehensive 
“horse race” among competing core inflation measures. Despite the pro-
liferation of alternative core inflation measures, exclusion-based measures 
appear to remain the most popular among policymakers, judging by the 
number of central banks that make some reference to exclusion-based core 
measures.1
In the core measures adopted by the Riksbank and the Bank of Cana-
da, the main rationales are evident for the exclusion of certain items from 
a measure of inflation. One is that the prices of some items, such as the 
service flow from owner-occupied housing, are difficult to measure. It is 
unclear whether proxies for those prices—or even the prices themselves—
convey useful information about inflation (as distinct from the cost of 
1 A comprehensive list would include not just the Federal Reserve, Sveriges Riksbank and 
Bank of Canada but also the European Central Bank, the Bank of Japan, the Reserve Bank 
of Australia, and the Reserve Bank of New Zealand. Some central banks make reference in 
their public statements to measures of core inflation in addition to exclusion-based measures, 
but I know of none that reference a nonexclusion-based measure without also referencing 
an exclusion-based measure. The Bank of England is alone among major central banks in 
making no references to core inflation in its public statements.
APPENDIXES
A. Selection of the Factors in A¢ ne Factor Models
A Reverse-Engineering Approach. As readers will suspect, the reverse-
engineering procedure for selecting the factors that characterize the sto-
chastic properties and dynamics of the pricing kernel (18) in the paper is
basically the same as the one described on page 10, but with a twist.
In the case of the one-factor model, the twist consists of replacing
lnY
(1)





" ￿ ￿xt ￿ ￿"t+1: (60)
The basic idea is that the identity of the latent factor xt can be subse-
quently inferred with econometric techniques that exploit the implications
of (60) for government bond prices.
To see how this is accomplished, recall that "t+1 is normally distrib-
uted, which implies that mt+1 is conditionally lognormally distributed.
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Taking logarithms on both sides and considering de￿nition (3) results





















This theoretical relationship can be given empirical meaning by requir-
ing that the unknown parameters and time series for the latent factor xt
on the right-hand side of the theoretical bond-pricing formula acquire val-
ues such that they are close, according to some criteria, to the time series
of actually observed one-period government bond prices over the period
under analysis. Many auxiliary assumptions about the stochastic proper-
ties of the factor xt , as well as computational and econometric techniques
such as the Kalman ￿lter, are involved in the process. However, a detailed
discussion of them is beyond the scope of this paper.
More important for readers is to gain intuition of the logic behind these
techniques by considering the hypothetical situation in which application of
these procedures results in point estimates of 1 for the unknown parameters
￿ and ￿: Suppose that ^ ￿ = 1 and ^ ￿ = 1: After substitution of these point
estimates in (61), it is revealed that the time series for the latent factor
that would generate one-period bond prices (in logs) identical to the actual
ones is the observed time series of one-period government bond prices itself.
That is, the latent factor xt underlying the pricing kernel (60) is the log of

















































living).2 If the cost of owner-occupied-housing services is proxied by mort-
gage interest expenses, then including that cost in a measure of inflation 
could mean, perversely, that a tighter monetary policy (a higher policy 
interest rate) causes a rise in measured inflation.3 The other main ratio-
nale for exclusion, evident in the Bank of Canada’s description of its core 
price index, is the elimination of highly volatile items from the inflation 
measure.4 This rationale, the reduction of volatility, will be my focus in 
this paper.
While PCE ex food and energy holds a special status as the core mea-
sure preferred by the Federal Reserve, the practices of other central banks 
make clear that there are alternatives to excluding all food and energy 
items (and only food and energy items). A look at disaggregated PCE 
data reveals that while food and energy items figure prominently among 
the components with the highest time series volatility, not all of the most 
volatile items are food or energy, and not all food and energy items rank 
among the most volatile.5 This fact suggests a closer examination of which 
items should be excluded if the aim is to produce an index with lower 
volatility than the headline index and still capture the longer-run trend in 
headline inflation.
In the next section, I begin the analysis by asking, simply, what are 
the most volatile items in the PCE? Rather than identifying the N most 
volatile items, for some N—à la the Bank of Canada’s core measure—I ask 
a somewhat different question. Food and energy make up roughly 20 per-
cent of the PCE by expenditure. What, then, are the most volatile items 
with aggregate weight of 20 percent? The list may be somewhat surpris-
ing. There are certainly plenty of food and energy items on the list but 
also computers, used autos, small electric appliances, women’s and girls’ 
clothing, airline services, and more. Also, many food items do not make 
the list—for example, cereals, bakery products, and “purchased meals: 
other than at schools,” which represents the price of meals at restaurants 
and bars. A common characteristic of food items not on the list (except 
for fish and seafood) is that they involve relatively more processing than 
raw items such as meats, eggs, fruits, and vegetables.
2 Inflation is commonly understood as a persistent and general increase in prices or an 
erosion of the purchasing power of a unit of money. More precise (and more operational) 
definitions are model-dependent. A cost of living index has a precise definition as the money 
cost to an economic unit (a household or individual) of maintaining a given level of well-
being in the face of changing prices. Astin (1999), in discussing the challenges of constructing 
harmonized inflation indexes for the euro area, provides a nice discussion of the different ends 
for which price indexes are constructed.
3 As stated on the Riksbank website (www.riksbank.com/templates/Page.aspx?id=10578), 
“Households’ mortgage interest expenditure is excluded more for reasons of clarity. It may in some 
cases be problematic for the Riksbank to explain why the immediate effect of a tighter monetary 
policy is that CPI inflation rises.”
4 Coincidentally, mortgage interest cost is also among the eight most volatile items 
excluded in the Bank of Canada’s core measure.
5 Bryan and Cecchetti (1994) make a similar point in reference to the exclusion of the 
component “food away from home” from CPI ex food and energy.
Of course, this naive example will never be encountered in practice,
and reverse engineering the latent factors that enter into the pricing ker-
nel from observed variables will require the application of fairly advanced
quantitative and econometric techniques. In fact, a large body of the em-
pirical ￿nancial literature revolves around the issue of reverse engineering
pricing kernels that match the observed time-series and cross-section fea-
tures of government bond prices better than existing pricing kernels do.
By contrast, the straight-engineering approach relies mostly on axioms
and results from choice theory to decide which factors should enter into
the pricing kernel, as discussed next.
A Straight-Engineering Approach. The straight-engineering approach
starts from the theoretical premise that households don￿ t value assets for
their own sake but for the consumption goods that the payo⁄s from those
assets allow them to acquire. Therefore, households must discount asset
payo⁄s according to their implicit consumption value. This approach re-
quires being speci￿c about how households value consumption streams.
In particular, it requires the speci￿cation of a function that measures the
satisfaction, or utility, that the representative household gets out of a par-
ticular consumption bundle.
For example, it is frequently assumed that a household derives utility
U(ct) from consuming ct units of a composite consumption good at time t
and ￿U(ct+1) from consuming ct+1 units of that same good, but at time
t + 1, where 0 < ￿ < 1. At time t, such a household will typically face the
choice of allocating one extra dollar of its budget to time t consumption,
or of buying, at the certain price Pt, additional units of an asset that will
pay stochastic dividends of xt+1 and be worth the uncertain price Pt+1 at
time t + 1.
The utility value that the household gets out of these two choices
must be the same; otherwise, the household could improve its utility by
consuming more or saving more, as the case may be, until indi⁄erence
between the options is restored. Formally, the solution to this decision






where U0(ct) measures the additional utility that a household would get
from an additional time t unit of consumption. Thus, the left-hand side in
the equation is a measure of the utility that the representative household
would give up if it purchased an asset at a price Pt instead of consumption
goods for the same amount. This utility loss must be exactly o⁄set by the
utility gains that the household expects to enjoy next period by selling the
asset at the price Pt+1 and using the proceeds, along with the dividends
xt+1 paid by the asset, to purchase consumption goods then.
Dividing both sides of the equation by the marginal utility of consump-
























































xclusion-based measures of core inflation—the traditional “inflation 
ex…” measures—have a long history. The Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(BLS) produced versions of the Consumer Price Index (CPI) excluding 
food and excluding shelter at least since the late 1950s, when those series 
first appeared in the annual Economic Report of the President. “CPI ex 
food and energy”—now taken almost synonymously with core inflation—
made its first appearance in the report in 1980. Many national statistical 
agencies produce inflation measures of this sort, and many central banks 
refer to these measures as guides for monetary policy.
For example, from 2004 to 2007, the Federal Reserve cast the inflation 
forecasts in its semiannual reports to Congress in terms of the price index 
for personal consumption expenditures (PCE) excluding food and energy; 
since 2008, the Fed has released forecasts for both headline PCE and PCE 
excluding food and energy. While “ex food and energy” seems to be the 
most common exclusion-based measure, others are in use. The Sveriges 
Riksbank refers in its public communications to a measure of consumer 
price inflation excluding mortgage interest costs and energy, while the 
Bank of Canada uses a CPI excluding the eight most volatile items as an 
operational guide for monetary policy.
Academic interest in exclusion-based core inflation measures began 
with Blinder (1982), who used them to analyze the high rates of infla-
tion experienced in the United States in the 1970s. In the 27 years since 
Blinder’s work, a number of alternative, nonexclusion-based measures of 
core inflation have been proposed. Silver (2007) provides a nice survey of 
this growing literature. Rich and Steindel (2007) present a comprehensive 
“horse race” among competing core inflation measures. Despite the pro-
liferation of alternative core inflation measures, exclusion-based measures 
appear to remain the most popular among policymakers, judging by the 
number of central banks that make some reference to exclusion-based core 
measures.1
In the core measures adopted by the Riksbank and the Bank of Cana-
da, the main rationales are evident for the exclusion of certain items from 
a measure of inflation. One is that the prices of some items, such as the 
service flow from owner-occupied housing, are difficult to measure. It is 
unclear whether proxies for those prices—or even the prices themselves—
convey useful information about inflation (as distinct from the cost of 
1 A comprehensive list would include not just the Federal Reserve, Sveriges Riksbank and 
Bank of Canada but also the European Central Bank, the Bank of Japan, the Reserve Bank 
of Australia, and the Reserve Bank of New Zealand. Some central banks make reference in 
their public statements to measures of core inflation in addition to exclusion-based measures, 
but I know of none that reference a nonexclusion-based measure without also referencing 
an exclusion-based measure. The Bank of England is alone among major central banks in 
making no references to core inflation in its public statements.
Comparison of this equation with (4) in the paper reveals the identity





Notice that under the common and sensible assumption that marginal
utility is decreasing in consumption￿ that is, that households don￿ t derive
as much utility from the second unit of a consumption item as from the
￿rst￿ the pricing kernel will be particularly high at times when ct+1 is
particularly low relative to ct (when consumption growth,
ct+1
ct , is partic-
ularly low and vice-versa). This implies that households are willing to pay
an insurance premium for assets that o⁄er high payo⁄s in periods in which
consumption growth is expected to be relatively low and the utility from
buying additional goods is, therefore, particularly high. Conversely, they￿ ll
demand a risk premium on the return of assets that o⁄er low payo⁄s in low
consumption-growth states, precisely when households need high payo⁄s
to boost consumption.
This can be seen more clearly by adopting the common assumption in
the literature that the level of utility the representative household derives













Taking logarithms of both sides of the expression produces the follow-
ing one-factor representation of the pricing kernel:
lnmt+1 = ln￿ ￿ ￿ lnxt + ￿t+1; (63)
where the factor xt is consumption growth and where ￿t+1, an identically
and independently normally distributed unforecastable error orthogonal
to lnct+1=ct, has been introduced to capture the stochastic nature of the
pricing kernel.
Comparison of (60) and (63) reveals that the choice-theory-based straight-
engineering approach rationalizes the reverse-engineering approach assump-
tion that the stochastic pricing kernel can be represented by a function
linear in state variables plus an innovation orthogonal to them. Each
approach has advantages and disadvantages extensively discussed in the
debate motivated by the so-called equity premium puzzle that Mehra and
Prescott (1985) brought to the attention of the profession. (See Cochrane















































living).2 If the cost of owner-occupied-housing services is proxied by mort-
gage interest expenses, then including that cost in a measure of inflation 
could mean, perversely, that a tighter monetary policy (a higher policy 
interest rate) causes a rise in measured inflation.3 The other main ratio-
nale for exclusion, evident in the Bank of Canada’s description of its core 
price index, is the elimination of highly volatile items from the inflation 
measure.4 This rationale, the reduction of volatility, will be my focus in 
this paper.
While PCE ex food and energy holds a special status as the core mea-
sure preferred by the Federal Reserve, the practices of other central banks 
make clear that there are alternatives to excluding all food and energy 
items (and only food and energy items). A look at disaggregated PCE 
data reveals that while food and energy items figure prominently among 
the components with the highest time series volatility, not all of the most 
volatile items are food or energy, and not all food and energy items rank 
among the most volatile.5 This fact suggests a closer examination of which 
items should be excluded if the aim is to produce an index with lower 
volatility than the headline index and still capture the longer-run trend in 
headline inflation.
In the next section, I begin the analysis by asking, simply, what are 
the most volatile items in the PCE? Rather than identifying the N most 
volatile items, for some N—à la the Bank of Canada’s core measure—I ask 
a somewhat different question. Food and energy make up roughly 20 per-
cent of the PCE by expenditure. What, then, are the most volatile items 
with aggregate weight of 20 percent? The list may be somewhat surpris-
ing. There are certainly plenty of food and energy items on the list but 
also computers, used autos, small electric appliances, women’s and girls’ 
clothing, airline services, and more. Also, many food items do not make 
the list—for example, cereals, bakery products, and “purchased meals: 
other than at schools,” which represents the price of meals at restaurants 
and bars. A common characteristic of food items not on the list (except 
for fish and seafood) is that they involve relatively more processing than 
raw items such as meats, eggs, fruits, and vegetables.
2 Inflation is commonly understood as a persistent and general increase in prices or an 
erosion of the purchasing power of a unit of money. More precise (and more operational) 
definitions are model-dependent. A cost of living index has a precise definition as the money 
cost to an economic unit (a household or individual) of maintaining a given level of well-
being in the face of changing prices. Astin (1999), in discussing the challenges of constructing 
harmonized inflation indexes for the euro area, provides a nice discussion of the different ends 
for which price indexes are constructed.
3 As stated on the Riksbank website (www.riksbank.com/templates/Page.aspx?id=10578), 
“Households’ mortgage interest expenditure is excluded more for reasons of clarity. It may in some 
cases be problematic for the Riksbank to explain why the immediate effect of a tighter monetary 
policy is that CPI inflation rises.”
4 Coincidentally, mortgage interest cost is also among the eight most volatile items 
excluded in the Bank of Canada’s core measure.
5 Bryan and Cecchetti (1994) make a similar point in reference to the exclusion of the 
component “food away from home” from CPI ex food and energy.
B. Derivation of the Nominal￿ Real Forward Rate Spread
This appendix presents the sequence of algebraic steps that led to the
compact formula (58) for the nominal￿ real forward rate spread as well
as the explicit formulas representing the coe¢ cients in that expression as
functions of the fundamental parameters of the model.
The ￿rst step in the process is to represent the nominal and real for-
ward rates in terms of fundamental parameters. For the one-period-ahead
nominal forward rate, this entails substituting the recursions (54) in the
appropriate places in de￿nition (37) with j = 1 :
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xclusion-based measures of core inflation—the traditional “inflation 
ex…” measures—have a long history. The Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(BLS) produced versions of the Consumer Price Index (CPI) excluding 
food and excluding shelter at least since the late 1950s, when those series 
first appeared in the annual Economic Report of the President. “CPI ex 
food and energy”—now taken almost synonymously with core inflation—
made its first appearance in the report in 1980. Many national statistical 
agencies produce inflation measures of this sort, and many central banks 
refer to these measures as guides for monetary policy.
For example, from 2004 to 2007, the Federal Reserve cast the inflation 
forecasts in its semiannual reports to Congress in terms of the price index 
for personal consumption expenditures (PCE) excluding food and energy; 
since 2008, the Fed has released forecasts for both headline PCE and PCE 
excluding food and energy. While “ex food and energy” seems to be the 
most common exclusion-based measure, others are in use. The Sveriges 
Riksbank refers in its public communications to a measure of consumer 
price inflation excluding mortgage interest costs and energy, while the 
Bank of Canada uses a CPI excluding the eight most volatile items as an 
operational guide for monetary policy.
Academic interest in exclusion-based core inflation measures began 
with Blinder (1982), who used them to analyze the high rates of infla-
tion experienced in the United States in the 1970s. In the 27 years since 
Blinder’s work, a number of alternative, nonexclusion-based measures of 
core inflation have been proposed. Silver (2007) provides a nice survey of 
this growing literature. Rich and Steindel (2007) present a comprehensive 
“horse race” among competing core inflation measures. Despite the pro-
liferation of alternative core inflation measures, exclusion-based measures 
appear to remain the most popular among policymakers, judging by the 
number of central banks that make some reference to exclusion-based core 
measures.1
In the core measures adopted by the Riksbank and the Bank of Cana-
da, the main rationales are evident for the exclusion of certain items from 
a measure of inflation. One is that the prices of some items, such as the 
service flow from owner-occupied housing, are difficult to measure. It is 
unclear whether proxies for those prices—or even the prices themselves—
convey useful information about inflation (as distinct from the cost of 
1 A comprehensive list would include not just the Federal Reserve, Sveriges Riksbank and 
Bank of Canada but also the European Central Bank, the Bank of Japan, the Reserve Bank 
of Australia, and the Reserve Bank of New Zealand. Some central banks make reference in 
their public statements to measures of core inflation in addition to exclusion-based measures, 
but I know of none that reference a nonexclusion-based measure without also referencing 
an exclusion-based measure. The Bank of England is alone among major central banks in 
making no references to core inflation in its public statements.
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The corresponding expression for the real forward rate can be derived
following the same steps, starting from the de￿nition for that rate given
in the paper. However, a more expedient way to obtain the same result
is to set all the parameters related to the in￿ ation rate stochastic process
equal to 0 in the above expression￿ that is, ￿ ￿ = ￿c = ￿v = ￿s = 0￿
and replace the coe¢ cients associated with the nominal price with the
analogous ones associated with the real price. That shortcut results in the
following expression for the real forward rate:
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Subtracting (65) from (64) results in the following one-period-ahead
nominal￿ real forward rate spread:
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living).2 If the cost of owner-occupied-housing services is proxied by mort-
gage interest expenses, then including that cost in a measure of inflation 
could mean, perversely, that a tighter monetary policy (a higher policy 
interest rate) causes a rise in measured inflation.3 The other main ratio-
nale for exclusion, evident in the Bank of Canada’s description of its core 
price index, is the elimination of highly volatile items from the inflation 
measure.4 This rationale, the reduction of volatility, will be my focus in 
this paper.
While PCE ex food and energy holds a special status as the core mea-
sure preferred by the Federal Reserve, the practices of other central banks 
make clear that there are alternatives to excluding all food and energy 
items (and only food and energy items). A look at disaggregated PCE 
data reveals that while food and energy items figure prominently among 
the components with the highest time series volatility, not all of the most 
volatile items are food or energy, and not all food and energy items rank 
among the most volatile.5 This fact suggests a closer examination of which 
items should be excluded if the aim is to produce an index with lower 
volatility than the headline index and still capture the longer-run trend in 
headline inflation.
In the next section, I begin the analysis by asking, simply, what are 
the most volatile items in the PCE? Rather than identifying the N most 
volatile items, for some N—à la the Bank of Canada’s core measure—I ask 
a somewhat different question. Food and energy make up roughly 20 per-
cent of the PCE by expenditure. What, then, are the most volatile items 
with aggregate weight of 20 percent? The list may be somewhat surpris-
ing. There are certainly plenty of food and energy items on the list but 
also computers, used autos, small electric appliances, women’s and girls’ 
clothing, airline services, and more. Also, many food items do not make 
the list—for example, cereals, bakery products, and “purchased meals: 
other than at schools,” which represents the price of meals at restaurants 
and bars. A common characteristic of food items not on the list (except 
for fish and seafood) is that they involve relatively more processing than 
raw items such as meats, eggs, fruits, and vegetables.
2 Inflation is commonly understood as a persistent and general increase in prices or an 
erosion of the purchasing power of a unit of money. More precise (and more operational) 
definitions are model-dependent. A cost of living index has a precise definition as the money 
cost to an economic unit (a household or individual) of maintaining a given level of well-
being in the face of changing prices. Astin (1999), in discussing the challenges of constructing 
harmonized inflation indexes for the euro area, provides a nice discussion of the different ends 
for which price indexes are constructed.
3 As stated on the Riksbank website (www.riksbank.com/templates/Page.aspx?id=10578), 
“Households’ mortgage interest expenditure is excluded more for reasons of clarity. It may in some 
cases be problematic for the Riksbank to explain why the immediate effect of a tighter monetary 
policy is that CPI inflation rises.”
4 Coincidentally, mortgage interest cost is also among the eight most volatile items 
excluded in the Bank of Canada’s core measure.
5 Bryan and Cecchetti (1994) make a similar point in reference to the exclusion of the 
component “food away from home” from CPI ex food and energy.
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As mentioned in the paper, the coe¢ cients Bi;n, for i = c; v; s, evolve
like truncated geometric sums because each new coe¢ cient in the sequence
fBi;ng is formed by adding the geometric increment ￿n
i (￿i + ￿i￿i) to the
previous element in the sequence. That is,





The same logic results in the following analogous expression for the






The last two equations imply the following useful relationships:





































































































xclusion-based measures of core inflation—the traditional “inflation 
ex…” measures—have a long history. The Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(BLS) produced versions of the Consumer Price Index (CPI) excluding 
food and excluding shelter at least since the late 1950s, when those series 
first appeared in the annual Economic Report of the President. “CPI ex 
food and energy”—now taken almost synonymously with core inflation—
made its first appearance in the report in 1980. Many national statistical 
agencies produce inflation measures of this sort, and many central banks 
refer to these measures as guides for monetary policy.
For example, from 2004 to 2007, the Federal Reserve cast the inflation 
forecasts in its semiannual reports to Congress in terms of the price index 
for personal consumption expenditures (PCE) excluding food and energy; 
since 2008, the Fed has released forecasts for both headline PCE and PCE 
excluding food and energy. While “ex food and energy” seems to be the 
most common exclusion-based measure, others are in use. The Sveriges 
Riksbank refers in its public communications to a measure of consumer 
price inflation excluding mortgage interest costs and energy, while the 
Bank of Canada uses a CPI excluding the eight most volatile items as an 
operational guide for monetary policy.
Academic interest in exclusion-based core inflation measures began 
with Blinder (1982), who used them to analyze the high rates of infla-
tion experienced in the United States in the 1970s. In the 27 years since 
Blinder’s work, a number of alternative, nonexclusion-based measures of 
core inflation have been proposed. Silver (2007) provides a nice survey of 
this growing literature. Rich and Steindel (2007) present a comprehensive 
“horse race” among competing core inflation measures. Despite the pro-
liferation of alternative core inflation measures, exclusion-based measures 
appear to remain the most popular among policymakers, judging by the 
number of central banks that make some reference to exclusion-based core 
measures.1
In the core measures adopted by the Riksbank and the Bank of Cana-
da, the main rationales are evident for the exclusion of certain items from 
a measure of inflation. One is that the prices of some items, such as the 
service flow from owner-occupied housing, are difficult to measure. It is 
unclear whether proxies for those prices—or even the prices themselves—
convey useful information about inflation (as distinct from the cost of 
1 A comprehensive list would include not just the Federal Reserve, Sveriges Riksbank and 
Bank of Canada but also the European Central Bank, the Bank of Japan, the Reserve Bank 
of Australia, and the Reserve Bank of New Zealand. Some central banks make reference in 
their public statements to measures of core inflation in addition to exclusion-based measures, 
but I know of none that reference a nonexclusion-based measure without also referencing 
an exclusion-based measure. The Bank of England is alone among major central banks in 
making no references to core inflation in its public statements.
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Substituting (67) to (71) into (66) results in the expression:
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living).2 If the cost of owner-occupied-housing services is proxied by mort-
gage interest expenses, then including that cost in a measure of inflation 
could mean, perversely, that a tighter monetary policy (a higher policy 
interest rate) causes a rise in measured inflation.3 The other main ratio-
nale for exclusion, evident in the Bank of Canada’s description of its core 
price index, is the elimination of highly volatile items from the inflation 
measure.4 This rationale, the reduction of volatility, will be my focus in 
this paper.
While PCE ex food and energy holds a special status as the core mea-
sure preferred by the Federal Reserve, the practices of other central banks 
make clear that there are alternatives to excluding all food and energy 
items (and only food and energy items). A look at disaggregated PCE 
data reveals that while food and energy items figure prominently among 
the components with the highest time series volatility, not all of the most 
volatile items are food or energy, and not all food and energy items rank 
among the most volatile.5 This fact suggests a closer examination of which 
items should be excluded if the aim is to produce an index with lower 
volatility than the headline index and still capture the longer-run trend in 
headline inflation.
In the next section, I begin the analysis by asking, simply, what are 
the most volatile items in the PCE? Rather than identifying the N most 
volatile items, for some N—à la the Bank of Canada’s core measure—I ask 
a somewhat different question. Food and energy make up roughly 20 per-
cent of the PCE by expenditure. What, then, are the most volatile items 
with aggregate weight of 20 percent? The list may be somewhat surpris-
ing. There are certainly plenty of food and energy items on the list but 
also computers, used autos, small electric appliances, women’s and girls’ 
clothing, airline services, and more. Also, many food items do not make 
the list—for example, cereals, bakery products, and “purchased meals: 
other than at schools,” which represents the price of meals at restaurants 
and bars. A common characteristic of food items not on the list (except 
for fish and seafood) is that they involve relatively more processing than 
raw items such as meats, eggs, fruits, and vegetables.
2 Inflation is commonly understood as a persistent and general increase in prices or an 
erosion of the purchasing power of a unit of money. More precise (and more operational) 
definitions are model-dependent. A cost of living index has a precise definition as the money 
cost to an economic unit (a household or individual) of maintaining a given level of well-
being in the face of changing prices. Astin (1999), in discussing the challenges of constructing 
harmonized inflation indexes for the euro area, provides a nice discussion of the different ends 
for which price indexes are constructed.
3 As stated on the Riksbank website (www.riksbank.com/templates/Page.aspx?id=10578), 
“Households’ mortgage interest expenditure is excluded more for reasons of clarity. It may in some 
cases be problematic for the Riksbank to explain why the immediate effect of a tighter monetary 
policy is that CPI inflation rises.”
4 Coincidentally, mortgage interest cost is also among the eight most volatile items 
excluded in the Bank of Canada’s core measure.
5 Bryan and Cecchetti (1994) make a similar point in reference to the exclusion of the 
component “food away from home” from CPI ex food and energy.
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Taking into account that ￿ ￿ + ￿c￿c + ￿v￿v = E[ln(1 + ￿t)], this ex-
pression is equivalent to the compact representation of the nominal￿ real
forward rate spread (58), with the coe¢ cients ￿i;n de￿ned as follows:





























































































































xclusion-based measures of core inflation—the traditional “inflation 
ex…” measures—have a long history. The Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(BLS) produced versions of the Consumer Price Index (CPI) excluding 
food and excluding shelter at least since the late 1950s, when those series 
first appeared in the annual Economic Report of the President. “CPI ex 
food and energy”—now taken almost synonymously with core inflation—
made its first appearance in the report in 1980. Many national statistical 
agencies produce inflation measures of this sort, and many central banks 
refer to these measures as guides for monetary policy.
For example, from 2004 to 2007, the Federal Reserve cast the inflation 
forecasts in its semiannual reports to Congress in terms of the price index 
for personal consumption expenditures (PCE) excluding food and energy; 
since 2008, the Fed has released forecasts for both headline PCE and PCE 
excluding food and energy. While “ex food and energy” seems to be the 
most common exclusion-based measure, others are in use. The Sveriges 
Riksbank refers in its public communications to a measure of consumer 
price inflation excluding mortgage interest costs and energy, while the 
Bank of Canada uses a CPI excluding the eight most volatile items as an 
operational guide for monetary policy.
Academic interest in exclusion-based core inflation measures began 
with Blinder (1982), who used them to analyze the high rates of infla-
tion experienced in the United States in the 1970s. In the 27 years since 
Blinder’s work, a number of alternative, nonexclusion-based measures of 
core inflation have been proposed. Silver (2007) provides a nice survey of 
this growing literature. Rich and Steindel (2007) present a comprehensive 
“horse race” among competing core inflation measures. Despite the pro-
liferation of alternative core inflation measures, exclusion-based measures 
appear to remain the most popular among policymakers, judging by the 
number of central banks that make some reference to exclusion-based core 
measures.1
In the core measures adopted by the Riksbank and the Bank of Cana-
da, the main rationales are evident for the exclusion of certain items from 
a measure of inflation. One is that the prices of some items, such as the 
service flow from owner-occupied housing, are difficult to measure. It is 
unclear whether proxies for those prices—or even the prices themselves—
convey useful information about inflation (as distinct from the cost of 
1 A comprehensive list would include not just the Federal Reserve, Sveriges Riksbank and 
Bank of Canada but also the European Central Bank, the Bank of Japan, the Reserve Bank 
of Australia, and the Reserve Bank of New Zealand. Some central banks make reference in 
their public statements to measures of core inflation in addition to exclusion-based measures, 
but I know of none that reference a nonexclusion-based measure without also referencing 
an exclusion-based measure. The Bank of England is alone among major central banks in 
making no references to core inflation in its public statements.
C. Parameter Values for the Simulations of the Three-Factor Model
This appendix presents and discusses the parameter values of the three-
factor model underlying the simulation presented in Figure 4 of the paper.
As mentioned in the paper, most of the parameters have been set equal
to those corresponding to experiment C in Tables 1 and 2 of Gallmeyer
et al. (2007). The exceptions, justi￿ed later, are denoted with an inequality
symbol (6=) within parentheses next to the value in the list below. When
the parameter values in that list are implied by theoretical relationships
between other parameters, the relevant formulas are explicitly displayed.
The parameters entering into those formulas that were left implicit in the
paper are identi￿ed with an asterisk within parentheses, (*), and their
correspondence with those in Gallmeyer et al. made apparent by keeping


































￿ ￿ = ￿0:015(￿);
￿x = 3:064(￿);
￿p = 2:006(￿);









c = 3:540538 (6=);






















































living).2 If the cost of owner-occupied-housing services is proxied by mort-
gage interest expenses, then including that cost in a measure of inflation 
could mean, perversely, that a tighter monetary policy (a higher policy 
interest rate) causes a rise in measured inflation.3 The other main ratio-
nale for exclusion, evident in the Bank of Canada’s description of its core 
price index, is the elimination of highly volatile items from the inflation 
measure.4 This rationale, the reduction of volatility, will be my focus in 
this paper.
While PCE ex food and energy holds a special status as the core mea-
sure preferred by the Federal Reserve, the practices of other central banks 
make clear that there are alternatives to excluding all food and energy 
items (and only food and energy items). A look at disaggregated PCE 
data reveals that while food and energy items figure prominently among 
the components with the highest time series volatility, not all of the most 
volatile items are food or energy, and not all food and energy items rank 
among the most volatile.5 This fact suggests a closer examination of which 
items should be excluded if the aim is to produce an index with lower 
volatility than the headline index and still capture the longer-run trend in 
headline inflation.
In the next section, I begin the analysis by asking, simply, what are 
the most volatile items in the PCE? Rather than identifying the N most 
volatile items, for some N—à la the Bank of Canada’s core measure—I ask 
a somewhat different question. Food and energy make up roughly 20 per-
cent of the PCE by expenditure. What, then, are the most volatile items 
with aggregate weight of 20 percent? The list may be somewhat surpris-
ing. There are certainly plenty of food and energy items on the list but 
also computers, used autos, small electric appliances, women’s and girls’ 
clothing, airline services, and more. Also, many food items do not make 
the list—for example, cereals, bakery products, and “purchased meals: 
other than at schools,” which represents the price of meals at restaurants 
and bars. A common characteristic of food items not on the list (except 
for fish and seafood) is that they involve relatively more processing than 
raw items such as meats, eggs, fruits, and vegetables.
2 Inflation is commonly understood as a persistent and general increase in prices or an 
erosion of the purchasing power of a unit of money. More precise (and more operational) 
definitions are model-dependent. A cost of living index has a precise definition as the money 
cost to an economic unit (a household or individual) of maintaining a given level of well-
being in the face of changing prices. Astin (1999), in discussing the challenges of constructing 
harmonized inflation indexes for the euro area, provides a nice discussion of the different ends 
for which price indexes are constructed.
3 As stated on the Riksbank website (www.riksbank.com/templates/Page.aspx?id=10578), 
“Households’ mortgage interest expenditure is excluded more for reasons of clarity. It may in some 
cases be problematic for the Riksbank to explain why the immediate effect of a tighter monetary 
policy is that CPI inflation rises.”
4 Coincidentally, mortgage interest cost is also among the eight most volatile items 
excluded in the Bank of Canada’s core measure.
5 Bryan and Cecchetti (1994) make a similar point in reference to the exclusion of the 







































v = 0:007939 (6=):
This list makes obvious that the parameters ￿s and ￿2
c, as well as
those that depend on them, are set to di⁄erent values than those selected
by Gallmeyer et al.
The purpose of the di⁄erent choice of value for ￿s (0.85 instead of
0.922) is to isolate the ￿ uctuations in the in￿ ation-expectations indicator
induced by time-varying risk premia from those induced by the short-term
dynamics of the monetary policy factor, st, captured by the last term in
the second line of (58). Numerical experimentations with the model reveal
that deviations of that factor from its long-run mean (0 by assumption)
are responsible for a sizable fraction of the ￿ uctuations in the simulated
in￿ ation-expectations indicator when the parameter ￿s takes on values of
0.90 or higher. Notice that changing the values of this parameter has
no impact on the ￿ uctuations of the in￿ ation-expectations indicator that
can be traced to time-varying risk premia in the model. That is because,
as demonstrated in Appendix B, the autoregressive parameter ￿s doesn￿ t
enter into the coe¢ cient ￿c;n in (58), the one that ultimately controls
the ￿ uctuations of the forward nominal￿ real rate spread originated in risk
premia that change over time.
As noted in the text, the variance of the innovation associated with real
consumption growth, ￿2
c, was set to the value implied by the unconditional
variance of that variable under time-varying risk premia. It can be shown




















This method seems to be more in line with the empirical evidence than
the seemingly arbitrary assumption that ￿2
c = 1, under which Gallmeyer et
al. derived their theoretical formulas. As mentioned in footnote 24 of the
paper, however, those authors make reference later in their study (bottom
















































xclusion-based measures of core inflation—the traditional “inflation 
ex…” measures—have a long history. The Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(BLS) produced versions of the Consumer Price Index (CPI) excluding 
food and excluding shelter at least since the late 1950s, when those series 
first appeared in the annual Economic Report of the President. “CPI ex 
food and energy”—now taken almost synonymously with core inflation—
made its first appearance in the report in 1980. Many national statistical 
agencies produce inflation measures of this sort, and many central banks 
refer to these measures as guides for monetary policy.
For example, from 2004 to 2007, the Federal Reserve cast the inflation 
forecasts in its semiannual reports to Congress in terms of the price index 
for personal consumption expenditures (PCE) excluding food and energy; 
since 2008, the Fed has released forecasts for both headline PCE and PCE 
excluding food and energy. While “ex food and energy” seems to be the 
most common exclusion-based measure, others are in use. The Sveriges 
Riksbank refers in its public communications to a measure of consumer 
price inflation excluding mortgage interest costs and energy, while the 
Bank of Canada uses a CPI excluding the eight most volatile items as an 
operational guide for monetary policy.
Academic interest in exclusion-based core inflation measures began 
with Blinder (1982), who used them to analyze the high rates of infla-
tion experienced in the United States in the 1970s. In the 27 years since 
Blinder’s work, a number of alternative, nonexclusion-based measures of 
core inflation have been proposed. Silver (2007) provides a nice survey of 
this growing literature. Rich and Steindel (2007) present a comprehensive 
“horse race” among competing core inflation measures. Despite the pro-
liferation of alternative core inflation measures, exclusion-based measures 
appear to remain the most popular among policymakers, judging by the 
number of central banks that make some reference to exclusion-based core 
measures.1
In the core measures adopted by the Riksbank and the Bank of Cana-
da, the main rationales are evident for the exclusion of certain items from 
a measure of inflation. One is that the prices of some items, such as the 
service flow from owner-occupied housing, are difficult to measure. It is 
unclear whether proxies for those prices—or even the prices themselves—
convey useful information about inflation (as distinct from the cost of 
1 A comprehensive list would include not just the Federal Reserve, Sveriges Riksbank and 
Bank of Canada but also the European Central Bank, the Bank of Japan, the Reserve Bank 
of Australia, and the Reserve Bank of New Zealand. Some central banks make reference in 
their public statements to measures of core inflation in addition to exclusion-based measures, 
but I know of none that reference a nonexclusion-based measure without also referencing 
an exclusion-based measure. The Bank of England is alone among major central banks in 
making no references to core inflation in its public statements.
unconditional variance of real consumption growth for the constant risk
premia case.
As should be obvious from the list of parameter values, the choice
of a di⁄erent value for ￿2
c from the one selected by Gallmeyer et al. in
their theoretical section has a cascade e⁄ect because that parameter enters
into the formulas that determine the value of many other parameters of the
model. Consequently, the quantitative di⁄erences with the results obtained
by those authors may not be trivial. For example, if ￿2
c = 1, as in Gallmeyer
et al., the value of the parameter ￿v￿ the factor loading on the real pricing
kernel corresponding to the factor vt ￿ would be 32.22, the same as those
authors report for experiment C in their Table 1. This value is about ten
times larger than the one implied by the underlying relationships between
the relevant parameters in this paper.
Incidentally, the di⁄erence in the value of the parameter ￿s in the
paper, ￿0:86, from that in Gallmeyer et al. is not entirely due to the choice
of a di⁄erent value for the parameter ￿s because, even for ￿s = 0.922 (the
value chosen by those authors), application of the relevant formula in the
list of parameter values would imply ￿s = ￿0:92251 instead of the value















































living).2 If the cost of owner-occupied-housing services is proxied by mort-
gage interest expenses, then including that cost in a measure of inflation 
could mean, perversely, that a tighter monetary policy (a higher policy 
interest rate) causes a rise in measured inflation.3 The other main ratio-
nale for exclusion, evident in the Bank of Canada’s description of its core 
price index, is the elimination of highly volatile items from the inflation 
measure.4 This rationale, the reduction of volatility, will be my focus in 
this paper.
While PCE ex food and energy holds a special status as the core mea-
sure preferred by the Federal Reserve, the practices of other central banks 
make clear that there are alternatives to excluding all food and energy 
items (and only food and energy items). A look at disaggregated PCE 
data reveals that while food and energy items figure prominently among 
the components with the highest time series volatility, not all of the most 
volatile items are food or energy, and not all food and energy items rank 
among the most volatile.5 This fact suggests a closer examination of which 
items should be excluded if the aim is to produce an index with lower 
volatility than the headline index and still capture the longer-run trend in 
headline inflation.
In the next section, I begin the analysis by asking, simply, what are 
the most volatile items in the PCE? Rather than identifying the N most 
volatile items, for some N—à la the Bank of Canada’s core measure—I ask 
a somewhat different question. Food and energy make up roughly 20 per-
cent of the PCE by expenditure. What, then, are the most volatile items 
with aggregate weight of 20 percent? The list may be somewhat surpris-
ing. There are certainly plenty of food and energy items on the list but 
also computers, used autos, small electric appliances, women’s and girls’ 
clothing, airline services, and more. Also, many food items do not make 
the list—for example, cereals, bakery products, and “purchased meals: 
other than at schools,” which represents the price of meals at restaurants 
and bars. A common characteristic of food items not on the list (except 
for fish and seafood) is that they involve relatively more processing than 
raw items such as meats, eggs, fruits, and vegetables.
2 Inflation is commonly understood as a persistent and general increase in prices or an 
erosion of the purchasing power of a unit of money. More precise (and more operational) 
definitions are model-dependent. A cost of living index has a precise definition as the money 
cost to an economic unit (a household or individual) of maintaining a given level of well-
being in the face of changing prices. Astin (1999), in discussing the challenges of constructing 
harmonized inflation indexes for the euro area, provides a nice discussion of the different ends 
for which price indexes are constructed.
3 As stated on the Riksbank website (www.riksbank.com/templates/Page.aspx?id=10578), 
“Households’ mortgage interest expenditure is excluded more for reasons of clarity. It may in some 
cases be problematic for the Riksbank to explain why the immediate effect of a tighter monetary 
policy is that CPI inflation rises.”
4 Coincidentally, mortgage interest cost is also among the eight most volatile items 
excluded in the Bank of Canada’s core measure.
5 Bryan and Cecchetti (1994) make a similar point in reference to the exclusion of the 
component “food away from home” from CPI ex food and energy.
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xclusion-based measures of core inflation—the traditional “inflation 
ex…” measures—have a long history. The Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(BLS) produced versions of the Consumer Price Index (CPI) excluding 
food and excluding shelter at least since the late 1950s, when those series 
first appeared in the annual Economic Report of the President. “CPI ex 
food and energy”—now taken almost synonymously with core inflation—
made its first appearance in the report in 1980. Many national statistical 
agencies produce inflation measures of this sort, and many central banks 
refer to these measures as guides for monetary policy.
For example, from 2004 to 2007, the Federal Reserve cast the inflation 
forecasts in its semiannual reports to Congress in terms of the price index 
for personal consumption expenditures (PCE) excluding food and energy; 
since 2008, the Fed has released forecasts for both headline PCE and PCE 
excluding food and energy. While “ex food and energy” seems to be the 
most common exclusion-based measure, others are in use. The Sveriges 
Riksbank refers in its public communications to a measure of consumer 
price inflation excluding mortgage interest costs and energy, while the 
Bank of Canada uses a CPI excluding the eight most volatile items as an 
operational guide for monetary policy.
Academic interest in exclusion-based core inflation measures began 
with Blinder (1982), who used them to analyze the high rates of infla-
tion experienced in the United States in the 1970s. In the 27 years since 
Blinder’s work, a number of alternative, nonexclusion-based measures of 
core inflation have been proposed. Silver (2007) provides a nice survey of 
this growing literature. Rich and Steindel (2007) present a comprehensive 
“horse race” among competing core inflation measures. Despite the pro-
liferation of alternative core inflation measures, exclusion-based measures 
appear to remain the most popular among policymakers, judging by the 
number of central banks that make some reference to exclusion-based core 
measures.1
In the core measures adopted by the Riksbank and the Bank of Cana-
da, the main rationales are evident for the exclusion of certain items from 
a measure of inflation. One is that the prices of some items, such as the 
service flow from owner-occupied housing, are difficult to measure. It is 
unclear whether proxies for those prices—or even the prices themselves—
convey useful information about inflation (as distinct from the cost of 
1 A comprehensive list would include not just the Federal Reserve, Sveriges Riksbank and 
Bank of Canada but also the European Central Bank, the Bank of Japan, the Reserve Bank 
of Australia, and the Reserve Bank of New Zealand. Some central banks make reference in 
their public statements to measures of core inflation in addition to exclusion-based measures, 
but I know of none that reference a nonexclusion-based measure without also referencing 
an exclusion-based measure. The Bank of England is alone among major central banks in 
making no references to core inflation in its public statements.
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living).2 If the cost of owner-occupied-housing services is proxied by mort-
gage interest expenses, then including that cost in a measure of inflation 
could mean, perversely, that a tighter monetary policy (a higher policy 
interest rate) causes a rise in measured inflation.3 The other main ratio-
nale for exclusion, evident in the Bank of Canada’s description of its core 
price index, is the elimination of highly volatile items from the inflation 
measure.4 This rationale, the reduction of volatility, will be my focus in 
this paper.
While PCE ex food and energy holds a special status as the core mea-
sure preferred by the Federal Reserve, the practices of other central banks 
make clear that there are alternatives to excluding all food and energy 
items (and only food and energy items). A look at disaggregated PCE 
data reveals that while food and energy items figure prominently among 
the components with the highest time series volatility, not all of the most 
volatile items are food or energy, and not all food and energy items rank 
among the most volatile.5 This fact suggests a closer examination of which 
items should be excluded if the aim is to produce an index with lower 
volatility than the headline index and still capture the longer-run trend in 
headline inflation.
In the next section, I begin the analysis by asking, simply, what are 
the most volatile items in the PCE? Rather than identifying the N most 
volatile items, for some N—à la the Bank of Canada’s core measure—I ask 
a somewhat different question. Food and energy make up roughly 20 per-
cent of the PCE by expenditure. What, then, are the most volatile items 
with aggregate weight of 20 percent? The list may be somewhat surpris-
ing. There are certainly plenty of food and energy items on the list but 
also computers, used autos, small electric appliances, women’s and girls’ 
clothing, airline services, and more. Also, many food items do not make 
the list—for example, cereals, bakery products, and “purchased meals: 
other than at schools,” which represents the price of meals at restaurants 
and bars. A common characteristic of food items not on the list (except 
for fish and seafood) is that they involve relatively more processing than 
raw items such as meats, eggs, fruits, and vegetables.
2 Inflation is commonly understood as a persistent and general increase in prices or an 
erosion of the purchasing power of a unit of money. More precise (and more operational) 
definitions are model-dependent. A cost of living index has a precise definition as the money 
cost to an economic unit (a household or individual) of maintaining a given level of well-
being in the face of changing prices. Astin (1999), in discussing the challenges of constructing 
harmonized inflation indexes for the euro area, provides a nice discussion of the different ends 
for which price indexes are constructed.
3 As stated on the Riksbank website (www.riksbank.com/templates/Page.aspx?id=10578), 
“Households’ mortgage interest expenditure is excluded more for reasons of clarity. It may in some 
cases be problematic for the Riksbank to explain why the immediate effect of a tighter monetary 
policy is that CPI inflation rises.”
4 Coincidentally, mortgage interest cost is also among the eight most volatile items 
excluded in the Bank of Canada’s core measure.
5 Bryan and Cecchetti (1994) make a similar point in reference to the exclusion of the 
component “food away from home” from CPI ex food and energy.
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